Europe on a geopolitical fault line between China and US
During his address to the UN General Assembly in September, SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres expressed his fear that a “great fracture” could split the international order into two “separate and competing worlds,” one dominated by the US and the other by China. His fear is not only justified, but the fissure he dreads has already formed, and it is getting wider. After Deng Xiaoping launched his
“reform and opening up” policy in 1978, the conventional wisdom in the West was that China’s integration into the global economy would naturally bring about domestic social and political change. The end of the Cold War — an apparent victory for the US-led liberal international order — reinforced this belief and the West largely pursued a policy of engagement with China. After China became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001, this process accelerated, with Western companies and investment pouring into the country and cheap manufactured products flowing out of it.
As China’s role in global value chains grew, its problematic trade practices — from dumping excessively low-cost goods in Western markets to failing to protect intellectual property rights — were increasingly distortionary. Yet few so much as batted an eyelid. No one, it seemed, wanted to jeopardize the profits brought by cheap Chinese manufacturing, or the promise of access to the massive Chinese market.
In fact, China has changed the international system much more than the system has changed China.
Today, the Communist Party of China is more powerful than ever. President Xi Jinping is set for a protracted — even lifelong — tenure. And, as US President Donald Trump has learned during his ill-fated trade war, wringing concessions out of China is more difficult than ever. Meanwhile, the rules-based international order limps along without vitality or purpose and the US has gradually withdrawn from global leadership.
This has produced a golden opportunity for China to begin constructing a parallel system, centered on Beijing. Yet many, including in Europe, are not particularly concerned about the emergence of this parallel system. Many Europeans also believe that they can improve their strategic position by situating themselves on the frontier between the two emerging worlds. That strategy may offer some advantages, including opportunities for arbitrage. But, as anyone who lives on a fault line knows, there are also formidable risks: Friction between the two sides is bound to shake the foundations of whatever is positioned atop the boundary.
The solution is not for Europe simply to take America’s “side” and turn its back on China (that would run counter to European values). Rather, the EU must heed Guterres’ call to “do everything possible to maintain a universal system,” in which all actors, including China and the US, follow the same rules.
In this sense, the recent joint statement by Xi and French President Emmanuel Macron reaffirming their strong support for the
Paris climate agreement is promising, as is Europe’s growing recognition that China is not only a partner or economic competitor, but also a “systemic rival.” But this is only a start. Europe needs a robust China strategy that recognizes the profound, often subtle challenges that the country’s rise poses, mitigates the associated risks, and seizes relevant opportunities.
Achieving this will require perspective and discipline, neither of which comes naturally to the EU. But there is no other choice. As soon as Europe stops defending the rule of law and democratic values, its identity — and its future — will begin to crumble.