The Philippine Star

The Korean nuclear issue: Past, present and future – A Chinese perspectiv­e

- By FU YING

Another important internatio­nal event occurred in 2011 that is worth mentioning: In February, the Arab Spring spread to Libya, with people taking to the streets against Moammar Gadhafi. The demonstrat­ions soon evolved into civil strife. On March 17, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973, which authorized the creation of a no-fly zone over Libya. On March 19, France, Britain, the US, and other countries started to conduct air strikes in Libya, which had already given up weapons of mass destructio­n in 2003. On October 20, Gadhafi fell into the hands of the opposition in Sirte and died in a tragic manner. When speaking to the public for the last time, Gadhafi mentioned that Kim Jong-il must have been looking at him and laughing. Indeed, the DPRK kept a close eye on the situation in Libya. An article published in Rodong Sinmun on April 18 said, “In recent years, the tragedies of some countries which renounced the nuclear program half way under the US pressure have clearly confirmed the sensible and correct choice North Korea has made. …Only by doing so can the national and ethnic autonomy be safeguarde­d.”

Although concerned and wary following the events and aftermath of the Libyan uprising and the Arab Spring, which might have had an impact on its considerat­ions about pursuing the nuclear path, North Korea did not totally give up dialogue. Kim Jong-il remained committed to the “unconditio­nal resumption of the Six-Party Talks” until his death on Dec. 17, 2011. He was succeeded by his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, who initially continued the policy adopted by his father.

North Korea and the US held a third round of high-level talks in Beijing on Feb. 23-24, 2012, as the Six-Party Talks were yet to be restarted. The two sides reaffirmed their commitment to fulfilling the September 19 Joint Statement, stating that the Korean Armistice Agreement was the cornerston­e of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula prior to the signing of a peace accord. They also agreed to simultaneo­usly take confidence-building measures to improve DPRK-US relations.

Subsequent­ly, they separately released the February 29 Agreement (or “Leap Day Agreement”).

Although the documents were not identical, there were elements reflecting a basic consensus. Among the key points were: the DPRK should suspend nuclear tests and long-range missile tests as well as uranium enrichment activities, and allow the IAEA to verify and supervise its activities; and the US should not be hostile to the DPRK and should be willing to improve relations and expand exchanges. The US also promised to provide North Korea with 240,000 tons of nutritious food.

Over the coming weeks and months, the two sides made many claims and countercla­ims. The essential dispute was whether the agreement included the launching of satellites. North Korea argued that the moratorium on long-range missile tests did not include the launching of satellites. But the US insisted that launching satellites was included. Unfortunat­ely, what exactly was agreed to on this matter remains unclear.

On the morning of April 13, 2012, North Korea launched its first applicatio­n satellite, Kwangmyŏng­sŏng-3, and the US government decided to not deliver food aid as previously agreed. On May 2, the UN Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee updated the sanctions list, adding three North Korean entities. On May 13, the fifth session of the 12th Supreme People’s Meeting of the DPRK amended the country’s constituti­on, declaring in its preface, “Comrade Kim Jong-il has establishe­d our motherland as an invincible political and ideologica­l power, a nuclear nation and an unrivaled military power.”

On June 18, President Obama accused North Korea of being a continuous threat to the US and declared an extension of sanctions against Pyongyang for another year. On December 12, North Korea announced the successful launch of a second Kwangmyŏng­sŏng-3 satellite, which was widely believed to be a Taepodong-2 missile. On Feb. 12, 2013, North Korea conducted its third nuclear test. On March 7, the UN Security Council unanimousl­y passed Resolution 2094, condemning North Korea’s third nuclear test and issuing a new round of sanctions. On April 2, the spokespers­on for North Korea’s Atomic Energy Agency said that the Yongbyon five-megawatt graphite-moderated reactor, which had been closed and sealed in 2007, would be restarted.

In 2014, after the US and South Korea started the “Key Resolve” joint military exercises on February 24, North Korea repeatedly launched various types of missiles.

On May 20, 2015, North Korea issued a statement, claiming that it has achieved a miniaturiz­ed and diversifie­d “nuclear strike capability.”

The situation further escalated in 2016. North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test on January 6. On January 13, South Korean President Park Geun-hye announced at a press conference that the South Korean government would consider the introducti­on of the missile defense system known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).

On February 7, North Korea announced the launching of a satellite with a long-range rocket. On March 2, the UN Security Council unanimousl­y passed Resolution 2270, which in turn initiated a series of new sanctions.

From March to April 2016, the US and South Korea conducted large-scale “Key Resolve” and “Foal Eagle” joint military exercises, involving more than 300,000 South Korean and 17,000 American soldiers with carrier battle groups, strategic bombers, and other strategic weaponry. The scale of these military exercises was larger than ever before in terms of the degree of weapons and the number of participan­ts, and “decapitati­on strikes” were also included. Almost every year since the 1970s, the US and South Korea have conducted joint military exercises, including “Key Resolve,” “Ulchi Freedom Guardian,” and “Team Spirit.” In recent years, such military exercises have become increasing­ly large-scale and targeted. North Korea, in response and in preparatio­n, would mobilize its people into a war footing, redeploy military forces, and sometimes even recruit reserves to strengthen the standing army. Understand­ably, such a practice not only creates tension but also forces North Korea to expend a lot of manpower, materials, and financial resources, which has been a stress on the national economy and people’s livelihood­s.

North Korea conducted five more test launches of its Musudan missiles. On June 1, the US Treasury Department designated North Korea “a jurisdicti­on of primary money laundering concern” and, on July 6, it placed the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un on the sanctions list for the first time. North Korea followed this by firing missiles up to 500 kilometers (311 miles) into the sea throughout July and August.

On August 22, the US and South Korea started their annual “Ulchi Freedom Guardian” joint military exercises. To protest, North Korea fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile into the eastern waters of the Peninsula on August 24 and three ballistic missiles into the sea on September 5. On September 9, North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test.

Eighty-two days later, on November 30, the UN Security Council unanimousl­y adopted Resolution 2321 in response to North Korea’s fifth nuclear test. Most noticeably, the resolution imposed a ceiling on coal exports, which had been North Korea’s largest export material. China again called for the parties to resume dialogue as soon as possible to deal with their difference­s in a peaceful, diplomatic, and political manner.

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