The elusive automated election system data sets

OUR elections generally follow four stages: 1) voting at the polling precinct; 2) counting of votes and preparation of the election returns (ER); 3) conveyance of ER to the city or municipal board of canvassers (C/MBoC); and 4) canvassing and consolidation of election results in a ladderized manner which goes through the C/MBoC then through the provincial board of canvassers (PBoC) and finally the national board of canvassers (NBoC). All four stages generate a lot of electionrelated data sets resulting from observation of the processes.

With the implementation of the Automated Election Law, or Republic Act 8436, as amended by RA 9369, voting remained manual. Voters had to make their selections of desired candidates per position using preprinted ballots. To make his selection for a particular elective post, the voter had to shade the oval to the left of the name of his chosen candidate. The voter then inserts his ballot in the voting machine, where internally, the machine “reads” the ballot and translates the vote selections into what is referred to as a “vote record” or the equivalent of “taras” recording on the tally board and tally sheet.

Following the close of the period of voting, the automated election system (AES) took over the second to the fourth stages of the whole process.

Prior to the automation of elections, the processes in the second to the fourth stages were observable in great detail. At stage 2, or the vote counting stage, observers saw how the chairman of the board of election inspectors (BEI) read each ballot and, as each name on the ballot was read, how the votes were recorded by the BEI poll clerk on the tally board posted on the walls of the polling precinct and by the BEI third member on the tally sheet on the table near the chairman. After the last ballot had been read, the BEI then proceeded to count the recorded votes. The tally sheet was finalized into an ER with the members of the BEI affixing their signatures and thumbprints. Watchers from accredited citizens’ arms were also requested to affix their signatures and thumbprints on the ER.

Interested individuals or groups accompanied the BEIs to the respective C/MBoCs to convey the ER, a process observed by election monitoring organizations (EMOs).

The canvassing and consolidation of voting results through the ladderized process were also observed.

All of the observable processes have been taken over by the AES, rendering the process non-transparent.

EMOs were limited to observing the actions of the voting public during the voting period, the actions of the members of the EBIs during polling precinct operations, and the actions of the members of the boards of canvassers at each level of canvassing and consolidation. Since the AES had taken over the processes in the second to the fourth stages of the elections, EMOs were unable to observe the detailed processes of ballot reading, vote recording, vote counting, preparation of the ER, transmission of the ER to various server destinations, and the detailed process of canvassing and consolidation.

Unable to observe the detailed processes described above as they happened, the National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel) opted for a post-election review of the processes. In its petition for accreditation with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) filed prior to each electoral exercise, Namfrel had requested a copy of various data sets generated by the various components of the AES. These include, among others, the respective logs of each vote-counting machine which contain all events that happened inside each vote-counting machine, including the machine interpretation of the selections made by the voter on

the paper ballot and recorded in what is referred to as the vote record — each ballot “read” by the machine has a corresponding vote record, the logs in each canvassing and consolidation server (CCS) with the C/MBoCs, PBoCs and NBoCs, the AES electronic transmission diagrams and the transmission logs from each vote counting machines to the canvassing and consolidation servers with the C/MBoCs, the transmission logs from the C/MBoCs to the PBoCs, and the transmission logs from the PBoCs to the NBoCs. Namfrel’s requests for the various data sets have been unheeded. Comes now the decision of the Supreme Court in GR 259254 where petitioners National Press Club of the Philippines, Automated Election System Watch, and Guardians Brotherhood Inc. asked the court to order the Comelec to disclose, among others, “transmission diagram or data/communications network architecture including all details of the transmission of the transmission router server and/or the “Meet-Me Room” and all equipment that will be used to transmit election results.”

The decision reads in part: “Anent petitioners’ prayer for access to and examination of the transmission diagram or data/communications network architecture of the VCMs, we find that the Comelec has failed to discharge its burden of showing that such information is not a matter of public concern or that it is exempted by law from the constitutional guarantee. In fact, such documents are matters of public concern and interest which should be made available, especially considering that unauthorized transmission and communications to and from network nodes plotted in the diagram or architecture may call into question the integrity of the elections. We hold, therefore, that were it not for the mootness of the issue, the Comelec may be compelled via a writ of mandamus to disclose the complete transmission diagram and data/communications network architecture of the VCMs.”

It remains to be seen if the Comelec will grant Namfrel’s requests for AES data sets.