50 years of the NPT

IAEA safeguards

The IAEA safeguards system has always served, and still serves, to verify the fulfilment of the states’ obligations under the NPT. The participating states’ confidence in the IAEA’s monitoring mechanism is a key factor in the sustainability of the nuclear non- proliferation regime. The IAEA system of safeguards needs to be consistently strengthened, primarily through a gradual universalization of the Additional Protocol, which remains a strictly voluntary matter for each NPT party to sign. At the same time, reforms, modifications and “evolution” of these safeguards would be justified only if the system itself remains objective, depoliticized, technically sound, understandable for the member states and based on the rights and obligations of the parties in accordance with the agreements they signed with the agency. Any new subjective elements in the application of the safeguards will inevitably make the IAEA control mechanism vulnerable to fleeting political interests, and hence lead to the erosion of the fundamental principle of noninterference in the member states’ internal affairs. This could result in detrimental consequences for both the system of safeguards and the NPT as a whole.

The reform poses the risk that information at odds with reality supplied by open sources and socalled “third parties” (intelligence agencies of different countries) will be inserted into the process of assessing states’ compliance with their non-proliferation commitments. Meanwhile, conclusions on the countries’ compliance with non- proliferation obligations are drafted, just like before the reform, by international bureaucrats in the IAEA Secretariat, and the practice is not going to change. In this case the nature of very important conclusions on safeguards would depend on the biased opinions of those bu-

mistrust of a certain information source. In other words, what had been a technical process may turn into a political one.

- est political oversight on the part of the IAEA member states over the reform of the safeguards payment on the long-term sustainability of the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT. Transparency of the Agency’s

- rameters of the reform is critically important for maintaining trust in the safeguards system. In our view, any conclusion on safeguards must be made exclusively on the basis of the information the Secretariat is ready to defend in an open discussion in the Agency’s managing bodies. Data

manner, as well judgments of the “very likely” or “highly likely” variety, may not be taken into consideration when conclusions on safeguards are made.

Iran deal

Nuclear non- proliferation goes hand in hand with peaceful exploration of nuclear technologies and underwrites further progress in nuclear science and energy. The increasing interest in peaceful nuclear energy, especially for power, is a pronounced and objective trend of our time. Over 450 powergenerating units are currently operating in the world, 55 more are under construction. There is also increasing interest in technical cooperation projects as well as in non- energy uses of nuclear technologies.

A serious challenge to the NPT regime can be seen in the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program, which was unanimously acknowledged by all the parties to the JCPOA as a key achievement in nuclear non-proliferation, and an example of resolving complicated non-proliferation challenges through the NPT. The measures under the JCPOA, includ-

as the mechanisms of information exchange, are unprecedented and give a reliable guarantee that Tehran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful in nature.

The situation with the JCPOA may have a negative impact on the nascent possibility of settling the Korean nuclear problem and may add elements of concern, mutual mistrust as well as suspicion to con-

Russia is aware of its responsibility as a founding and depositary state of the NPT. Ensuring the integrity and sustainable operation of the NPT calls for consistent efforts to improve the spirit of constructive cooperation within the framework of the NPT, to bring about a rapprochement in the parties’ positions on various aspects of the review process, to avoid unnecessary politicization, and to act with utmost discretion with regard to the NPT and any other international agreements based on it.