Duterte school of foreign policy
(Part I)
By
THERE are many ways to describe Duterte’s foreign policy, from “fast and furious” to “shock and awe.” There were a lot of “sound and fury” too in between. But beyond the media headlines and his controversial rhetoric – what Filipino historian Vicente Rafael aptly described as “semiotic overdrive” – there are some underlying patterns (or method to the seeming madness) of our tough-talking President’s foreign policy.
First of all, it is crucial to recognize that our foreign policy isn’t necessarily what Duterte says. It is ultimately what his administration does, refused to do, or equivocated on, based on a complex interplay of internal debates and external pressure. As I wrote in one of my The New York Times columns, the institutional interests and paradigmatic preferences of key constituencies, particularly the Armed Forces of the Philippines, mediate Duterte’s foreign policy.
This is mainly because the men in uniform enjoy the deep respect of the commander-in-chief. To put things into perspective, Duterte has appointed six former and current AFP chiefs of staff to senior cabinet positions, among 59 former military and police officials currently serving in top government positions. It is more or less an open secret that the AFP remains largely suspicious of China, communist rebels, and lukewarm on Russia, while viewing America as a critical partner, if not insurance policy against internal and external threats.
This brings us to the second key element of Duterte’s foreign policy, which is our continually robust relations with tried and tested allies, namely Washington as well as other Western partners such as Australia. Last month, on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, I had a chance to briefly talk to Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull as well as top American defense officials, namely Admiral Harry Harris of the US Pacific Command. Both of them reiterated that bilateral security relations with the Philippines are not only as good as ever, but they will, especially in the case of America, likely expand due to the ongoing operations in Mindanao. As Admiral Harris told me: “We are involved in activities in Mindanao to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines take the fight to ISIS in the Philippines. I think that is a recognition of how important our relationship with the Philippines is…”
At this point, it seems that our traditional allies, which have deployed Special Forces, drones, surveillance aircraft, and equipment to the Battle of Marawi, are more focused on shared threats, namely the Islamic State, rather than recent disagreements on human rights issues. In the case of President Donald Trump, he seems even sympathetic, if not fully partial to, Duterte’s war on drugs, which has been heavily criticized by human rights groups as well as key partners such as the European Union.
The third factor is Duterte’s hyperactive diplomacy. Despite his advanced age (72), and concerns over his health, Duterte has, in less than a year, clocked in 77,542 miles in mileage, visiting 17 countries throughout 21 foreign trips. He has almost matched the record of President Fidel Ramos throughout his entire term. This is quite a huge leap for a former provincial mayor, who had limited international engagements throughout much of his political career.