Why some Iranian Kurds have joined Daesh against Iran

Most of the estimated 8 million Kurds seek cultural, linguistic and religious rights, as well as a degree of political autonomy within Iran. But the ongoing absence of economic perspective, as well as the porous border with Iraq, constitute the perfect substrate for extremism.

Afew days after the first successful terrorist operation in Iran by Daesh, authorities revealed the identities of the five gunmen involved. To the surprise of many, at least four of them were Iranian Kurds. Officials admitted that fellow Iranians had targeted two potent symbols of the Islamic Republic: The Imam Khomeini mausoleum, the final resting place of its founder; and Parliament, the symbol of Iran’s vibrant yet imperfect democracy. The attack left at least 17 people dead, some 53 wounded and the country traumatized.

Soon after, Intelligence Minister Syed Mahmoud Alavi announced the killing of the alleged mastermind of the operation, who was tracked down in Iraq, where the five attackers had fought alongside Daesh in its Mosul stronghold. He also announced the arrest of 50 suspects in an attempt to crush “terrorist cells” across Iran. But security and intelligence services have understandably focused their efforts on Iranian Kurdistan, where operations continue.

The region, called Rojhalat by some Kurds, is spread over Iran’s western provinces of Kordistan, Kermanshah and parts of West Azerbaijan and Ilam. It is an underdeveloped mountainous region that has been a hotbed of separatist tendencies for decades.

The long history of distrust between Kurds and the central government in Tehran stems from the short-lived Republic of Mahabad. On Jan. 1, 1946, Kurdish leader Qazi Mohamed sided with the Soviet Union, which had occupied northern Iran since 1941, to declare an independent Kurdish state. But a few months later, under US pressure, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Iran and abandoned Mahabad to the shah’s ruthless repression.

Several Marxist and agnostic political parties, such as the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komala, continued the fight for the region’s independence. Iran’s repression of the Kurds was supported by the US as part of a global fight against the spread of communist ideology.

The 1979 Islamic Revolution did not stop the oppression; it added the sectarian factor as the mullahs despised and distrusted the majority-Sunni Kurds. Iran has since imposed severe restrictions on Kurdish expression of their religion, language and tradition. The intelligence service forced Komala and the KDPI into submission by assassinating several of their leaders in Europe.

But the discrimination against the Kurds, and the lack of economic development in the region, led to the emergence of a more radical leftist organization, PEJAK, which launched indiscriminate attacks against civilians. This led to waves of repression that proved successful from the government’s point of view.

While Komala, the KDPI and PEJAK continue to support a degree of autonomy and engage in regular low-level skirmishes with local forces, they have failed to mobilize support for the communist ideology.

Even in Iranian Kurdistan, there exists a sense of belonging to Persian culture, and an increasing number of Iranians see the region as integral to the country’s history. The city of Kermanshah, for example, holds many preIslamic historical sites, such as the multilingual Behistun inscription dated circa 500 BC and the Taq-e-Bostan, a series of large rock reliefs commissioned by the Sassanid kings who ruled part of West Asia between 226 and 650 AD, before the Islamic conquests.

The emergence of a nationalist movement that sees pre-Islamic Zoroastrian Persia as the glue binding Iranians has prevented centrifugal forces opposed to the religious revolution imposed in 1979 from destroying the country.

Far from being politically disengaged, Kurds rejected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s 2009 re-election as president, and participated in the Green Revolution that followed. The vast majority of Kurds backed Hassan Rouhani in the 2013 presidential race. And despite a growing sense of frustration shared by many Iranians regarding Iran’s slow economic revival, more than 60 percent of Kurds voted for him again in 2017.

However, Iranian authorities have observed with great concern increasing signs of religious radicalization in the Kurdish provinces, which were previously marked by Marxism, feminism and agnosticism. The recent terrorist attacks gave substance to this fear, and while authorities will continue to blame Saudi Arabia for allegedly providing financial support to Sunni extremists, they will need to find a local solution.

Most of the estimated 8 million Kurds seek cultural, linguistic and religious rights, as well as a degree of political autonomy within Iran. Separatist movements have failed and are no longer perceived as a viable option. Iranian Kurds feel they enjoy relative security compared to Kurds in Turkey, Syria and Iraq. But the ongoing absence of economic perspective, as well as the porous border with Iraq, constitute the perfect substrate for extremism.

The government and even the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have been engaged in a new policy to win Kurdish hearts and minds through the creation of jobs and social welfare. Yet the recent attacks, as well as security forces’ reaction, could disturb the fragile equilibrium in Iranian Kurdistan. The end of a moderate policy and the start of indiscriminate repression could push many Kurds into the arms of terrorist organizations such as Daesh.

To stop Iranian Kurdistan and its Iraqi rear base from turning into terrorist havens, Tehran needs to continue implementing Rouhani’s policies, use the region’s proximity to Iraq to ensure its transformation into a logistics hub, and support local socio-economic leaders.

But while Kurds are the third-largest ethnic group in Iran, they are only one minority among many. The challenges Iran faces today with the Kurds could metastasize to other groups such as the Baluchs, Arabs and Azeris, endangering the country’s national fabric.

QMarc Martinez is a senior analyst at The Delma Institute, a foreign affairs research house in Abu Dhabi.