‘Hiya,’ trust, and fairness

AT the turn of the last century when the Spanish influence was still strong in our country, “sin verguenza” was a pejorative term that people, even those who did not speak Spanish, used to describe one who is shameless. In Tagalog, we used the literal translation – “walang hiya” – to express the same exact sense.

Since then, we have lost the use of Spanish expressions or have co-opted many of them into our language so that they ceased to be Spanish at all. A good example of this absorption is the show of concern or common greeting “Como esta usted?” which has become the Tagalog “kumusta ka?”

Another notable change in language is the change in the subtle meaning of some of the common terms we used. “Walang hiya” was a very serious imputation that, in days gone by, could have merited a charge under our penal laws. It was then a term that did not only refer to one’s personal values and resulting characteristic; it implied as well one’s relationship with his neighbors or community – the lack of regard for what the community values.

These days, “walang hiya” has become a common cuss or dirty word, in the same manner that “p ***** i**,” as used, has lost its literal meaning. The latter has ceased to be understood as an imputation against one’s revered mother. It is now also a cuss word that even our highest officials use in public. In fact, in these days of gender equality, even the term “puta” (in the original, una mujer promiscua o de moral cuestionable o reprensible) may no longer carry its original meaning and implications.

The continued use of the same words or terms but with changed or newer subtle meanings can only mean that the community using the words has itself changed. In “hiya,” the sense of shame may have changed both with respect to the person described as “walang hiya” and with the community itself where that person lives.

I recall that in the days gone by, a jueteng operator lived in the margins of his community; he operated under a different set of standards and was not allowed or was merely tolerated among those who had chosen to live within the norms of legality. Not so these days, although it can be said that gambling has now become practically legitimate and society has rendered its verdict through the laws.

This recollection leads to a comparison with the drug lords whose products now wreak havoc on our society; our governing laws continue to penalize the mere possession of the drugs they peddle. Why have these drug lords been accepted in some communities and have even managed to be elected public officials in others? What has changed?

The short and simple answer is that we ourselves have changed as individuals and as a people; “hiya” is no longer a controlling element in the behavior of the members of our society. “Walang hiya” has taken a new meaning as “hiya” is no longer taken seriously. Thus, one accused of a wrongdoing does not need to worry about facing his neighbors after he has issued a denial and made an appeal to the “truth,” the one-size-fits-all cloak that people believe can magically shield them.

This development is a very troubling one for our society in many respects. But one particular cause for concern for me, based on my past government experience, is in society’s views and attitudes towards trust and fairness, the concepts that underlie an efficient public service. I fear that significant changes might have already transpired, and future changes may yet come emanating from the people served as well as from our public servants.

Negative future developments can come via the awaited constitutional change if the amendments would relax, rather than tighten, the present constitutional terms on accountability of public officers. I consider this as a development from the people served as constitutional change comes from the act of the sovereign people.

Under the Constitution, our highest officials – the President, the vice presidents, the Justices of the Supreme Court and the members of the Constitutional Commissions – cannot be removed from office except by impeachment. These are our officials who have been given the highest trust and widest discretion in the exercise of their functions and who must, in return, fully respect the trust reposed in them. They are removable only by impeachment to shield them and leave them free to exercise their functions fully, without however rendering them totally immune from responsibility.

Aside from extending its reach, the Constitution also touched on the grounds for impeachment. The 1935 Constitution simply provided for treason, bribery, or other high crimes as impeachment grounds. The current 1987 Constitution provides for stricter and broader grounds.

Thus today, culpable violation of the Constitution (i.e., an act that violates both our Constitution and our criminal laws) is a ground for impeachment. Aside from treason and bribery, the 1987 Constitution has added “graft and corruption,” as well as “other high crimes.” The latter apparently refer to crimes other than those listed, but which share the “high” character of these listed crimes.

Separately from crimes, the 1987 Constitution provides for “betrayal of public trust” as an additional ground. This ground specifically focuses on the impeachable officials whose acts may be contrary to the high level of trust their offices repose in them.

The current Constitution leaves no doubt as to what public office is and what public trust entails. It provides: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

For members of the judiciary, the Constitution provides an added standard: A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Competence relates to knowledge of the law, the judiciary’s standards in resolving violations of rights and the existence of grave abuse of discretion. Integrity, at its simplest, is the quality of being honest and fair. Probity means adherence to the highest principles and ideals. Independence particularly refers to the need for magistrates to act and decide on their own, without bias and without yielding to pressures from external influences.

By separating the ground of “betrayal of public trust” from the preceding listing of impeachable crimes, the Constitution obviously intended to convey the idea that the acts under this ground do not need to be punishable as crimes in the way that violations of the Constitution must be “culpable” to be impeachable grounds.

Hence, breaches of trust and fairness by justices do not need to be a “high crime” nor carry the characteristic of being “high” in order to be considered impeachable, although not every misdeed can qualify as a breach of public trust. For example, an erroneous decision, in the absence of gross incompetence or malice, cannot qualify as a betrayal of public trust. The best standard to consider on this point is the word “betrayal.” The presence of malice in violating a sworn duty, for example, should qualify an act as a betrayal irrespective of the weight or nature of the act committed because malice and trust cannot exist side by side.

When the time for constitutional amendments comes, these standards should be among the leading concerns that should preoccupy the people as the party whose rights the Constitution protects and whom the Constitution will primarily affect.

It will be up to us, the people, to ask: Will the amendments loosen public service standards, and can we introduce changes to tighten up the standards that inappropriate application and interpretation have watered down?

As I mentioned above, public servants, too, can change our governing norms of trust and fairness in the public service when they slowly and in gradual stages deviate from these norms without objection from the people, thus effectively lowering these norms. After a time, these lowered standards effectively become the new normal for those in public office.

An example, although not in the context of impeachment, is the use of cuss words in public; their use can conceivably become acceptable if used often enough by high officials with no signs of disapproval from the public. The same can happen anywhere in the public service, even in the judiciary on the question of trust and fairness, when nobody complains or is bold enough to complain for the acts of justices and judges.

People should always remember that even small abuses, when disregarded, can become lethal. This is how the frog, in slowly heated water, ends up boiled and dead! Readers can contact the author at jadb.legalfront.mb@gmail.com