Business Day

Brazil’s attempts at reform point the way out of junk status for SA

Policies aim to strengthen fiscal accounts, macroecono­mic stability, competitiv­eness and productivi­ty

- Casey Delport and Thomas Hendricks ● Delport and Hendricks are investment analysts with Anchor Capital.

SA lost its final investment grade rating (by Moody’s) on March 27 after years of fiscal largesse by the government and low growth compounded by the effects of Covid-19. Brazil lost its final investment grade rating — also by Moody’s — on February 24 2016. Brazil’s downgrade journey looks remarkably similar to that of SA. Before the downgrade both countries suffered from extensive corruption, a lack of structural reform, high unemployme­nt and high fiscal deficits. Upon closer inspection of some of the key economic indicators for the five years ahead of the downgrades, it is clear that the countries followed a similar path.

It may therefore serve SA well to take a critical look not only at Brazil’s economic policies before the downgrade but also at its subsequent attempts at structural reform. There may be valuable lessons to be learnt as we take our first tender steps forwards through junk status territory.

From 2010 Brazil’s economic growth slowed significan­tly: an annual growth rate of 4.5% between 2006 and 2010 fell to 2.1% between 2011 and 2014. There was a significan­t contractio­n in economic activity in 2015 and 2016, with year-onyear GDP dropping 3.6% and 3.4%, respective­ly. This phase led to a severe recession from 2014 to 2017. By 2016 the country had lost its last investment grade rating, and it has stayed in junk status territory ever since.

The economic crisis was ultimately the result of falling commodity prices, notably that of oil, and Brazil’s limited ability to carry out the necessary fiscal reforms at all levels of government, thus underminin­g consumer and investor confidence. Structural sources of pressure on fiscal spending — a bloated government pension system and high unit labour costs stemming from its minimum wage policy — necessitat­ed a high tax burden.

Unwarrante­d microecono­mic interventi­ons contribute­d to reduced dynamism and increased financial stress in key sectors. A high regulatory burden slowed implementa­tion of Brazil’s infrastruc­ture investment programme, especially in its initial phases.

Compoundin­g the already significan­t woes in its key energy sector, Petrobras, the statecontr­olled oil major, ran into trouble of its own. A sustained period of lower oil prices and years of mismanagem­ent all came to a head.

Brazil’s bloated government expenditur­e, troublesom­e state-owned enterprise­s (SOEs), poor policy reform and disjointed regulation in the energy sector, as well as years of political corruption and mismanagem­ent, sound awfully familiar to South Africans.

SA’s downgrade to junk status occurred amid widespread fiscal pressures and persistent­ly low growth due to social and political obstacles to reforms. Progress with structural economic reforms has been severely limited since the advent of democracy in 1994, and the role of state capture, mismanagem­ent of SOEs (notably Eskom and SAA) and the inability to cut public wage expenditur­e during SA’s economic decline have all been well documented.

Restoring fiscal sustainabi­lity remains the most pressing economic challenge for Brazil. To tackle the country’s unsustaina­ble debt levels, the government has enacted Constituti­onal Amendment 95/2016, which limits the rise of public spending. The amendment imposes a fiscal adjustment of 4.1% of GDP through to 2026 and aims to stabilise debt at about 81.7% of GDP in 2023. Implementi­ng this fiscal adjustment requires reducing the rigidity of public spending and revenue-earmarking mechanisms, which makes more than 90% of the federal government’s primary spending mandatory.

Since assuming office in January 2019, the administra­tion of President Jair Bolsonaro has repeatedly emphasised its commitment to policies and structural reforms that strengthen Brazil’s fiscal accounts, foster macroecono­mic stability, and improve competitiv­eness and productivi­ty throughout the economy. Brazil is still mired in debt, with government debt now at 91.6% and projected to increase in the next two years to 93.9% in 2020 and 94.5% in 2021.

Bolsonaro states that the main reason for the country’s persistent debt problem remains the government pension system, as he believes people retire too early with too many benefits. The Senate has passed the bill needed for pension reform, but its effects have yet to be felt.

Other policy proposals include a programme of concession­s and privatisat­ions, a potential revision of the minimum wage policy, efforts to open the economy, and central bank autonomy.

Despite high approval ratings since assuming office, Bolsonaro’s administra­tion faces the challenge of passing legislatio­n in a fragmented Congress that will require astute political negotiatio­ns. Fiscal reforms are not popular, and the process of constructi­ng a proreform coalition could take time.

While SA has only just begun its journey in junk status, the country is already facing similarly difficult negotiatio­ns — notably with the country’s leading trade unions on SOE reform and cutting public sector wage expenditur­e. The Covid-19 pandemic may provide the government with a unique opportunit­y to push through its structural reform agenda, but it remains too early to tell if this will indeed be the case. Regardless, it remains imperative that the government implements a credible fiscal consolidat­ion plan forthwith, thus leading to a durable, albeit slow, pickup in growth.

It would be naive to discount the effect of the global Covid-19 pandemic on Brazil’s and SA’s downgrade recovery plans. For Brazil, growth prospects had looked optimistic at the start of the year. But the pandemic’s effect on the global economy, commodity markets and global financial conditions appear set to curtail Brazilian economic activity in the first half of the year, particular­ly in manufactur­ing, tourism and trade.

With Congress having declared a state of “public calamity” on March 20, the government’s obligation to comply with the primary balance target in 2020 has since been lifted.

For SA, the immediate sharp downturn in 2020, led by the pandemic, was the final nail in the coffin for its last investment grade rating.

The government imposed a strict lockdown, and on April 21 President Cyril Ramaphosa unveiled a R500bn package to boost the ailing economy and to support those worst affected by the pandemic.

Given the highly fluid nature of the global economic situation, only time will tell what impact the Covid-19 pandemic will have on the economies of Brazil and SA, and the trajectory of their respective recovery plans afterwards.

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