CHARTER CHANGE COULD HELP BREAK ‘IMPERIAL’ MANILA’S DOMINANCE

Since charter change is essentially a nation-rebuilding effort, it should involve a redesigning of executive power. This means moving away from the notion of a “single” and “all- compassing” Chief Executive.

We could soon be starting a national undertaking that is truly historic: we could be initiating the formal process of overhauling the 1987 constitution, writes lawyer Michael Yusingco in today’s Conversations. He believes decentralizing executive authority should be a main point in any proposal to shift to a federal government. “Fortunately, President Duterte is a firebrand who can successfully break Malacañang’s long-held chokehold on the powers of the state,” he adds.

Charter change is a core commitment of President Rodrigo Duterte. A few months ago, he announced that members of his envisioned Consultative Committee (Con-Com) on constitutional reform will be named after the Bangsamoro Transition Commission presents the new version of the Bangsamoro Basic Bill. This occurred on July 17, 2017, therefore the Con-Com’s organization can come anytime now.

Pertinently, the leaders of both chambers of Congress have declared that revising the charter will be treated as a priority in the Second Regular Session of the 17th Congress. Although it must be noted that their committees responsible for constitutional reform have already conducted hearings toward this end.

We could soon be commencing a national undertaking that is truly historic. We could be initiating the formal process of overhauling the 1987 Constitution.

With charter change just beyond the bend, it is worth noting that the very first matter discussed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission was the form of government well-suited for Filipinos. A query by the sublime constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is particularly relevant to us now, to wit:

“Should we continue a system where practically all governmental power must come from the central government, from Manila? Must we continue the over dominance of Manila over the rest of the country?” (Record of the Constitutional Commission, Volume 1, June 3, 1986, page 25)

The bitter irony here is that the 1987 Constitution still did exactly that. Consider first Article VII, Section 1 on the Executive Department, which states, “The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” Then read this in conjunction with Section 17, which provides, “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”

Three decisions by the Supreme Court paint a picture of the extent of the Chief Executive’s dominion over the country. First, the landmark case of Marcos vs. Manglapus where the executive authority of the President was deemed all-encompassing and absolute:

“The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.” [G.R. No. 88211, Oct. 27, 1989]

Second, the case of Carpio vs. Executive Secretary where the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or the “alter-ego of the President” principle was explained and the notion of a “single executive” was further affirmed:

“Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.” [G.R. No. 96409, Feb. 14, 1992]

Third, the case of Pimentel vs. Aquirre, which confirmed the enduring practice of top-down economic development planning despite its obvious inconsistency to the constitutional prescription of local autonomy, and thus further entrenching the supremacy of Malacañng in the overall management of government:

“But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, poli- cy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.” [G.R. No. 132988 ( July 19, 2000)]

These rulings all sum up to the reality that practically all public service mandates intersect at the Office of the President. Consequently, we continue to be burdened with an over-centralized government structure.

Since charter change is essentially a nation-rebuilding effort, it should primarily involve a redesigning of executive power. This means moving away from the notion of a “single” and “all-compassing” Chief Executive. Accordingly, the duties covered by this branch of government should be clearly allocated between the central and local bureaucracies.

The point to remember here is that the division of functions must be formulated in such a way that the assignment of accountability is unequivocal. We do not want a distribution scheme that leaves everybody clueless as to which government office can be held answerable for our dissatisfaction. Neither do we want overlapping designations that allow government agents to pass the blame for failure to deliver public services to our satisfaction.

Furthermore, to shed the President’s “supreme emperor” image, his general supervision power over local government should no longer be retained. The conventional view that local governments are mere “agents” of the national government is already outdated. The more appropriate civil law analogy to characterize relations between the two levels of government is that in the pursuit of national development, they should form a partnership.

To conclude, diffusing or de-centralizing executive authority should be a main component in any proposed federal design. And thus should be the primary focus in the charter change process. Fortunately, the man at the helm, President Duterte, is a proven firebrand who can successfully break Malacañang’s firm and long-held chokehold on the powers of the state.

Indeed, his obvious disdain for the trappings of the office and the ruthlessness he has displayed in governing the nation will enable him to ignore the bloody trail of dynastic politicos (his allies included) left behind by the deconstruction of the imperial throne in Manila.