Appeasement of China as strategy for statecraft in WPS dispute
We should not neglect the discussion of an alternative policy strategy that pro-China apologists among us have been actively promoting as the appropriate and rational policy strategy for our government to pursue at this time. This is the policy of appeasement of China, which they contend can be a viable and effective policy for the nation to employ and is the best way to avoid war in the contested waterway.
The pro-China lobby characterizes as “belligerent and confrontational” the approach of President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. in navigating the dispute with China in the West Philippine Sea (the part of the South China Sea that is our exclusive economic zone under Unclos).
They contrast without blushing the Marcos policy with the earlier policy of the previous administration of President Rodrigo Duterte, which worshiped a policy of friendship and submission to China, highlighted by Duterte’s dictum of being “a friend to all and an enemy to no one.”
In their book “Force and Statecraft,” Gordon Craig and Alexander George include a full discussion of appeasement as a strategy in conflictual relationships in interstate relations. They wrote:
“The historical case against appeasement is well-understood and deeply etched in the consciousness of generations of policymakers and foreign policy specialists. In contrast, the case for appeasement is not well understood and lacks an analytical basis derived from historical instances when it was usefully employed in the interest of avoiding conflict and developing positive relations. Policymakers who believe it may be expedient to ‘conciliate’ a possible dangerous adversary or to engage in a ‘constructive engagement’ with him do not have available a historically grounded theory regarding the conditions under which what is essentially ‘a policy of appeasement’ is likely to be a viable strategy. Under what conditions is appeasement a dangerous policy that will increase the likelihood of war or a worse war in the future? But also, under what conditions is appeasement a viable strategy that will reduce conflict with another state and markedly lower or eliminate the possibility of war?
“Only now, however, is a scholarly effort finally underway to make a systematic analysis of historical cases of appeasement in order to identify those conditions under which it is likely to be a viable conflict avoidance strategy and other conditions in which appeasement is likely to be misguided and contribute to the eventual onset of war.
“In the classical European balance of power system, there existed a gradation of steps for improving relations between two states that was incorporated into well-defined concepts and practices of diplomacy. The process of improving relations might begin with ‘détente.’ which referred merely to a relaxation of tensions, and could possibly develop into ‘rapprochement,’ whereby one or both sides expressed a desire to address some or all of their disagreements with a view to possible agreement. This, in turn, could lead to an ‘entente’ — a limited but significant improvement in relations in which the two sides at least recognized a similarity of some views and interests, but with understandings between them limited to certain issues that stopped short of an alliance. Entente could then lead to appeasement — the methodical removal of the principal causes of the conflict.
“Following the breakup of the European system, the precise definition and sharp distinction among these concepts and practices were badly eroded. The history of interstate relation was marked by the experience of British appeasement policy toward Hitler, and various instances in which appeasement or conciliation either worked — or did not.”
Woven into the narrative of proChina apologists is the line that in defying China’s bullying, the Philippines is advancing the interests of the United States and not its own. In the words of Anna Malindog-Uy, a Filipino graduate student at China’s Peking University, who also happens to write a column for the Times, “President Marcos’ strategy emphasizes bolstering the Philippines’ military ties with the US, the trilateral defense/ military pact and alliance between the Philippines, Japan and the US, and the regular joint military exercises and naval patrols by these countries in the South China Sea.
The apologists long for the time when President Duterte made kowtowing to China the official Filipino policy. No doubt Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders have the same longing for Duterte’s predictable and now long-departed regime.
Up to this point, the Philippines and China have made clear the irreconcilability of their positions in the WPS dispute. They have exhausted the possibility of a negotiated solution.
China has persisted and continues to encroach on the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), absurdly claiming for itself “indisputable sovereignty” over our EEZ. And blasting water cannons at our ships in the waterway and surreptitiously trying to turn another Philippine shoal into its own.
Meanwhile, amid these trials and tribulations, the transition from President Duterte to President Marcos has shown marked improvement and modernization of our country’s armed forces and defense capability. More countries today rally to our side, and many have shared with us some of their military assets and hardware to assist in defending our interests. More and more are actively pledged to stand with us in the event of an unfortunate breakout of hostilities in the waterway.
Our country is in a much better position to defend its EEZ and its sovereign rights and interests than it was in earlier years and earlier presidencies.
As in the case of South Korea and Taiwan, under the stress and trial of persistent threat and intimidation by a powerful neighbor, the Philippines, too, is emerging from the shadows as a modern state that has become vastly more ready and capable of defending its national interest and territory. We have not had until now a more modern and better equipped armed forces. Nor have we had a people more roused and alert to the dangers posed by the ambitions and bullying of a more powerful neighbor.
Appease Goliath? Who dares to urge upon the nation such a grotesque and foolish policy in the West Philippine Sea?