Pandemic challenge Europe’s sense of itself

COVID-19 has had a profound impact on how nations interact with each other. A pandemic is by definition global, and demands global responses; but too many countries and regions have prioritized their own supply of vital personal protection equipment (PPE) over international solidarity, closed borders to their neighbors, and simply hunkered down to ride out the storm.

Nowhere was this erosion of solidarity more apparent than in the EU, which is founded on precisely that principle. French President Emmanuel Macron called the pandemic Europe’s moment of truth, and with good reason.

It is true that European cooperation improved as time went on. Josep Borrell, effectively the EU’s foreign minister, pointed out that while comparisons between Russian and Chinese donations of PPE to Italy and those from the rest of the EU were unflattering, they were inaccurate. France, Austria and Germany sent far more to their beleaguered neighbor than China did, but did not feel the need to stick their flags on the emergency supplies. The same applies to repatriation flights for 420,000 stranded European tourists, an EU-wide effort. Countries also cooperated in accepting COVID-19 intensive care patients from neighboring regions with full hospitals. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen apologized to Italy because

“too many were not there on time when Italy needed a helping hand at the very beginning,” but said Europe had “now become the world’s beating heart of solidarity.”

Is this rose-tinted view warranted? Probably not. Cooperation has improved on COVID19, but not on the economic front. True, the European Central Bank has launched a 750 billion euro pandemic emergency purchase program and the eurozone finance ministers agreed on a 540 billion euro package of money from the European Stability Mechanism, funds to support unemployment schemes and a package by the European Investment Bank to support loans for hard-hit small businesses. That all sounds like a lot of money, and it is, but it may not be enough. The sticking point is the mutualization of debt. Current programs allow countries to borrow on their books. In addition, Italy, Spain and France want a 400 billion euro joint fund or EU budget allocation to mitigate the economic fallout of coronavirusrelated lockdowns across the bloc. Germany and the Netherlands oppose mutualized debt on the ground that they should not be held liable for what is owed by their highly indebted southern neighbors while northern countries had acted with fiscal prudence over the past decade. Macron argues that the EU is more than merely an economic framework for cooperation. it is a political construct and as such needs to act in solidarity when a crisis occurs. His historic comparisons are also pertinent; countries tend to regret when they make others pay for past sins, but can be rewarded when they are magnanimous. For example, the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 humiliated Germany, and was at least partly responsible for the ascent of Hitler and the Second World War. In contrast, the US Marshall Plan created prosperity in Europe, served its architects’ foreign policy in Europe well, and became a cornerstone of the “Pax Americana” that shaped much of the second half of the 20th century.

If we have learned anything from the 1930s then it is just how vigilant we must be at times of great change, and how dangerous populist regimes can be when they go unchecked. What has already happened in Hungary could also happen in Italy, even France, and elsewhere. Prosperous neighborhoods also make sense from an economic perspective, because they cause far fewer problems than destitution on one’s borders.

The EU will need not only to adjust to the post-COVID-19 world, but also to restructure its unwieldy bureaucracy. What the bloc needs above all is strong and far-sighted leadership — as indeed does the rest of the world.