Amendment of a final judgment (1)

A decision on judicial foreclosure should render judgment for the sum due and order the same to be paid within 90-120 days from entry of judgment

What happens if the decision, which has become final and executory, in a foreclosure case is incomplete? Incomplete because it is not executable. Hard to understand?

In one mortgage foreclosure case, the court merely declared that the property was foreclosed and ordered the losing party to pay attorney’s fees. Ironically, the losing party requested a motion for execution, inviting the court’s attention to the decision’s deficiency. The court granted it and included what was needed in the writ of execution.

The winning party then questioned this, arguing that it was tantamount to amending the decision, one that had already become immutable. Under the rules, a decision can no longer be modified if it has become final. Thus, parties are bound to abide by the decision no matter what. What is the Supreme Court’s stand regarding this matter? Can the decision really be modified? Or will supplying the deficiency in a writ of execution be sufficient?

“It is rather unfortunate that the present case reached this stage when the controversy could have been averted if only the courts a quo had properly applied Rules 68, Sections 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. On account of this inadvertence, the Petition is partially impressed with merit.

A decision on judicial foreclosure should render judgment for the sum due and order payment within 90-120 days from the entry of judgment.

Rule 68, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides for the manner of resolving an action for foreclosure and enumerates the contents of the judgment thereon. Section 2 reads as follows:

Section 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. — If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation, including interest and other charges as approved by the court, and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to the court or to the judgment obligee within a period of not less than 90 days nor more than 120 days from the entry of judgment and that in default of such payment, the property shall be sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment.

Section 2 expressly mandates the trial court (1) to render judgment on the amount due and thereafter (2) order the judgment debtor to pay the sum within 90 days but no longer than 120 days from entry of judgment. It is only when the judgment debtor defaults from paying the amount that the trial court shall order the property sold at public auction following the guidelines under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

A plain reading of the fallo of the 17 February 2011 Decision shows that the RTC, Branch 153 merely declared the disputed property as foreclosed, and ordered spouses Tiglao to pay for attorney’s fees in the amount of P60,000. It is evident therefrom that it should have strictly adhered to the requirements in Section 2 by indicating the amount and the period to pay the same. It bears emphasis that there was nothing erroneous with the decision, only that it was incomplete in view of the requirements laid down by Rule 68, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.

It is only when the judgment debtor defaults from paying the amount that the trial court shall order the property sold at public auction following the guidelines under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Interestingly, the RTC, Branch 153, had been sufficiently apprised of such omission when spouses Tiglao ironically moved for the execution of the 17 February 2011 decision. Spouses Tiglao pointed out that the Decision was silent as to how it can be executed pursuant to Rule 68, Section 2.

Despite this information, the RTC, Branch 153, merely granted the Motion mainly because of spouses Tiglao’s averments and spouses Lontoc’s manifestation that they had no objection against the Motion. At this point, the RTC, Branch 153, committed the error of granting the Motion instead of merely amending its 17 February 2011 decision.

(To be continued)