North Korean crisis could be about to reignite

The problem with living in the 24/7 news cycle is that, once a news item is no longer the immediate focus of the fruit fly-like attention span of the mainstream media, it seems to cease to exist. However, as history so often shows, more often than not unresolved crises — while making for very bad news copy — metastasize, returning with a vengeance.

The present lull in reporting about the once-fashionable North Korean nuclear crisis is a case in point. While the fact that nothing is going on makes for less than diverting television, this should not remove the nuclear standoff from our minds; indeed, it is a warning sign that, like some poor B-grade movie sequel, the monster will come back from the dead.

The key political risk fact to know about the crisis is that at base — despite all the supposed historic summits, photo ops and general hoopla — there never has been a genuine basis for a deal. Both the leaderships in Pyongyang and Washington have utterly unrealistic expectations as to what is possible.

Since the failure of the Hanoi summit in February, both Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un have rigidly hewed to their maximalist positions. Pyongyang has consistently made it clear it wants the Trump administration to give it a security guarantee and significant relief from US-led global sanctions, which are stifling the already horribly mismanaged North Korean economy. In return,

Kim is prepared to make some unspecified limited disarmament steps, while never fully committing to giving up the entirety of his nuclear program. Further, North Korea wants sanctions gradually lifted in a step-by-step approach as the process goes on.

Conversely, Trump has been holding out for a big deal that would only grant sanctions relief as a reward at the end of a complete North Korean nuclear disarmament process. It was precisely these demands that led Kim to walk out of the Hanoi summit, blaming the collapse of the talks on “unilateral US demands.” In turn, America stated that

Hanoi came to nothing because of Pyongyang’s “excessive” demands for immediate sanctions relief.

Obviously, these two negotiating positions are canyons apart, because the underlying problem is that both North Korea and the US think they are in a better strategic position than the other, and can afford to keep to their maximalist demands.

Further, nothing has happened in the interim to do anything other than bolster them both in their misplaced confidence. For Kim, the very ugly strategic spat between Japan and South Korea — wherein the two American allies have abrogated agreements to work together regarding their common North Korean foe — is a welcome splintering of the anti-Pyongyang alliance.

Second, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to North Korea in June underlined the very real limits of the Americanbacked sanctions regime. As the US and

China lurch ever deeper into their trade war, both acknowledging the other as their primary global strategic competitor, Beijing has increasingly gone back to its traditional strategic posture as primary ally and defender of North Korea.

Since China accounts for the vast majority of trade and aid for cash-strapped North Korea, Beijing can, at any moment, curtail the effectiveness of the global sanctions that drove Kim to the negotiating table in the first place.

But the Trump administration does not feel it is in a bad strategic place either. The sanctions regime is ( just about) holding; nothing has dramatically happened in North Korea to change the basic fact it is highly susceptible to sanctions, given the haplessness of its economy.

Also, Kim has not gone back to the bad old days that characterized things before the talks. North Korea still has not scientifically perfected the re-entry process for its long-range nuclear missiles, meaning the US is not (quite) in Pyongyang’s crosshairs. This has always been the ultimate threshold America adamantly does not want North Korea to cross.

Likewise, Pyongyang has not gone back to unnervingly testing its long-range missiles or conducting major nuclear tests so, while its program is surely not diminishing, nor is it moving forward beyond America’s strategic comfort level.

But, while both countries feel they are in a better strategic position than the other, Kim is growing restless at not being economically rewarded for what he sees as his strategic patience. Rather clearly, at the end of April, Kim flatly stated that America had until the end of 2019 to “change its attitude” if there is to be a third summit. So far, there is absolutely no sign whatsoever that Washington is going to do this.

And herein lies the danger; for a complete breakdown in talks will inevitably lead to North Korea going back to its familiar playbook of nuclear blackmail, bellicosely threatening its neighbors and America by showily restarting its nuclear program. However, after the thaw, it is hard to see how things will go back to this unsettling brand of normal. Instead, burned by Kim and humiliated on the world stage, it is unlike Trump to return to the status quo. More likely, Kim’s warlike gestures will be met in kind by America, and things will be even worse than before the Kim-Trump romance began.