A lot is at stake in talks, but conflict in Ukraine will be a tough nut to crack
After five years of war, 13,000 deaths, more than 2-million internally displaced people and billions of dollars in economic destruction, progress towards settling the conflict in eastern Ukraine would be very welcome.
In fact, much more will be at stake when the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine meet in Paris on December 9 for their first direct talks about the region in more than three years.
The heart of the matter is whether western governments and Russia are in the mood for a lasting accommodation over Ukraine, the pivotal country in Europe’s post-Cold War order.
Even though the US will be absent from the Paris discussions, Washington knows no less than its allies that stability on the European continent will never be assured as long as Ukraine’s place in this order remains undefined.
A bargain over Ukraine may seem remote, given that frictions between Moscow and the West are at their most acute for more than 30 years. And deal might raise awkward questions for western governments about “spheres of influence” in Eastern Europe, a concept the West has officially treated as outdated since the cold war’s end.
Moreover, any compromise would be highly controversial in Ukraine if it ignores the patriotic pride in independence that emerged after Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent intervention in the Donbass region. The consolidation of Ukrainian statehood across national and linguistic divides shows how Russian President Vladimir Putin’s support for secessionist rebels has backfired against him.
President Emmanuel Macron of France wants to reset the West’s relations with Moscow, despite misgivings in Berlin, Warsaw and other EU capitals.
Yet reduced tensions require a settlement in Ukraine, and it will be no easy task to reconcile respect for Russian interests with support for Ukraine’s freedom, territorial unity and desire to integrate with the EuroAtlantic world.
In practice, some western capitals have quietly written off Crimea and do not wish to encourage Ukraine’s hopes of joining Nato and the EU. Rather, they think Ukraine should be satisfied with a status similar to that of Finland during the Cold War. It was a democracy, but neutral rather than in the western camp and careful never to tread on Moscow’s toes.
Then there is the China factor. In the view of some strategists in Washington, an arrangement with Moscow that ruled out full Ukrainian alignment with the West could bring closer another prize. They seek a less confrontational Russia, which distances itself from
China, the West’s main rival over the long term.
Would Russia, under Putin or any successor, really take this bait? Ukraine, in Russian eyes, is fundamentally different from Finland because the history, culture and peoples of the two Slavic states are so closely intertwined. Furthermore, to the extent that Ukraine flourishes as a democracy, it represents to Russia’s political and security establishment a threatening contrast to their country’s more repressive methods of rule.
All the same, it is becoming harder for Putin to justify the war’s costs to disenchanted Russians. For the first time since 2014, Moscow appears interested in dialling down the conflict, but not at any price. Putin is perfectly capable of maintaining military and political pressure on Ukraine if he receives no western concessions.
The ghost at the Paris talks will be US President Donald Trump’s administration. The presidential impeachment inquiry being conducted by the House of Representatives has shone a light on US policy towards Ukraine. Testimony has exposed a gap between diplomatic professionals committed to the official US goal of an independent Ukraine, cleansed as far as possible of corruption, and the circles around the US president.
The latter’s behaviour over the summer, when pressure was put on Ukraine to investigate Trump’s potential 2020 rival Joe Biden, shows they care about Ukraine only insofar as it serves as a political weapon to re-elect the president. The credibility of US policy has suffered enormous damage.
A breakthrough on Ukraine seems therefore unlikely at Paris and may have to wait, at best, until the 2020 US election campaign is over.
Even then, fear of being accused of sacrificing Ukraine will be balanced in western capitals against fear of being sucked into deeper confrontation with Russia. /©