Cyril ‘Robin Hood’ Ramaphosa? — This might just be what SA needs
Apart from cleaning up his party’s image, the new head of state will need to strategise in order to deliver
President Cyril Ramaphosa faces a formidable strategic agenda. In every direction, and on every front, there is complexity and urgency, as well as tough choices. Putting aside for the moment the detritus of the Zuma years — for the toxic hangover may well linger — as well the necessity of having to looking constantly over his shoulder to ensure that his party is not tearing itself apart but remaining loyal to the Nasrec commitment to unity, there are many policy and governance dilemmas to wrestle with. Thus there is a need to prioritise strategically.
First, of course, Ramaphosa must decide what to do with his Cabinet, including the position of deputy president. Wholesale change in structure and personnel is unlikely at this point, not least because of the interdependent relationship with what is going on behind him in the ANC, which must itself embark on what will probably be a long and difficult process of organisational renewal and reunification.
As a simple example of this, while Ramaphosa might well wish to satisfy the clamour for Bathabile Dlamini’s dismissal, given the calamity of her management of social security and its importance to the ANC’s base electoral support, she remains the ANC Women’s League president, and until the leagues are sorted out it is unlikely that she can be discarded from the Cabinet altogether. A sideways reshuffle is more likely.
Much attention will inevitably be focused, and not just by the markets and rating agencies, on Finance Minister Malusi Gigaba. Will he stay or will he go? Gigaba is clearly doing his utmost to make the case for keeping his job.
The problem is not just the minister and his reputation itself, but the “parallel state” his Quixotic squad of advisers have established within the Treasury, and who persistently hamper and undermine the seasoned professionals within finance.
Secondly, he has little credibility in the investment community and, justifiably blamed for the harmful hollowing out of state-owned entity (SOE) governance to enable corrupt interests to prosper when he was public enterprises minister, may have to be replaced as a matter of principle. Whether it will be deemed necessary to do so before he gives the budget speech on Wednesday is just one of the items Ramaphosa must settle before the weekend is out.
As with the Zuma prosecution, Ramaphosa will probably wisely hope to be able to stay well away, in the reasonable expectation now that the law-enforcement agencies and Zondo commission of inquiry into state capture will do their jobs. That way he can focus on the future and not be drawn into divisive and distracting decisions about the past. He must be able to stay unquestionably arms-length from the National Prosecuting Authority.
But appointing a strong and independent candidate, with an absolutely impeccable record character-wise, as the new national director of public prosecutions (NDPP) will be critical if this strategy is to work. Whichever way the many possible or likely criminal investigations go in the coming months —from Ace Magashule to the Gupta brothers to Zuma and Mosebenzi Zwane— the public must be able to trust the independence of the NDPP, which was conspicuous by its absence during the Zuma years.
Second there is the task he has already commenced of rebuilding the leadership and governance of key state bodies and agencies, especially SOEs such as Eskom. Happily, this country is not short of talent and human capital — it is a question of where it is to be found and where it is deployed.
Many businesses will, I suspect, be all too willing to contribute to the Ramaphosa change agenda by offering skilled individuals on secondment — and so they should, for one of the defining features of the new era is that government and business must do even more together than they do at present.
This notion of a strategic partnership between the key stakeholders and actors in the economy, including the labour unions as well as corporate leadership is Ramaphosa’s unique selling proposition: that he has the credibility with all the main players and sectors to be able to lead and drive a consensus-forging process around the main trade-offs that must be made in pursuit of real transformative economic growth.
Defining the terms of that vision and the process that will be needed to realise it may prove to the strategic pivot of the Ramaphosa era. Inclusivity will be one of its hallmarks, enabling a more pluralistic as well as open approach to policy-making and implementation.
Former president Thabo Mbeki’s form of consultation was all too often more about control and co-option than about genuine dialogue and partnership. After the stripping the presidency of its policy-making and co-ordination capacity soon after coming to power in 2009, Zuma’s approach resembled a medieval monarchy dispensing patronage and facilitating “deals” rather than a serious, modern democratic government.
Lastly, settling some key policy choices within the context of the fiscal crunch the country faces will be crucial not just to the political equilibrium point of the new government but in meeting the legitimate expectations of both rating agencies and potential investors.
Ramaphosa has already affirmed in his very lucid January eighth statement that his government will be open for business and that the utmost care will be taken not to do anything that will deter much-needed inward investment that will help stimulate a sluggish economy.
But, as he has already clearly stated in that same statement, things cannot remain the same. No one should be lulled into thinking we are returning to a pre-Zuma world circa 2004. The material sociopolitical and economic conditions have shifted substantially.
While the true merit of the underlying claims of social injustice have been masked by the empty populist rhetoric and Bell Potting er inspired spin of“radical economic transformation”, the strategic dilemma that issues such as the concentration of ownership and wealth in the financial sector, land redistribution and food security, and equitable access to education and training evoke, will have to be addressed substantively and convincingly.
Settling the revised Integrated Resource Plan and publishing it for further public participation, and revoking any suggestion that an illicit nuclear power deal will proceed, would be a good start in rejuvenating confidence in the democratic state. In return for reforming government and repairing lost trust in the democratic project, Ramaphosa is going to have to ask those with the most wealth and power to share and sacrifice more in service of structural socioeconomic change.
This may prove to be his most vital act of leadership, as well the strategic core of his “new deal” if he is to be able to convincingly repel the attacks that will continue to come from Julius Malema’s EFF, the Black First, Land First movement and other militant, destabilising forces.
Friday’s state of the nation address will not answer all of the inevitable questions this strategic agenda provokes, but it can set the tone and the trajectory of what will follow. SA and the world wait with a sense of heady anticipation and high expectation.
Managing those expectations by identifying the nuances of the strategic choices and dilemmas SA’s new president faces will be essential if his first year in office is to be judged on a rational and reasonable basis.