Amending the Constitution

Frankly, we have a quite talkative (“verbose,” as others would put it) Constitution. At 12,700 words, it is more than double that of the world’s oldest, longest continually running constitution, that of the United States which is at 4,500 words. On that score alone, a revision to our Constitution may indeed be opportune. Less talk, less mistake.

So, the least we could do is to make our Constitution leaner and more flexible: simply delete Arts. XI to XV. They have no place being there and their contents are better off left to the discretion of Congress. The “impeachment provisions” could be placed under the General Provisions.

Interestingly enough, despite our Constitution’s loquacity, it did forget to state a “Supremacy Clause.” Because, believe it or not, there’s no legal basis for actually saying that our Constitution is the supreme and fundamental law of the land. For some reason, the framers of the 1987 Constitution overlooked providing for something akin to Article VI.2 of the US Constitution. Indirectly of course, there is Art. VIII.5 of the Constitution. But that is as far as the Supreme Court goes. In any event, it wouldn’t hurt to put an express and clear “supremacy clause” in our Constitution.

Profound changes to our governmental system with farreaching beneficial consequences could be made without the need for constitutional amendments. One is that local government units (LGUs) can be further strengthened by simply amending the Local Government Code (not necessarily through the Constitution). The power to make investment, trade, and customs regulations, and provide education, welfare, and health services should be devolved to, with primary responsibility in the hands of, the provinces. The national Departments for Trade, Education, Welfare, and Health shall now be relegated to mere coordinating agencies. The LGU shall be solely responsible for raising domestic revenue and developing export markets. The National Government shall focus on merely addressing trade remedies and security issues. All LGU earnings shall remain with the LGU, with the consequence that no province is entitled to any more share from the national budget. This renders inutile the need for a federal form of government.

Another is our Civil Service, whose structure can be changed through revising the civil service code rather than constitutional amendment so that only department secretaries are appointed by the president, with the rest (i.e., undersecretaries down) being permanent employees of the government. This has the advantage of a more stable, professional, and politically neutral civil service system with better institutional memory.

As for actual constitutional amendments, one is on voter qualification. Raise the voting age to 25 years. Scientific research indicates that the human brain attains full development at about that age. Such, at the same time, corresponds with other scientific findings suggesting that the youth today go through an extended adolescence period, ending (again) at around 25 years of age.

Also, require all new voters to pass a civics exam. With the Philippines having a 99% literacy rate and considering one needs to pass various tests just to drive an automobile, it makes sense that voters prove their knowledge (consequently, the desire to have knowledge) about the country whose officials and issues they’ll be voting upon.

Whatever happens, we need to retain our current presidential and unitary governmental system. Our recent and quite unfortunate experience with the COVID pandemic shows the complete inappropriateness and unreadiness our country is for a federal form of government. Besides, any concern that local governments might have could readily be addressed by revising the local government code and not the Constitution.

Having said that, the Constitution could be changed so that the president and vice-president are voted together, with the choice of the vice-presidential candidate left to the presidential candidate. Whatever reasons given in the past for non-tandem voting, experience shows it does not work. By electing a team, the Philippines is assured of a more cohesive government, with the vice-president having better opportunity to be productive governance-wise.

Furthermore, presidents should be constitutionally required to have a majority of votes cast, with a run-off election if need be.

Also, a vice-president currently has a monthly salary of P325,807 to P374,678 (plus other benefits), so it’s ridiculous for this public official to not have any specifically designated work. Constitutionally, the VP could preside over the Senate, with voting power available in case of ties. Or at least reserve a cabinet position, preferably Finance (as that would be a serious training ground for one who should be ready anytime to assume the presidency).

For our judiciary, we should revise the Constitution so that only purely constitutional questions reach the Supreme Court, with all other issues stopping at the

Court of Appeals. For the latter, the Congress can legislate that divisions of the Court of Appeals be assigned jurisdictionally and physically to different regions or provinces.

Finally, regarding our legislature, our people have had enough experience with both the bicameral and unicameral versions to make an informed decision on the matter. A presidential form of government can very much work with a unicameral Congress. However, if we do decide to stick with a bicameral legislature, then at least have the Senate constitutionally converted to having its members elected on a regional or provincial (including autonomous regions) rather than national basis. This ensures greater equal representation. The Senate members could also be appointed from the ranks of the respective Provincial Boards, instead of being directly elected by the citizens; doing so lessens costs and makes the senators more accountable to the people of that region or province.

The views expressed here are his own and not necessarily those of the institutions to which he belongs.

JEMY GATDULA read international law at the University of Cambridge. He is the dean of the Institute of Law of the University of Asia and the Pacific, and is a Philippine Judicial Academy lecturer for constitutional philosophy and jurisprudence. https://www.facebook.com/jigatdula/ Twitter @jemygatdula