Why Israel might want to retaliate against Iran
It’s easy to state a compelling case against the idea that Israel should strike Iran after Iran’s weekend drone and missile attack. Iran’s assault failed, spectacularly. Its vaunted long-range arsenal proved ineffective (at least in that strike), and the attack itself rallied Israel’s allies to its aid. American, British and even Jordanian forces intervened to protect Israel.
In other words, if Israel stops now, then it will have clearly gotten the better of Iran. A direct strike from Israel into Iranian territory carries substantial risk of further escalation, including perhaps a large-scale attack from Hezbollah and a two-front ground war in Gaza and Lebanon. Plus, what’s the real risk in restraint? If Iran attacks again, won’t Israel and its allies simply shoot down the missiles once more?
Perhaps not. While Iran’s bombardment failed, no one should minimize what it tried to do. As Gen. Mark Hertling (I served under his command in Iraq in 2007 and 2008) observed on CNN, Iran’s effort was comparable to the first day of America’s “shock and awe” strike against Iraq in 2003. We fired 500 precision weapons. Iran fired more than 300 against Israel.
As he also noted, the attack failed not just because Israel’s air defenses are so advanced but also because the attack was poorly executed.
As we’ve seen from Russia’s similar barrages against Ukraine, militaries tend to learn lessons from failure. If Iran improves its tactics (as Russia has) or cracks appear in Israel’s air defense, then the consequences could be catastrophic: a potential mass casualty event, making the Middle East a very different place.
Under these circumstances, Israel could rationally believe that offense is the best defense. It may not always be able to count on immediate, effective allied help, and degrading Iran’s capabilities could potentially deter Iran, diminish the missile threat and preserve the precious (and expensive) missile defenses that saved so many Israeli lives. Israel recently paid a terrible price for its lost deterrence, and restraint could lead Iran to believe that it could launch missiles at Israel again without paying a terrible price.
No one should understate the difficulty of Israel’s decision, including not just the decision whether to retaliate but also how to strike back. There is no clear, safe path to peace and security. But the wisdom of Israel’s next move may depend on the answer to two key questions: Can diplomacy secure Israel more effectively than an IDF response? And if diplomacy fails, how confident is the IDF that it can stop Iran again if another 300 drones and missiles fall from the sky?