A fund for joint development of contentious waters

IOBSERVED with interest over the past months the numerous reported encounters between the maritime vessels of various littoral jurisdictions in and around disputed territorial waters in the South China Sea. These incidents are but the latest eruptions in the series of longstanding territorial and sovereignty disputes among various littoral jurisdictions around the South China Sea, involving overlapping claims. There have been a number of bilateral and multilateral efforts aiming to resolve or at least not worsen the ensuing confrontations between the parties involved. The adoption of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea (DOC) near the beginning of this century was vastly touted to be the first positive step to bring about some semblance of harmony to the otherwise tense situation in and around the South China Sea. But two decades on, the march toward a more rigorous Code of Conduct of Parties on the South China Sea (COC) could at best be described as “slow and steady,” or more realistically as carefully negotiating around the obstacles.

And the obstacles are understandably aplenty. For one, issues on sovereignty go to the heart of any jurisdiction’s existential wellbeing. When sovereignty over even a small strip of land or sea is at stake or in dispute, the governments of the jurisdictions concerned would typically go a long way in trying to safeguard or reclaim such sovereignty coverage, or at least they have to appear to be assiduously doing so — otherwise, their governing legitimacy could be questioned. Moreover, issues of sovereignty are often compounded with those of national security, as the strategic depths of affected jurisdictions would vary relative to one another if their borders shifted. In other words, when questions of sovereignty and security are involved, it is very difficult to find compromise, not to mention concession.

This difficulty over the more grandiose sovereignty and the more existential security issues is coupled with perhaps the more pragmatic concerns over mineral deposits, fishing rights and access to shipping lanes, to name but a few of the myriad economic considerations when jurisdictions bicker over their territorial claims. The individual jurisdictions concerned would understandably like to scoop up most, if not all of, the maritime wealth that they could muster, more so doing it in what they consider to be maritime stretches where they could claim ownership. The minerals could replenish their public coffers, and the fishes could improve both the livelihood of their fishermen folks and the overall diet of their citizens. Stable and secured access to international shipping routes would also enhance imports and exports for these littoral jurisdictions.

But it is perhaps in these more economically oriented sectors where, at least for the foreseeable future, a glimpse of relative harmony and prosperity in and around the South China Sea could be glanced, not least by sincere collaborations among the various interested parties that are, frankly, often at odds with one another. Issues over sovereignty and security are grand and would thus take a long time to resolve, if ever. But issues of economy and of livelihood are real and are clear and present. The littoral jurisdictions of the South China Sea tout themselves as some of the fastest-growing economies of the world, but there are still huge pockets of poverty and underdevelopment in many of these economies that are crying out for help. To harness the much glorified South China Sea maritime minerals, basic industrialization has to take place in these economies. To feed their growing populations with the nutritious bounties of the South China Sea, food processing plants have to be set up and fishing boats built. To properly avail of the international shipping routes, a shipbuilding industry would have to start, and both port facilities and land access to their hinterlands have to be improved first. Other public utilities, such as clean water and stable electricity, must also be available to both citizens and investors alike. And the youngsters must be educated or trained well in order to join the workforces that are required to run all these developments.

I am, therefore, in a very preliminary manner, proposing the idea of the various interested parties in and around the South China Sea, and especially the littoral jurisdictions, temporarily setting aside their differences and sincerely joining hands in setting up a sort of joint venture development fund for the South China Sea. The development of the South China Sea for common benefits requires both funds and knowhow, but especially funds, for we are talking about trying to harvest bounties in often treacherous high seas. So, a development fund is especially appropriate in these circumstances. In order to skirt sovereignty concerns, the interested parties could arrange for their respective quasi-governmental or even non-governmental financial or developmental institutions to participate in such a fund, forking out capital for the fund according to their various capabilities.

The idea is to pool together a large enough fund that could meaningfully finance various developmental undertakings in and around the South China Sea. The fund must be professionally and not politically or diplomatically managed, with the various developmental projects in and around the South China Sea that are seeking the fund’s loans or investments to be adjudged and disbursed on their economic or financial merits and not on political and diplomatic expediency. Mineral explorations, seafood processing plants, port facilities, shipbuilding, rails and roads, water and electricity supplies, and even relevant educational ventures in and around the South China Sea are all viable candidates for financing considerations. One important consideration is, of course, that such a fund must be as soon as possible and, in any case, eventually be profitable and self-sustainable and not require incessant funding from the various interested parties; otherwise, it is likely to fade into oblivion even if its funded projects yield tangible results that improve the development of the region. Some parts of the fund should also be dedicated to constructing public goods such as navigational and guidance facilities in and around the South China Sea. It is also hoped that such a fund would be one form of confidence-building mechanism among the various interested parties that could, in the long run, facilitate the more difficult negotiations over conflicting sovereignty claims. Quarrels aside, lives have to go on, hopefully on full stomachs.