Transitional justice for Bangsamoro, 2

T(Conclusion) he Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) went on to argue that transitional justice has bearings on the future, warning that unaddressed problems could serve as incubators for further violence, and threaten the durability of peace processes.

Other than recognizing that the recommendations are part of the details of the government’s Six-Point Peace and Development Agenda, there has been little progress on official actions on the TJRC Report.

The Marawi crisis, which by July 22 was already on its 60th day, is a compelling argument for more systematic work to deal with a past that is still very much part of our present.

The prevailing mainstream view is that the Islamic State through the Dawla Islamiyyah in collaboration with the Hapilon wing of the Abu Sayyaf is looking to establish a caliphate in Mindanao, thus the attacks in Marawi and other places. But the complexities that underpin the violence in Marawi are not adequately acknowledged.

These include problems related to poor dispensation of justice and bad governance at many levels that made groups like the Dawla compelling alternatives, and a culture of guns and self-protection a practical one among citizens; the confluence of interests among political warlords and those engaged in illegal activities such as drugs; and growing frustration with the twists and turns in the peace processes, among others.

Ironically, the effects of the proclamation of martial law prolonged security operations that included airstrikes and allegations of abuses in the past 59 days such as looting, arson, summary executions and discrimination are more pronounced now for those displaced by the Marawi crisis than the mass terror initially sowed by the Dawla.

A transitional justice-oriented approach will also help in the recovery of Marawi. The country, but most of all the people of Marawi and adjoining places, need to know the truths of and behind the crisis—and it will be plural despite efforts to reduce it to one reasoning.

The victims and the survivors deserve to be named and recognized. To restore confidence in the system, justice has to be meted out to those who committed abuses, both from State and nonState forces alike. Reparation will have to take on both material and symbolic forms, at the levels of the individuals, families, and communities affected, and also society.

Finally, responsibility for ensuring that another crisis like Marawi will not recur does not rest solely with government and the security sector. Together, the Maranaos and the rest of the Bangsamoro, Mindanawons and Filipinos will have to find ways of decisively foiling terrorists without resorting to means that will only create favorable conditions for terrorism to rear its ugly head again and again in the future.--

Ironically, the effects of the proclamation of martial law prolonged security operations