Business World

The truth about the Xiamen Air crash

- ANDREW J. MASIGAN

At four minutes to midnight of Aug. 16, Xiamen Airway’s Boeing 737 landed at NAIA and overshot the runway. Minutes later, the aircraft laid debilitate­d on a grassy patch adjacent to runway 24.

It was unfortunat­e that the aircraft was positioned some 80 meters from the center point of the runway, 70 meters short of the minimum distance required by the Internatio­nal Civil Aviation Organizati­on (ICAO) safety guidelines for the continued use of the airstrip. MIAA authoritie­s had no recourse but to close the runway until such time as the aircraft is moved. The runway’s closure caused the cancellati­on of some 280 flights. Meanwhile, flights scheduled to land at NAIA had to be rerouted to Clark and other nearby airports.

Mayhem spread throughout NAIA’s four terminals as waves upon waves of passengers were stranded. Tensions rose as more than 40,000 marooned passengers tried to make arrangemen­ts for alternativ­e flights among just a handful of airline personal. Stress reached fever pitch as the airlines could not tell when normal flights would resume. Exacerbati­ng the stress was the sardine-packed conditions of the airport and its shortage of waiting areas.

Photos of NAIA’s jampacked terminals and horror stories of passengers flooded the internet instantane­ously. As expected, public outrage filled the air. Accusation­s were hurled against Manila Internatio­nal Airport Authority personnel, specifical­ly towards its General Manager Ed V. Monreal.

Among the accusation­s thrown at MIAA were: 1. That it did not have the safety protocols nor the equipment to deal with emergency situations quickly; 2. That MIAA did not attend to the needs of the stranded passengers; 3. That 34 uncoordina­ted landings occurred under MIAA’s nose; 4. That MIAA gave false hopes to the passengers by saying that the runway was to be re-opened at 12 noon on the day after the incident, only to extend the re-opening five times.

The dust has finally settled and we can now revisit the incident with objective eyes. Was NAIA Unprepared? Let me narrate the succession of events and you, my readers, can judge for yourselves.

First of all, it should be known that ICAO is very specific about the chronologi­cal steps an airport authority must take during crashlandi­ng situations. Four steps must be followed in specific order: The first step is to rescue passengers and control imminent fire and explosions. This should be followed by the investigat­ion of the wreckage, the gathering of evidence and retrieval of the black-box.. Only then can the aircraft be moved from the crash site. Cleaning of debris, fragments and rubble follows before the runway can be reopened.

This is how the incident went down:

At 11:56 pm of Aug. 16, the Manila Control Tower lost contact with Xiamen Air flight 8667.

Two minutes later, MIAA’s Safety Patrol reported that the aircraft had landed but veered towards the grassy area of runway 24 with its belly on the ground. Its landing gear had collapsed and its left engine was detached.

Emergency Plan No. 1 was immediatel­y put into effect. MIAA’s Rescue and Firefighti­ng Division (MIAA-RFD) was alerted as was the office of the General Manager, Assistant GM and Action Duty Manager. Within seconds, the MIAA-RFD dispatched all available fire trucks to the crash site.

Twelve minutes later, the MIAA Airport Police arrived to secure the area. They were trailed by the MIAA’s medical team to attend to the injured.

At 12:25 a.m., buses were deployed to evacuate the passengers.

At 12:30 a.m., the Airport Crisis Control Management Group was activated and was temporaril­y headed by Action Manager on Duty, Manny Rodriguez. General Manager Ed Monreal arrived five minutes later and took over as on-scene commander. His first act was to organize the immediate evacuation of Xiamen Air’s 165 passengers. This was done successful­ly flood lights and the like. The recovery personnel acted with extreme dedication too, ignoring fatigue and braving the lighting despite having a fuselage filled with fuel. By the way, MIAA was recently graded a 9 out of 10 by ICAO in terms of completene­ss of rescue and recovery equipment.

It took MIAA some 36 hours to reopen the runway from the time of the crash. For context, a similar incident happened in Thailand and it took them four days to resume normal operations.

All factors considered, I reckon that MIAA acted with extreme profession­alization, following ICAO guidelines to a tee. In hindsight, they should be commended for the speed in which they resolved the situation, not persecuted for it.

Did MIAA not attend to the needs of the stranded passengers?

ICAO rules specify that it is the airlines, not the airport

The dust has finally settled and we can now revisit the incident with objective eyes.

with all passengers safely transferre­d to a holding area in terminal 1.

At 2:10 a.m., the investigat­ive team arrived, headed by CAAP Director-General Jim Sydiongco, together with representa­tives from the Aircraft Accident Investigat­ion and Inquiry Board. A mobile command post was set up at the scene. Evidence were gathered and the black-box was retrieved. Initial reports point to pilot error being the cause of the crash. Cargo and luggage were also unloaded at this time. Meanwhile, Monreal and his team planned how to extract and transfer the aircraft to a nearby holding bay.

So as not to waste time, MIAA’s aircraft removal team arrived with their equipment even while the investigat­ive team was at work. They were on standby, ready to be deployed as soon as clearance was given.

The investigat­ive team took four hours to gather evidence. It was only at 6:10 a.m. that the aircraft removal operation could commence.

The plan was to jack up the aircraft using airbags, deploy its landing gear and tow the plane to a site where it did not pose a hazard to other aircrafts.

Upon lifting the aircraft one meter from the ground, however, it was found that the landing gear was jammed. The plane could not be rolled out. The only option was to lift it using a telescopin­g crane.

MIAA does not own a telescopin­g crane. ICAO rules do not mandate it to own one — having one immediatel­y accessible is good enough. Royal Cargo, a company based in nearby Multinatio­nal Village, owns this $10-million equipment. It is from them that MIAA leased the crane.

The removal of the plane took 26 hours. This was due to the time it took to deliver the telescopin­g crane to the crash scene, install its balancing weights, secure the harnesses on the plane, etc. Making the process more challengin­g was the muddy terrain, strong rains and lightning alerts.

Save for the crane, MIAA had all the necessary equipment on hand including the air bags, forklifts metal sledges, trailers, turn tables, administra­tor, that are responsibl­e for providing compliment­ary food and lodging to their passengers in case of a cancelled flight. The airlines are also liable for whatever damages may arise.

Records show that the airlines indeed provided food, water and lodgings to some of their passengers. Problem was, not all were given this courtesy. This is where the complaints stem from.

For MIAA’s part, they provided bottled water and blankets to the passengers of the crashed flight despite it being the responsibi­lity of Xiamen Air.

Inside the airport terminal, MIAA set up a special lounge for people with disabiliti­es, senior citizens and those with infants. Unfortunat­ely, the sheer lack of space was the reason why proper waiting areas could not be provided for all.

Thirty four uncoordina­ted landings occurred under the nose of MIAA.

It is important that we understand the context of this allegation.

The 34 landings were all recovery flights. For those unaware, recovery flights are flights that were re-routed to alternativ­e airports, but now landing in NAIA, its final destinatio­n.

As a general rule, all flights need to secure CAB, CAAP and the airport operator’s approval. CAB is the approving party for aircrafts to fly in and across our airspace, CAAP clears them to use the runway and the airport operator allows them to use the airport’s gates, air bridges, baggage carousels, etc.

Records show that the 34 recover flights secured CAB and CAAP approval. However, MIAA did not give them clearance to land since all gates were occupied with parked aircrafts. It did not have the capacity to accommodat­e them. The recovery flights landed, nonetheles­s. This is the reason why most of them had to wait several hours on the tarmac before they could be assigned a gate to disembark.

The airlines whose flights landed without MIAA’s approval are in violation here. In which case, correspond­ing penalties are being contemplat­ed.

 ??  ?? ANDREW J. MASIGAN is an economist
ANDREW J. MASIGAN is an economist

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