The post Trump-Kim challenges: Peace, demilitarization and US politics
- nuclearization. It is also about peace and demilitarization in the Korean peninsula – and overcoming
HERE are the facts: Following hours of closed-door talks in the Hotel Capella Singapore, President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a joint four-point agreement: to establish new US-North Korean relations, a stable peace regime, a North Korean commitment to achieve the “complete denuclearization” of the Korean peninsula, and the repatriation of the remains of American prisoners of war.
Unsurprisingly, the Trump-Kim agree-
“irreversible” pledge by North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. Yet, the current deal is but a framework to pave the way to ongoing discussions. Consequently, it could be seen as a promising ‘memorandum of understanding.’
US and North Korean leaders have never met before. So technically, a state of war prevails between the two countries. For these two leaders to sit down, agree on their differences and outline a path to resolve those disagreements is a very big deal.
Nevertheless, a real peace and stability requires far more than a four-point agreement. It is predicated on a bilateral peace agreement, demilitarization of the Korean peninsula and overcoming the obstacles of US politics.
Peace agreement
In the West, North Korea is customarily portrayed as a sort of paranoid hermit kingdom with demons as leaders. In reality,
America as an existential threat.
In 1951, after Washington had lost its nuclear monopoly to the Soviet Union, the early setbacks in the Korean War prompted General MacArthur to consider using nuclear weapons against the Chinese and North Koreans. The idea was to use radioactive fallout zones to disrupt Chinese supply chains; until MacArthur was dismissed by President Truman.
Nevertheless, between 1950 and 1953, the US subjected North Korea to a devastating bombing campaign, which destroyed 85 percent of the country’s buildings and caused one million civilians to die—more than the entire civilian deaths in World War II bombings of Germany and Japan, respectively. The scorched-earth policy set the standard of what was to come in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia.
Ever since the 1953 Armistice Agreement, Washington has seen North Korea as a “rogue state.” Even with the Soviet Union, Washington supported “peaceful coexistence,” but with North Korea, only a “temporary
of imminent intrusion in Pyongyang. In this status quo, Trump’s statement in the press conference that the US has agreed to stop playing “war games” with Pyongyang, referring to the joint military exercises with South Korea, is important. But while Trump added that he wants to “bring our soldiers back home” from South Korea, he admitted it was “not part of the equation right now.”
Typically, the decision to cease the joint military exercises with South Korea was not included in the agreement. That’s vintage Trump. Only days before, he had nearly agreed to the G7 Summit communiqué, which fell apart amid the controversial aftermath. In the Trump
always subject to changing circumstances.
Last August, former US President Jimmy Carter who has negotiated with several North Korean leaders, noted that, for a long time, Pyongyang has sought a “peace treaty to replace the [1953] cease-
want peaceful relations with the US and regional neighbors. The real question is what does the US want, really.
In view of the long record of US-led regime changes and the recently undermined Iran nuclear deal, continued worries in Pyongyang are not just a futile concern.
Demilitarization in the Korean peninsula
In a televised 2013 New Year’s address, Kim Jong- un advocated “a radical turn in the building of an economic giant on the strength of science and technology by fanning the flames of the industrial revolution in the new century.” These economic efforts should “be manifested in the people’s standard of living.”
It was an appeal to the White House. Yet, instead of seizing the transition in Pyongyang to work for the peace, President Obama opted for a Pentagon-led “pivot to Asia” that virtually ensured another half a decade of nuclear escalation. Armed with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s outline for a Pentagon-led “pivot to Asia,” Obama did not seek reconciliation with Pyongyang. Rather, the objective was to seize the opportunity to cooperate with the then President of South Korea, Park Geun-hye, the conservative hawk and daughter of the controversial former President Park Chung-hee.
Instead of rapprochement, Washington pushed for a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system in South Korea. As far as Pentagon was concerned, THAAD would kill two birds with one stone: it would subdue Pyongyang if needed, it could be used to contain China. These plans, however, fell apart in early 2017, when President Park was impeached and sentenced to 24 years in prison. That paved the way for the presidency of the more moderate Moon Jae-in, who seeks reconciliation with South Korea.
Nevertheless, Park’s conservatives were able to postpone the repeal of the Operation Control agreement (OPCON), which allows the Pentagon— not Seoul— to control its military fate. The mission of the South Korea/US Combined Forces Command (CFC) is to “deter hostile acts of external aggression” against South Korea by a “combined military effort.” The CFC is commanded by a US general and it has operational control (OPCON) over more than 600,000 active duty military personnel from both countries.
President Park managed to defer the transfer to 2022. In the event of war, US interests will thus override the interests of South Koreans—in their own country.
Impending time bombs in US politics
In addition to a peace agreement some 65 years after the Korean War and demilitarization following decades of nuclear threats, a true and lasting peace in the Korean peninsula also requires overcoming hindrances in US politics.
A sustained agreement is predicated on a Trump administration that will continue to support the talks. Consequently, it is based on the idea that impeachment efforts against the White House will fail and minimal losses for the incumbents in the US mid-term elections.
As Trump’s outline suggests critical bilateral moves in the early 2020s, the US-North Korean agreement is also predicated on another Trump election triumph in 2020 as well as continued support for the peace process in South Korea in the 2022 election.
That’s a very, very tall order. But in
historic step to the right direction.