Nagorno-Karabakh deal cuts US out of the Caucasus
The cease-fire deal signed last week between Armenia and Azerbaijan, brokered by Vladimir Putin, establishes not only peace (hopefully one that is more than merely tentative) in Nagorno-Karabakh, but also entrenches Russia’s influence in the Caucasus. Those who say, “Why not? This is, after all, on Moscow’s doorstep,” have a point. However, is it ultimately in the interest of the region? That interest might have been better championed had the US not been missing from action in the South Caucasus for the past month-and-a-half. It is now effectively shut out from the region for the next five years, perhaps longer.
The Karabakh cease-fire appears durable. There are powerful incentives for both sides to restrain themselves, including the presence of nearly 2,000 Russian peacekeepers. A week after the signing, Russian forces had already established two dozen observation posts lining both the line of contact between Armenian and Azeri forces, and the crucial Lachin corridor that connects Karabakh and Armenia proper.
These established facts on the ground, enshrined by Russia’s presence as the sole international actor in the Armenian-Azeri agreement, leave little room for other international powers to involve themselves. The US, in particular, having been largely absent during the conflict, finds itself on the outside looking in.
On paper at least, there is significant leeway for American involvement in what comes next in Karabakh. The most intractable issue of the Karabakh dispute — the precise final status of the Armenian-populated and controlled rump territory — remains wholly unaddressed, not even mentioned in the deal
Neil Hauer is a security analyst currently in Yerevan, Armenia. Usually based in Tbilisi, Georgia, his work focuses on, among other things, politics, minorities and violence in the Caucasus. ©Syndication Bureau signed last week. Committed US diplomacy could play a key role here.
But Russia’s unilateral imposition of the present cease-fire deal and the entry of Russian forces into Karabakh show that Moscow holds the cards at present.
How, then, could the Biden administration play a constructive role in the conflict and, more importantly, attempt to counterbalance Russia’s bolstered influence in the region? Simply put, in the short term, there is little Washington can do.
Missing this opportunity and allowing Moscow full rein over how the war ended means Russia now sits with military bases on the territory of all three South Caucasus republics. Any US engagement with Karabakh now will thus start firmly on the back foot, beholden to this unfavorable reality on the ground. Looking forward, the end of the five-year mandate of Russia’s peacekeeping operation in Karabakh could mark a logical date to work toward, with the US angling for a place in whatever comes next in international peacekeeping securing the region. Unfortunately for Washington, Russian peacekeepers do not tend to leave an area once they are deployed. The reality is that the US has missed the boat on this conflict for the next generation. The incoming Biden administration can fiddle around the margins, playing a role in minor related issues, but Russia is now enshrined, both in law and in practice, as the international power through which Karabakh’s fate will be decided.
By this fact, Russia has cemented its primacy in the region and shut out the US. What the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan shows is that even a brief lapse in attention by Washington can have long-lasting repercussions.