Design systems to help politicians put their best feet forward

While we are right to appeal to politicians’ moral conscience to have the best interests of the public at heart, we also need to design systems to help them achieve that. We might like to paint politicians as people who are totally in command of their actions, and so are good or bad, but they are human, with human vulnerabilities. We therefore need systems that put pressure on them to be their best selves, rather than pressure to be their worst.

SA is emerging from a period of institutionalised corruption, and we are still trying to make sense of what happened. Some argue that the state of affairs we found ourselves in stemmed from bad faith (and bad morals) within the governing party of the day. These say President Cyril Ramaphosa was part of Jacob Zuma’s government and therefore enabled the corruption of that period. This does not, however, square with Ramaphosa’s actions since assuming the presidency, which so far seem to indicate commitment to combating corruption and improving governance. The question therefore remains: why was he, and other committed politicians, unable to bring about change during Zuma’s administration?

The problem clearly lies in the power relations in political parties and in Parliament. Should a president go rogue, very little can be done to hold him or her to account. In theory, Parliament can (and should) hold presidents to account, but this has proved to be flawed in practice, for a number of reasons.

First, parliamentarians are not accountable to constituencies but to parties. If they do not act in line with the decisions of their parties, they may face disciplinary action and damage to their political careers, even expulsion.

Perhaps an even more fundamental reason for sticking to the party line is that “unity” is ingrained in party ideology. In the last moments of Zuma’s reign it was clear unity was the overarching value of the ANC. Politicians are not required to be true to the stated values of the party, only the party itself. This ideology affects the way politicians of all parties see their responsibilities.

Second, senior politicians are more likely to get positions in the executive (Cabinet), leaving the oversight of their conduct to people frequently their political juniors. In the private sector it would be like expecting middle management to hold top management to account. Private sector governance principles require top management to be accountable to boards, which are in turn accountable to shareholders. Yet at the more important country level, this independence is missing, save for elections every five years.

Let’s not pretend accountability works flawlessly in the private sector — but when there are serious failures, there are corrective measures. If former Steinhoff CEO Markus Jooste had known he was accountable only to middle management, there would have been no pressure on him to step down. If he had had control of the criminal justice cluster, he would have been even less inclined to relinquish power.

Which brings us to the external institutions that play a role in holding individuals to account. Here we think of the South African Police Service, the Hawks, the National Prosecuting Authority and the South African Revenue Service. We have, however, seen how these institutions were rendered ineffective through inappropriate appointments made by the president, who removed a few of them from their positions when it was convenient to do so. While such levels of presidential power might work with a well-intentioned president, we have seen that we cannot count on having one.

IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR IT WOULD BE LIKE EXPECTING MIDDLE MANAGEMENT TO HOLD TOP MANAGEMENT TO ACCOUNT

Two main issues need to be tackled. The first is that loyalty in politics is to parties rather than constituencies. The Van Zyl Slabbert Commission on Electoral Reform made recommendations on this in 2003, and perhaps it is time for these to be revisited.

The second is the extent to which power is in the hands of the president, especially when appointing and removing people from positions in the justice cluster. This must, surely, be curbed.

There are more nuanced discussions to be had about better balancing power relations, and this is exactly what I am hoping for. We could say that we have plenty of time for these discussions, since we trust the moral conscience of the president. I would, however, say that we should appeal to Ramaphosa’s conscience to lead with some urgency on this. It would help him and his Cabinet remain their best selves.