China’s sea power doctrine

ALESSON that China learned after the Opium Wars was that it needed a large navy capable of defensive and offensive operations. During the Qing dynasty, China focused on building up its defenses at the northern border, negating the need for a modernized and developed navy.

Around the time of the Opium Wars, the British exploited this weakness and used its powerful navy to get China on its knees. Finally, after the consecutive defeats in the First and Second Opium Wars, the Chinese government realized that modernization was needed in all aspects of its military, especially its navy.

The Imperial Chinese Navy was formed in 1875 to consolidate China’s regional navies. The restructured navy comprised modern warships mostly purchased from Germany and the United Kingdom. The navy reached its peak in 1894 when it became the largest navy in Asia. China’s modernization programs for its military were tested during the First Sino-Japanese War. Under the Meiji Restoration, Japan also experienced modernization in its armed forces. Both countries navies’ met at the Battle of the Yalu River, in which the Imperial Japanese Navy won a decisive battle against the Imperial Chinese Navy.

Ultimately, Imperial China’s modernization programs were second-rate compared to Meiji-era Japan. In the end, the Japanese won the war, and China was forced to concede to Japanese demands.

The modernization program of the imperial Chinese military ultimately failed. After the First Sino-Japanese War, imperial China rolled back on military spending as it lacked the funds to maintain a modern army and navy. In 1911, during the Xinhai Revolution, the Qing dynasty was overthrown, and China became a republic.

While the new republic did modernize the Chinese army by asking for aid from the Germans in the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War and later the Allies during World War 2 especially, little did the KMT (Kuomintang) do to modernize the Navy.

The PLAN

Fast-forward to the end of the Chinese Civil War, the new government began developing the People’s Liberation Navy (PLAN) toward the end of the 1960s. During the 1980s, the PLAN became the world’s third-largest navy, second to only the Soviet Union and the United States. Toward the dawn of the new millennium, the PLAN started taking a global role. In the 2010s, China built more shipyards to accommodate the need to create more warships.

At present, China now has a greater shipbuilding capacity of around 23 million tons, compared to the 100,000 tons US shipyards are capable of (https://www.businessinsider.com/us-navy-chinasshipbuilding-capacity-200-times-greater-than-us-2023-9).

Aside from utilizing its navy to achieve foreign policy goals, China is also adamant about using the China Coast Guard (CCG) as an auxiliary police force to advance its territorial claims and its own maritime laws in the South China/West Philippine Sea.

While most incursions in the South China/West Philippine Sea involve the CCG and not the PLAN, over the recent months, beginning with the third quarter of last year, PLAN presence has become more frequent in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea. This week, in particular, PLAN vessels were spotted in Scarborough Shoal and last week during a joint US-Philippine patrol. After months of escalation, China is sending more naval vessels and will most likely continue if tensions with China fail to de-escalate.

US forces overstretched

In his book titled “Asia’s Cauldron,” the noted geopolitical thinker Robert Kaplan notes that the United States will have a difficult time fulfilling its defense commitments in East Asia. While America spends more of its gross domestic product on military affairs as opposed to China, China enjoys the privilege of having most of its forces concentrated in East Asia with only one foreign military base in Djibouti, Africa.

On the other hand, America’s military spending is more spread out, with other commitments in Europe and the Middle East, and more recently, the Russo-Ukraine war, the IsraelHamas war and intervention against the Houthis in Yemen.

As a security measure, countries within the region, including Asean (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries and other US partners, are developing their navies to counterbalance the ever-growing PLAN and CCG. Asean countries have already started developing their navies, particularly the Philippines, which is keen on acquiring submarines as part of a modernization program for its navy.

Asean countries must continue developing their defensive capabilities aside from relying on the US’ commitment to its allies in the region. Asean countries, especially the Philippines, risk “finlandization” by China if it continues to rely solely on US support. While the Mutual Defense Treaty and our other defense agreements with the US, such as the Visiting Forces Agreement, have been beneficial to the creation of security in the region, one cannot ignore the simple fact that the United States is overstretched and may not be able to commit most of its forces. And China knows this, too.

(Finlandization is the process by which one powerful country makes a smaller neighboring country refrain from opposing the former’s foreign policy rules while allowing it to keep its nominal independence and its own political system).

Furthermore, we are still determining where the United States will go regarding foreign policy. The US presidential election and its results will play a detrimental role in the direction of US foreign policy. A victory for Donald Trump would warrant an isolationist approach for the United States, which would then roll back on its foreign commitments in favor of a noninterventionist foreign policy.

Asean joint security

To ensure that security is maintained in the South China Sea, the Philippines and other Asean claimant states must develop collective security measures that can stand independently, with or without American commitment. While no individual Asean country has the infrastructure to create or develop an armed force capable of deterring Chinese interests, it is possible to deter Chinese interests by creating a defensive bloc composed of Asean claimant states in the SCS, which would encourage collaboration among the different Asean states to protect our shared interests in the region.

While a defensive bloc among Asean states has not been formalized, certain measures have been taken to ensure collective security within the Asean. For instance, just last month, the Philippines and Vietnam signed multiple collective security measures focused on “incident prevention” and “maritime cooperation” between both countries’ respective coast guards.

Recently, the Philippines also committed to increasing its bilateral ties with Indonesia. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has also initiated more collective security initiatives by inviting Malaysia, Vietnam, and hopefully, other Asean countries to create a separate code of conduct in the South China Sea.

While collective security measures in the Asean community are in their infancy, I believe that this is an alternative option worth exploring, a joint alliance of Asean nations can deter China’s ambitions by collectively developing our armed forces, especially our joint naval capabilities, while committing to peace and development in the South China Sea.

China’s reasons for creating its powerful navy and coast guard are ultimately a reaction to its past. The negation of a need for a strong navy caused China to succumb to the ambitions of great powers. Ultimately, China realized it needed to strengthen itself as a maritime power to secure its interests in East Asia. However, will a joint Asean collective security initiative put China’s naval buildup in check? Or will the PLAN play a more significant role in China’s pursuit of regional dominance?