Son of the Iron Butterfly

AS co-dictator of the Philippines, Imelda Marcos enjoyed the jet-set lifestyle — something that her son, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., notoriously inherited from her. From the mid-1970s until her husband’s dictatorial regime fell in 1986, Mrs. Marcos went on dozens of international junkets under the nebulous blanket of “diplomatic missions,” mostly with no clear purpose or measurable objectives. Her now-famous visit with ailing Chinese despot Mao Zedong in 1974 did not seem to have any clear purpose other than the equally vague notions of improving relations between the Philippines and China.

Videos of that 1974 visit are still available on the internet. The Iron Butterfly and her son were warmly welcomed in Beijing, particularly by Mao. Historical context will help explain why that trip surprisingly became a success.

The possible motives of the Marcos dictatorship in pursuing that visit to China 50 years ago included the improvement of the Iron Butterfly’s (international) political standing as co-dictator and possibly the successor of her husband (see my column of Feb. 9, 2024).

Unsurprisingly perhaps, during the latter part of the Mao era, there was a simmering conflict between China and the Soviet Union. After Josef Stalin’s death in 1953, Mao was quite eager to recalibrate bilateral relations away from Stalinist chauvinism to a more equal footing. Though a communist state, Maoist China still believed — as they do at present — it was the “Middle Kingdom.”

Mao’s right-hand man Premier Zhou Enlai became a very visible figure in the historic Bandung Conference of 1955, where Western and Soviet colonialism were rebuked. In 1963, the Chinese also criticized the Soviet Union over the latter’s unilateral policy of cooperating with the West.

William Burr of the National Security Archive noted that the 1963 ideological debate between China and the Soviet Union paved the way for increasing minor border conflicts between the two communist powerhouses. Consequently, the Soviet Union “initiated a major buildup of conventional and nuclear armaments” in the border regions between the two countries, including in Mongolia. Some accounts even say that Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev came close to starting a nuclear war with Maoist China because of the border conflict.

In light of these circumstances, Mao slyly played the “American card,” or his active pursuit of rapprochement — defined by Merriam-Webster Dot. com as “the establishment of or state of having cordial relations” — with the United States. Chinese consensus toward rapprochement with the Americans took shape because the calculus changed from concerns regarding Washington-Moscow collusion against Beijing to worries about a possible Soviet military offensive.

US rapprochement with China was not a simple matter even though President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saw its importance for regional stability and Washington’s strategic position vis-à-vis Moscow largely because of Beijing’s nuclear capabilities and the possible effect of rapprochement to its vital Cold War alliances in East Asia. The US approached Chinese rapprochement very cautiously.

Modification in the strategic thinking of both the US and China paved the way for the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations in October 1971, replaced by the People’s Republic of China. This was followed by Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 and the signing of the Shanghai Communique, which essentially affirmed the “one-China” principle and promised to “progressively reduce (American) forces and installations on Taiwan.”

Yet, American official recognition of China did not happen until 1979.

Between 1972 and 1979, China was eager to accelerate its opening up to the West and its Cold War allies. China and Japan normalized relations in September 1972 largely as a consequence of the recalibration of relations between Washington and Beijing. Moreover, having positive relations with China was consistent with the national interest of the Philippines. Thus, the Iron Butterfly’s visit to Beijing in 1974 was in line with the international relations climate of the times.

In the October 30-Nov. 5, 2023 issue of Chinese-language news magazine Yazhou Zhoukan, editor-in-chief Qiu Liben wrote (translated via Google Translate) that the Marcoses originally pursued close ties with Taiwan but shifted gears to be in line with the American rapprochement with China in the 1970s. This time around, however, Qiu Liben warned the current Philippine President — the son of the Iron Butterfly — Bongbong Marcos about “falling into the vortex of the Taiwan Strait [and] getting lost in the political turmoil of the Sino-US game.”

I have written repeatedly about our country’s less-than-ideal relationship with China, particularly regarding the West Philippine Sea (WPS). However, the Son of the Iron Butterfly’s solution cannot lie with making the country a dispensable American cannon fodder in the precarious Taiwan Strait vortex through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.

Filipinos desperately need a prudent foreign policy agenda in the WPS that is authentically consistent with our national interests.