Syria braces for war but peace may be given a chance
Two events over the last two weeks suggest that Syria could soon be seeing either a twofront war or, surprisingly, the prospect of peace. On Oct. 20, Turkey removed its troops from the Morek observation post in northern Idlib. In a separate development on Oct. 26, Russia launched a massive air attack on the Faylaq Al-Sham militia, which is one of the largest rebel groups backed by Turkey. The Morek base was set up by Turkey following its Sochi agreement with Russia in May 2018. Ankara was to use this truce to remove all radical groups from the region. However, not surprisingly, instead of identifying and eliminating the extremist elements of Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham
(HTS), Turkey sought to project them as “moderate” and co-opt them into the Syrian National Army (SNA).
Turkey continues its efforts to incorporate the HTS into the regional “military council” it has set up with the rebel forces — the
SNA and the National Liberation Front — in northern Syria. Meanwhile, HTS has made every effort to shed its extremist identity and project itself as a moderate political grouping. Turkey’s consistent failure to distance itself from extremist groups in Idlib is perhaps the reason for Russia’s lethal attack on
Faylaq Al-Sham. In fact, this divide between Russian and Turkish interests compounds their differences in Libya and in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, where Ankara has deployed Syrian fighters to back Azerbaijan. Turkey has made it clear that its principal desire is to control the entire Turkish
Syrian border up to a depth of 40 km. In this context, after the Russian air attack, Turkish
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s warning was directed not at Russia but at the Kurds. He referred to the Kurdish presence close to the border as that of “terrorist organizations,” warning that, if the areas are not cleared, “we have the legitimate right to mobilize once again.”
Thus, to free the M4 highway and rid the region of rebel forces, the Syrian army has been mobilized at different points around Idlib, while Turkey has complemented its own forces by providing new equipment and training for the militias it controls in the region.
The chances of a two-front war — one against the Kurds in northeast Syria to take the border areas under their control and the other against Syrian government forces around Idlib — are therefore very high.
But countervailing forces are also in play. Russian President Vladimir Putin, while referring to differences between Turkey and Russia, thoughtfully noted recently that Erdogan “is a flexible person and finding a common language with him is possible.”
This observation suggests that Erdogan, with his usual approach of going to the edge of the abyss and then drawing back at the last moment, will not jeopardize his country’s ties with Russia, particularly when his differences with the US, regardless of who is in the White House, are so deep.
Thus, instead of war, we could actually see Russia and Turkey work on arrangements in north and northeast Syria that serve all parties’ interests and finally set up dialogue between Turkey and the Assad government. As the Russian intervention in Syria enters its sixth year, this would be the best outcome of Putin’s diplomacy.