Six days that determined the next 50 years, and counting

IN Israeli historiography, mixed with mythology, the Six-Day War was a famous watershed military victory in ensuring the nascent Jewish state’s survival, and establishing it as a regional power. The military accomplishments were obvious as the country’s territory increased fourfold by occupying the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza. However, it did not ensure lasting security or bring an end to the conflict with its neighbors. Moreover, it has stealthily changed the Israeli society beyond recognition, and not necessarily for the better.

Israel of 1967 was a tiny country of less than 3 million people, around half of them migrants and refugees, and with a large Arab Palestinian minority, which was treated suspiciously and as if it did not belong to the country. The young country was in the process of constructing its own identity, while struggling with security issues, and its complete isolation within the region.

Then as today Israel and Israelis were in complete denial of how the Zionist project affected the Palestinians. At no point did they realize the correlation between their independence and the “Nakba” (catastrophe) that had befallen the Palestinians with the destruction of many of their towns and villages, and imposed exile as refugees. The Six-Day War added an entirely new dimension to these issues.

By the end of the war Israel’s self-perception and its image in the world changed completely. It is commonly agreed that the war that started on June 5, 1967, was the result of miscalculation. All sides were sucked into it without clear strategic aims. By the end of the war, it became apparent that Israel was better prepared for it, but far from having a coherent and thoughtful strategy as to what to do with the vast territory it had just occupied.

For the more security-minded individuals, the outcome of the war provided a sense of invincibility through strategic depth, pushing Israel’s borders away from the population centers. For others, it was also a catalyst for the emergence of messianic-religiousnationalistic Zionism.

Some interpreted the quick and decisive military victory in theological terms, believing that such an outcome could not have been achieved without divine intervention. The main trigger for this line of thought was the occupation of East Jerusalem and the West Bank, which are the cradle of Judaism and the home of the holy places. The inevitable and misguided corollary of this approach was the Jewish settlement movement in the West Bank and Gaza. Five decades later this discourse took over the social and political debate in Israel with disastrous consequences.

Neither the security-minded nor the messianic individuals grasped the opportunities for peace afforded by the outcome of the Six-Day War. It became apparent to everyone in the region that Israel is very unlikely to be defeated on the battlefield. Nevertheless, this on its own was not enough to acquire the regional recognition that Israel longed for.

For those who supported the security paradigm, the territorial expansion provided an ostensible sense of security verging on arrogance. What they failed to see was that it increased the likelihood of war with Egypt and Syria and resistance, including an armed one, by the Palestinians in the occupied territories. It was Gen. Moshe Dayan, the defense minister during the Six-Day War, who argued: “Better Sharm El-Sheikh without peace than peace without Sharm El-Sheikh.” It took him another war and thousands of casualties to grasp the folly of this misperception and to become one of those who led the peace process with Egypt in the late 1970s, including a complete withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula.

For the more astute Israeli strategists the occupied territories were no more than bargaining chips, providing short-term security until they were traded for peace. In the weeks after the war, the Israeli government did try to pursue this line of reasoning by offering a swift exchange of the newly occupied territories for peace. Shell-shocked by the magnitude of the disaster of the 1967 war, the defeated sides were not ready for this. Regrettably, the Israeli side would go back to this approach only as a result of costly wars and Palestinian intifadas. Five decades later, trading territory for peace with Syria is not feasible in the foreseeable future, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process has reached a complete standstill.

The most disturbing legacy of the Six-Day War is the perpetuation of the occupation of the West Bank and the blockade of Gaza. It is there where extreme national-messianic religious ideology, mixed with oversimplified security arguments, has been cemented through the illegal building of Jewish settlements and the controlling of the lives of millions of Palestinians. This undermines the chances of reaching a peace agreement under a two-state solution. Beyond the moral bankruptcy of occupying and not upholding the basic human and political rights, it also spells the end of the dream of the founding fathers for a Jewish and democratic state. The military victory of June 1967 has turned into a poisoned chalice with no leadership to radically alter the current impasse. Yossi Mekelberg is professor of international relations at Regent’s University London, where he is head of the International Relations and Social Sciences Program. He is also an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. He is a regular contributor to the international written and electronic media.