Transparency and the hybrid election system
SECRET voting, public counting. This is a universal principle in democratic elections. It is a balance between secrecy, that a vote cannot be traced back to any voter, and transparency, that the process of counting is publicly observable ensuring that all votes are counted and counted properly and correctly.
The same automated election system had been used in the previous three national and local elections. The same questions had been raised and will continue to be raised. Some of these issues were raised by Sen. Vicente Sotto 3rd in two separate privilege speeches he delivered in March. The allegations raised doubts on the legitimacy of the previous elections and the credibility of future elections if the same automated election system is used.
Concerned stakeholders raised the spotty and questionable compliance with R A 8436 as amended by Republic Act 9369, or the Automated Election Law (AEL), by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) in implementing the provisions of the law during hearings conducted by the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the joint congressional oversight committee on automated election systems (JCOC-AES).
The automation of our elections was seen as a solution to the ills that plagued manual elections of the past. The AEL sought to “ensure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot and all election, consolidation and transmission documents on ( order that the process shall be transparent and credible and the results shall be fast, accurate
the people.” (Section 1, RA9369)
The requirement for transparency has never been met in the automated election system used in the previous three elections. For the absence or lack of transparency, the automated election system implemented and used did not meet the lofty and noble objectives of the AEL.
In the recent Expert Group Meeting on Cybercrime that I attended in Vienna, Austria, one of the categories of cybercrimes identified was political crimes which include tampering of election results. The participants shared their experience in the automation of elections and raised similar concerns and questions as those that have been raised regarding our automated elections. The experts were one in saying that there is great potential for tampering with the election results because the transparency of the process is lost with the automation of elections.
The 2019 electoral exercise is just eight months away. Even as the issues raised by Sen. Sotto remain unresolved, the Comelec is in the thick of preparations for the 2019 elections.
At the end of the JCOC- AES meeting held last August 6, Sotto raised the possibility of pushing for the use of a hybrid election system if the allegations he raised in his privilege speeches remain unanswered and unresolved.
Rep. Gwendolyn F. Garcia of
bill on the use of hybrid election systems. The passage of these bills into law would be a challenge considering the few remaining days that Congress will be in session.
Supporting the hybrid election system, information technology professionals and practitioners would argue that systems may not be fully automated. The degree of automation depends on the requirements of the system as provided by policy and procedures. The AEL requires that the process be transparent. The transparency of elections requires that the counting of the votes be made public. The transparency requirement cannot be met if the vote counting happens inside the machine, hidden from public view. Further, the process must be simple and easily understood by the ordinary voter — the voter that does not have knowledge about the technology used.
The technology used in the previous three national elections did not fully automate our elections. The voting was not automated. If the Comelec found the technology used in previous elections appropriate, all
manual vote counting or technologyassisted vote counting appropriate. The manual or technology-assisted vote counting meets the transparency requirement of the AEL.
The other hurdle that proponents of the hybrid election system face is provided in Section 12 of RA 9369 which states that “the system procured must have demonstrated capability and been successfully used in a prior electoral exercise here or board ( The electoral exercise referred to in the law does not only
but may also refer to corporate or student council elections.
The automated election system provider, Smartmatic, prior to the 2010 elections, provided touch- screen voting machines, generically referred to as “direct recording equipment.” Smartmatic never had any experience with paper-based vote-counting machines. In fact, it partnered with another election technology provider, Dominion Voting Systems, which developed a paperbased voting and vote-counting machine, for the 2010 elections. Having gained experience and knowledge, Smartmatic developed its own paper-based voting and vote-counting machine and branding it “VCM.”
Our election system is unique and complex. It may be concluded that the Smartmatic-provided automated election system did not meet the requirement of
Smartmatic is not only the technology provider but it has been running and managing the automated election systems. Its representatives have been highly visible, explaining to the public issues raised against the system it provided. We should put an end to this. If the Comelec cannot do it, it should let Filipino election experts and technologists do it without ceding its leadership role.