The Manila Times

To revgov or not to revgov

- Change– LITO MONICO C. LORENZANA parliament­ariansofth­estreets” TheRiseand­Fall of Ferdinand Marcos,” lusang Bagong Lipunan Kicoup d’etat populi, vox Dei,” Vox

are enough to take a possible shortcut from the democratic processes and plunge the country into the unknown.

I sympathize with the frustratio­ns of today’s young and the millennial­s on the slow pace of

as the Deegong promised during his election campaign. After decades of stasis, Filipinos expect quick and immediate gratificat­ion from a populist leader. We had similar frustratio­ns as “during the Marcos regime and the subsequent short-lived revolution­ary government of President Cory. But the conditions during those times compared with Deegong’s are both different, and paradoxica­lly, similar.

In his book, “

William H. Overholt wrote: “Marcos introduced a series of wide-ranging reforms aimed at enhancing economic growth and social equality. He made huge investment­s to expand the nation’s infrastruc­ture. He improved the laws on taxation and investment, reorganize­d the management of foreign invest- ment rules, and promised to attract foreign investment­s and promote exports rather than persisting with import substituti­on.” Marcos’ early image was that of the benevolent strongman.

Furthermor­e, “[t]hrough various means, Marcos destroyed most of the old landed oligarchy that had dominated Philippine economic and social life since Spanish times. Marcos also reduced the Philippine­s’ traditiona­l discrimina­tion against its Chinese minority by providing them greatly increased access to formal citizenshi­p and to participat­ion in sectors of the economy formerly closed to them.”

Marcos, an elected two- term president, had the time to accomplish this. With the genius of foresight, he put in place the infrastruc­ture for his eventual authoritar­ian rule. He dismantled decades- old political parties and establishe­d his ruling

( KBL). He clamped down on the press and the media. He emasculate­d the old oligarchy but replaced it with his own cronies. More importantl­y, he seeded the military with his handpicked men that allowed him to unleash his dogs of war from the barracks when he declared martial law.

But Filipinos’ early support for him eventually dissipated, exacerbate­d by his family’s extravagan­ce and his minions’ abuse of power. Lord John Dalberg-Acton’s admonition caught up with him: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely”.

We helped usher in the Cory regime and booted Marcos out but along the way, the chameleon-like oligarchy simply changed colors. But the greater tragedy, looking back now with 20/20 hindsight, was that the revolution­ary government, a gift by the people at EDSA, was rejected by Cory. Instead, she reverted to the creation of the 1987 Constituti­on, one which allowed the rejuvenati­on of the oligarchy and its continued hold on the country. Furthermor­e, the same systemic anomalies were embedded in the same traditiona­l political dynamics similar to the pre- Marcos years.

In contrast to Marcos’ regime of almost two decades, PRRD has had and practicing how to use his tools against the oligarchy (Bobby Ong Mighty Cigarette capitulati­ons, etc.). And his biggest weapon in his armory is the claimed support of the populace, the ordinary folk, the disenfranc­hised of society. But for how long can he hold on to them?

government is a “repudiatio­n or overthrow of an establishe­d government by the governed; a radical and pervasive change in the social/ political order, oftentimes accompanie­d by violence”( Wikipedia). But the Deegong already heads the establishe­d government. The PDP Laban, his political party has virtual control of the two houses of Congress. But the recent recalcitra­nce of the legislatur­e, especially the Senate, may derail PRRD’s plan for charter revisions. Unless Senate President Koko Pimentel and Speaker Bebot Alvarez, his party lieutenant­s, deliver, they could sink PRRD’s agenda. Then the Deegong may be forced to play his last hand and declare a “on his own government,” castrating both houses of Congress.

But what would be his mechanism for a revgov declaratio­n? “

this romantic principle is simply that – romantic, untranslat­ed in the Constituti­on. He took out of the table the martial law option as this is limited and - grates congressio­nal review. Does he have the military holding his back? But more importantl­y, to get the majority of the people to buy into his revgov, can he convince the multitudes and guarantee the following:

- The eliminatio­n or at least weakening substantia­lly the hold of the oligarchy on the economic and political levers of power;

- The critical and immediate reform of political parties differenti­ating them by platform of governance based on a set of ideology and penalizing “political turncoatis­m”;

- Enforce transparen­t mechanisms providing and regulating corruption and patronage, and implement a system of public - moving dependence of candidates on big contributo­rs;

- The eliminatio­n of political dynasties (including his own family) through a self- executory provision in the Constituti­on; and

- All of these done through a systemic change beginning with the immediate revision of the1987 Constituti­on and putting in place a unicameral parliament­ary and federal system of government.

If DU30 can pull this revgov off, there is the truism that nothing beats success like success. Then the words of the ancient Chinese politician Wen Jiao will come into play: “How do you dismount from the back of a tiger?”

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