Of Filipinos?
changing the script would not have happened twice (one in 2013 and another one in 2016). Well, that was evidence that the AES used in 2013 didn’t pass through extensive Comelec didn’t bother to check!
The following day, May 14, 2013, AES Watch convened for a meeting to discuss a more pressing issue than the formatting error. It was the discovery by Dr. Lex Muga, one of the AES Watch members, of the 60- 30- 10 phenomenon which revealed that the nationwide election results showed 60 percent winning candidates from the Liberal Party, 30 percent from UNA and 10 percent from the rest of the political parties. I saw it with my own eyes when Dr. Muga was still in the process of gathering the data. Hence, AES Watch concluded that the unbelievable pattern was statistically improbable. How did it happen? Former Comelec Chairman Sixto Brillantes’ only reaction was that he would investigate the phenomenon. Up until he retired, there was no investigation made. He just let it go! But among the academicians, the 60-30-10 pattern was extensively debated. They said it was mathematically impossible. But for IT professionals, it was merely an act of unauthorized reprogramming of the canvassing and consolidation system, as simple as that, no debates needed. Just like what happened in Episode III (2010 testing and sealing a week before the 2010 elections and the tampered computer program of the seized 60 PCOS machines in Antipolo were manifestations of AES that had been meddled with. Even Comelec could not refute the AES Watch
Equally disturbing as the 60-30-10 phenomenon was the 76 percent success rate of Comelec in transmitting the election results from the precinct level, much less than the 90 percent of 2010. Comelec blamed the telcos for the failed transmission of the election results coming from the 24percet clustered precincts. However, the telcos said in a JCOC hearing that their facilities were 100 percent dedicated virtual private network not mixed up with regular data and voice that they provided the SIM cards to Smartmatic and the latter distributed these cards nationwide. This could be the crux of the matter as only Smartmatic knew what SIM card number operated with a precinct.
A month after, on June 18, 2013, Ombudsman for failure to implement the safeguards in the law and for entering into contracts grossly disadvantageous to the government and the electorate.