All good things come to a head

WHENEVER we see fellow developing countries fallen on hard times, our instinct is to of course rally around them in solidarity, if not in practical deeds then at least in comforting words. That was the spirit of camaraderie enshrined in the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, and has since been carried over to the Non-Aligned Movement and the notion of South-South cooperation.

Well, over the past month or so, two large developing countries have

The currencies of both Turkey and

in value, and their economies have shown strong signs of trouble as a result. Not so long ago, Turkey was the darling, well-performing economy that attracted interest from around the world. Modern Turkey was the poster child of moderate

in religious tradition.

When the Ottoman Empire that had ruled Turkey and large tracts of Asia Minor and the Middle East was overthrown in the aftermath of World War 1 by a group of

republic which they founded was supposed to be a strictly secular one, modeled after the best of the modern Western socioeconomic system. The Turkish military has since seen itself as more or less the self-appointed guardian of such a modern secular society. Juntas were frequently installed over the next century, whenever the military saw that there was a deviation from religious moderation in a country where a large proportion of the population, especially those who refuse to be cosmopolitan in their disposition, remains deeply religious. Turkey was thus put in perhaps a slightly uncomfortable socio-political position, such that its politics vacillated between a strictly secular but brutal militaristic regime and one which can only be described as quasi-democratic (in the sense that there is at least a semblance of popular elections) but profoundly religious.

Turkey in recent years has voted in the second mode of governance. The government consolidated its power tremendously after yet another attempted coup two years ago. One way for it to retain popularity was perhaps the result of taking a leaf from its neighbor Greece, that of disbursing generous welfare

general populace. Greece landed itself in economic crisis nearly a decade ago, in the aftermath of

Greek banks and many businesses, in addition to the Greek government, were then on the verge of not being able to service their primarily foreign debts and thus risking “bankruptcies.” Greece’s saving grace came in the form of it being a member of the Eurozone, sharing a common Euro currency with some of the largest European economies. In an effort to salvage the Euro, Germany and France led other Euro economies in putting together rescue packages for Greece. Greece “graduated” from

Eurozone, European Central Bank and the International Monetary

I strongly suspect that Turkey may have noticed its erstwhile rival Greece’s continued popular

decades. Despite the aforementioned troika’s numerous demands and deadlines for fundamental

- cial and societal systems, the Greeks continued to vote in nationalistic governments which refused to seriously undertake such much-needed reforms. Yet the troika, especially

help but pour in more funding for Greece, as the Euro is simply too

experiment to fail, especially over the troubles of one of its minor members. Like Greece, Turkey has been borrowing heavily from for-

social welfare programs. But Turkey must realize that unlike Greece, it is not a Eurozone member, and in fact not even a European Union member state. European countries, if not the worldwide developed-countries community, would likely have very different attitudes toward Turkey from the sort of indulgence they have been continuously granting to Greece. The developing countries, however sympathetic toward Turkey they might be, are hapless when it comes to putting up the hard cash that Turkey urgently needs to service its debts. Turkey would be well advised to strap up its boots and undertake much-needed political and social reforms, in addition to

those in a position to help would likely demand.

Across the world in South America, it is frankly very tempting to derogatorily characterize Argentina as a “basket case.” Before World War 2, Argentina was one of the 10 largest economies of the world, with its fertile land yielding plenty of resources and its European cosmopolitan outlook reminiscent of a developed economy. But many years of harsh military regimes coupled with seemingly uncontrollable spending led to Argentina’s numerous national bankruptcies, the last time a mere two decades ago. But it doesn’t appear that Argentina has learned from its many previous bitter lessons, not to mention those of quite a few of its

- ment. It continues to borrow heavily from foreign sources. And it sees no problem in announcing its inability to service such debts.

Indeed the lessons take away from such frustrating cases would be that countries, especially developing ones, must not see themselves as privileged to be able to borrow heavily, especially from foreign sources. They should welcome foreign direct investments that could stimulate the local economy by creating jobs and building up industries, but otherwise they must learn to live within their humble means.