Identification of the offender

“[T]HE… identification of the author of a crime should be the primal concern of criminal prosecution in any civilized legal system. Corollary to this is the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused” (Concha, et al. v. People, G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018 citing People v. Arapok).

“All these must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt… and without solace from the weakness of the defense. Thus, even if the defense of the accused may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the prosecution failed to discharge the onus on his identity and culpability” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).

The identification of the offender can take place in-court or out-of-court.

The former is subject to the exacting requirements of cross-examination while the latter, being conducted in law enforcement establishments, is not bound by the rules of a court proceeding.

The Supreme Court said “the testimonies from aggrieved parties should not simplistically be equated to or treated as testimonies from detached parties…”

However, the Supreme Court “recognizes the ‘probative weight of an in-court identification is largely dependent upon an out-of-court identification’.” Thus, it is necessary to determine if the conduct of the latter is above suspicion.” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).

“Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification…, mug shots where photographs [ of suspects] are shown to the witness…, [ or] thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up…” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).

“Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018 citing People v. Teehankee).

In resolving the admissibility of outof-court identification of suspects, the Supreme Court has adopted the “totality of circumstances” test where the following factors are considered:

“(1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018 citing People v. Teehankee).

In the case of Concha, et al. v. People, the victim of carnapping, Macutay, failed to provide descriptions of his attackers when he reported the incident to the police.

He “did not describe them as to their height, skin color, clothes, or any distinguishing mark that could have made them stand out” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).

Further, “Macutay was admittedly scared and confused, which reduced his degree of attention. His disorientation was apparent when he gave his watch, wallet, and even his t-shirt to his assailants as soon as he heard ‘holdup.’ He did not even wait for them to tell him what they needed from him” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).

“[I]t was not shown how certain Macutay was in his identification of [the accused]. Without any prior description, the basis of his identification is questionable. It also remains uncertain whether the t-shirt that petitioner Concha wore during the police show-up was the same t-shirt that Macutay gave to his assailants…” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).

“Finally, the out-of-court identification was tainted with improper suggestion… When Macutay, the sole witness, was invited by the police to identify his assailants, his mind was already conditioned that he would come face-to face with the persons who robbed him” (G.R. 208114, October 3, 2018).

“Both verbal and non-verbal information might become inappropriate cues or suggestions to a witness. In appraising the suggestiveness of identification procedures, this Court has previously considered prior or contemporaneous actions of law enforcers, prosecutors, media, or even fellow witnesses” (People v. Nuñez, G.R. 209342, October 4, 2017).

“The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the degree of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the moment of identification. What is most critical here is the initial identification made by the witness during investigation and case build-up, not identification during trial” (G.R. 209342, October 4, 2017).

“A witness’ certainty is tested in court during cross- examination. In several instances, this Court has considered a witness’ straight and candid recollection of the incident, undiminished by the rigors of cross- examination as an indicator of credibility” ( G. R. 209342, October 4, 2017).

“Still, certainty on the witness stand is by no means conclusive. By the time a witness takes the stand, he or she shall have likely made narrations to investigators, to responding police or barangay officers, to the public prosecutor, to any possible private prosecutors, to the families of the victims, other sympathizers, and even to the media” (G.R. 209342, October 4, 2017).

“The witness, then, may have established certainty, not because of a foolproof cognitive perception and recollection of events but because of consistent reinforcement borne by becoming an experienced narrator… what is more crucial is certainty at the onset or on initial identification, not in a relatively belated stage of criminal proceedings” (G.R. 209342, October 4, 2017).

“‘It is by now a well-established fact that people are less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long retention interval than after a short one.’… This Court has considered acceptable an identification made two days after the commission of a crime, not so one that had an interval of five and a half months” (G.R. 209342, October 4, 2017).

In the case of People v. Nuñez, the prosecution witnesses were “not aided by the sheer length of time that had lapsed from the criminal incident (robbery with homicide) until the time they made their identifications. By the time Cruz made the identification, seven years and eight months had lapsed… [a]s for Perez, eight years and nine months had already lapsed” (G.R. 209342, October 4, 2017).

The Supreme Court has always been mindful that “[t]he greatest care should be taken in considering the identification of the accused, especially when this identification is made by a sole witness and the judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification” (People v. Ansano, G.R. 232455, December 2, 2020).