Smartmatic again in 2019
erations of the transparency server was clearly a serious breach of system operations protocol which raised doubts on the integrity of introduces any correction in a live, running mission critical system! The erroneous display of names was not a fatal programming error to begin with. If there was a pressing need to make the correction, such correction should have gone through the proper change management process.
The decision to exercise the OTP was reached when the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc convened in a meeting on or about December 18, 2017. The OTP contract was reportedly signed by outgoing Acting Chairman Christian Robert Lim on January 12, 2018.
Three automated elections have already been conducted on a national scale. Is the Comelec not yet ready to independently manage the automated election system ( AES) for the 2016 NLE? It should be noted that the Venezuelans have had active roles in the operations of the AES in the 2008 ARMM elections and the 2010, 2013 and 2016 NLE. Why are foreigners involved in the operations of the AES in the first place?
Sixteen months remain the Comelec to prepare for for the 2019 poll exercise. It must resolve all issues hounding the Smartmatic system.
Among the issues that hound the Smartmatic system to this day is the absence of digital signatures on electronically transmitted election returns and canvass reports. Even as the poll body and its AES provider declare that election reports were digitally signed, IT professionals who had access to election returns via the transparency server observed that the results were in comma separated values format and did not bear digital signatures. The absence of digital signatures on election returns received via the transparency server prevented recipients from independently verifying the source, integrity and authenticity of the election returns.
paper audit trail (VVPAT), or what has become to be known as the voter receipt, was resolved when the Supreme Court, acting on the petition for mandamus (GR 222731), ordered the printing of the VVPAT. However, due to the tight schedule, VVPATs, devoid of identifying marks such as the clustered precinct and date of the elections, were printed by the vote counting machines.
The electronic transmission of election returns in 2016 was sig 2013 elections. Still, 3.86 percent of election returns, equivalent to about 1.7 million votes, failed to reach the transparency server. Acting Chairman Lim maintained that the poll body’s central server received the balance of the election returns except from a few clustered precincts. While it was claimed that the balance of the election returns were all accounted for, there was a lack of information on how they were received and
There was lack of disclosure of the complete set-up of networks. At the transparency server operations center, there was what was referred to as an “intermediary server” or “work file server” in 2013. In 2016, another server was uncovered. This was referred to as a “queue server,” the existence by Smartmatic’s Garcia during the preliminary investigation of the “ñ” case conducted by the Manila
The poll body needs to 1) be transparent in every stage of its preparations; 2) fully disclose the network set-up down to its components, including the transmission network; 3) adopt the appropriate information technology project management methodology; 4) adhere to established IT standards and good practice; 5) establish clear operational guidelines, problem resolution and escalation procedures, and reporting protocol; and 6) ensure that the proper IT security and contingency measures are in place.
Commissioner Al Parreño has been designated commissionerin-charge of the preparations for the 2019 NLE. Having previously worked with a technology company, Parreño possesses some technical knowledge and had undergone training in project management. His knowledge and skills will surely be put to good use. Still, he needs all the help he can get.