Hezbollah’s only option is to step back in time
Lebanese public affairs consultancy The Pulse and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, the German political foundation, published a study last week in which Lebanon’s protest groups were mapped. Among the different issues the survey highlighted, the most controversial and divisive was Hezbollah and its weapons.
In short, 92 percent of respondents believe that all arms should be under the jurisdiction of the state, meaning that Hezbollah should disarm; but they have differing views on how and when that should happen.
When presenting the report, The Pulse president Huda Usta Kaskas offered a glimmer of hope, saying that, even though opinions differed on the issue of arms, a space for compromise could be found. The important point is that people don’t want to fight and repeat the scenario of 1975. The key factor is to see what compromise Hezbollah is willing to make in order to save the country.
Hezbollah is the prime status quo power.
The current situation is totally convenient to the group. It has maximum control over the country, while assuming minimum responsibility. There is a weak state that allows Hezbollah to have leeway within the system, whether it is smuggling prohibited goods from Syria or circumventing customs when importing goods. Hezbollah wants the system to stay afloat, but it is difficult to do so amid the popular desire for change domestically and the international perception of the current elite.
Hezbollah looks at Lebanon from a regional perspective. The country is only one piece of the puzzle; part of a regional plan that the group works for. The “plan” is the priority, not the welfare of Lebanon. The head of the group, Hassan Nasrallah, has already stated that he is a mere “soldier in the Vilayat-e Faqih party.” Though the interests of Iran come first and though the group is ideological, it has some degree of pragmatism, as does its patron, Tehran. Both Hezbollah and Iran realize that, should Lebanon totally collapse, all the effort and funding that have been invested over the past 30 years would be lost. Hence, Hezbollah might be willing to compromise on some of its privileges in order to keep the country afloat. Despite Nasrallah’s claim that Hezbollah will not let his people go hungry, it cannot feed 2 million Shiites. A functional state is needed to provide social services, even for Nasrallah’s own constituency.
Hezbollah reached its peak in the 2018 elections. Its electoral bloc won a parliamentary majority that basically means it has control of the state across all the different branches, while assuming minimum responsibility. However, the 2019 protests showed that the status quo is no longer sustainable. The new study shows cracks in the “resistance” support base due to the deteriorating economic conditions in the country. The party has been struggling as discontent and criticism have spilled out into the open. In 2019, Hezbollah had to brutally crack down on protesters. Despite employing the rhetoric of the powerful, Hezbollah is at its weakest point.
Hezbollah started evolving from the day it entered the government and began increasing its influence within the state. However, this empowerment came at a cost — it had to build alliances with crooked politicians and hence lost the cachet of being a pure and genuine resistance movement that is above corruption. It lost a lot of credibility and legitimacy, especially with its entry into the Syrian war. Nevertheless, the party saw the potential fall of the Assad regime as an existential threat, as it would have cut their lines of supply. The party also remembers the 2006 war. Then, after one week of fighting, 80 percent of its supplies were depleted. It was only after Assad decided to open Syria’s borders that support started flowing in and Hezbollah was able to continue to fight. On top of this, being under sanctions means it has to revert to illicit activities in order to finance its operations, which drives criticism and discontent toward the group.
However, Lebanon is at a stage where minor changes will not work — drastic reforms are needed. The system is obsolete and needs changing. So far, Hezbollah has been the main guardian of the system, which is the main cause of the political anger toward it. The rejection of its arms by the Lebanese people is not because they are a deterrent against Israel, but because they see that the arms are the protector of corruption and that they have allowed Hezbollah to enjoy oversized influence in the country. They see in it the spinal cord of the system.
Though a change to the status quo might be a risk for Hezbollah, it would also be a chance for it to redeem itself and regain the respect of the Lebanese people. Opening up to Iran could entice Hezbollah to loosen its grip on the government, as it will be compensated for the loss of income from illicit activities by funds it receives from Tehran once the sanctions are lifted. In this case, it might relinquish some of the privileges it has accumulated over the years and pull the plug on its corrupt allies in order to allow for reforms that could prevent the state from collapsing.
Hezbollah has shown pragmatism in the past. It has made short-term concessions in order to preserve its existence and the overall long-term project of Iran. Tehran cannot lose Hezbollah and, with it, the deterrence factor it has against Israel.
If Hezbollah accepts being removed from government and the plug pulled from its corrupt allies, while also accepting and embracing reforms to state institutions, then it will go back to the 1990s and the time when it had the respect of the Lebanese people, as it was seen as a legitimate national resistance movement. Though the casual observer might look at it loosening its grip on power as being the beginning of the end, in fact the only way for it to survive is to step back in time to when it was only a resistance movement and a deterrent to any aggression by Israel.
The key factor is to see what compromise
the group is willing to make
in order to save Lebanon
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