The Korean nuclear issue: Past, present and future – A Chinese perspective (Part 7)
On Sept. 23, 2005, almost at the same time the Six-Party Talks were in progress, the US Treasury Department, without any warning, openly accused the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) of money laundering and circulating counterfeit bank notes to several North Korean accounts. The funds, according to the accusation, were used for “supporting terrorism.” On September 9, the US requested that North Korea’s $25 million in the BDA be frozen. Then, on October 21, the US blacklisted eight North Korean enterprises and froze their US assets. On the surface, the BDA case was not directly related to the Korean nuclear issue, yet it exerted a major impact on the progress of the talks.
The North Korean delegation came as promised to the first stage of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing on Nov. 9-11, 2005. In December, the US implemented another round of financial sanctions against Pyongyang. In the face of increased US sanctions, North Korea publicly stated that it would not return to the Six-Party Talks until the US removed its economic sanctions. But instead of ceasing to impose sanctions, the US Treasury Department stepped up sanctions in April 2006.
This not only put an end to any possible implementation of the agreement achieved by the Six-Party Talks; it practically set off a vicious cycle of sanctions, nuclear test, more sanctions, and another nuclear test, which has since become a familiar pattern. The escalating sanctions by the US did not stop or slow down the pace of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. Pyongyang test fired seven missiles into the Sea of Japan on July 5, 2006, and declared a successful underground nuclear test on October 9.
On Oct. 14, 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1718, proposed by the US. The resolution required all UN members to embargo goods related to nuclear weapons and technology, large weapons, and luxury commodities headed for North Korea, while urging Pyongyang to stop its nuclear tests and suspend all actions relating to ballistic missile development.
In October 2006, China, along with other members of the UN, did not want to give up on the peace process and continued to pursue mediation. North Korea eventually agreed to return to the Six-Party Talks on November 1. During this time, the US Democratic Party had won the midterm congressional elections, forming a majority in both the House and the Senate. So-called neoconservatism ebbed in the US, and the Bush administration toned down its tough stance on North Korea.
At the second- and third-stage meetings of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks held in Beijing on Dec. 18-22, 2006, and Feb. 8-13, 2007, a major success was achieved: a joint document entitled Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (hereafter, the February 13 Joint Document). It outlined a number of parallel actions, including North Korea shutting down its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon and declaring and abandoning all nuclear programs. The US and North Korea agreed to hold bilateral talks and the US agreed to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea’s agreement to declare and end all of its nuclear programs marked an important step forward.
After the signing of the February 13 Joint Document, the situation on the Peninsula improved and North and South Korea resumed ministerial level dialogues. The IAEA director general, Mohamed ElBaradei, headed for North Korea to discuss the details of closing and sealing up the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. On the same day, the North Korean vice foreign minister, Kim Kye-gwan, paid an “ice-breaking” trip to the US and attended negotiations on normalizing relations between the two countries, the first time such an event had taken place.
However, sanctions on North Korea continued to hinder the implementation of the September 19 Joint Statement and the February 13 Joint Document. North Korea insisted that the prerequisite for shutting down the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon was to lift sanctions, but the US refused.
When the first-stage conference of the sixth round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing on March 19-22, 2007, the US confirmed that the North Korean funds frozen in the BDA would be transferred to the Bank of China. North Korea promised to use the money for humanitarian purposes and education. Unfortunately, due to some “technical problems,” the money was not deposited into the designated Bank of China account. North Korea took this as a breach of the agreement on the part of the US, as Pyongyang had fulfilled its responsibilities while Washington failed to complete its part of the commitment. Therefore, North Korea declared that it “would take no further step” until the BDA problem was solved. When it was eventually resolved on June 25, North Korea resumed its actions to fulfill the February 13 Joint Document. On July 14, with the nuclear facilities shut down, 6,200 tons of heavy oil provided by South Korea arrived in North Korea and IAEA inspectors headed for Yongbyon to supervise and verify the shutdown. Meaningful progress in addressing the Korean nuclear issue had finally been made.