SA Air Force could do a lot better in rescue missions if it had funding

Just more than two years ago 43 South Africans were trapped in Palma, northern Mozambique, when guerrillas captured the town. Most were rescued by helicopter crews of the Dyck Advisory Group, a private military company.

This year we had about 70 South Africans stuck in Khartoum when fighting broke out. Most were able to escape to Egypt on buses organised by Gift of the Givers, and others were able to hitch rides on French helicopters or on vehicles to Port Sudan. The SA Air Force deployed a C-130 Hercules transport plane with a special forces protection team to collect those in Egypt. Fortunately, the special forces team was not needed.

Given the spread of conflict in the Sahel and other parts of Africa, and the number of South Africans living and working across the continent, it is safe to assume there will be more such situations in future, and more South Africans trapped by fighting. Will they always have to rely on private companies or other governments to get them to a secure airport? Is that really the best we can do? Should SA not be able to help its citizens trapped by conflicts in Africa?

For the moment, unfortunately, that is probably the best we can do given the sorry state of the SA Air Force. That is both a result of underfunding and of the fanciful notion in the late 1990s that SA would “never” operate in Africa. That saw the air force discard its Boeing 707s and C-160 Transall transport aircraft, the only type that could transport an Oryx helicopter in a state that allowed it to fly within hours of landing, and saw the navy discard its only sealift ship, SAS Outeniqua.

There was a change of heart during the 2011-13 Defence Review, when it was decided that SA should be able to mount an “autonomous joint combat group intervention by air or sea”. Related to that were projects to acquire A400M transport aircraft (Continent) and landing ships (Millennium), the A400M like the discarded C-160s being able to transport an Oryx with a minimum of disassembly. Neither project was funded, and underfunding has meanwhile reduced the air force to one operational Hercules and a handful of operational Oryx helicopters, the rest grounded for lack of spares or funding for maintenance.

Could we do better in future? Given adequate funding, yes. There is nothing wrong with our people, and we have carried out such operations in the past, albeit less risky ones or on a smaller scale. In 1998, for instance, an SA Air Force C-130 Hercules and a Boeing 707 flew several sorties to Kamina airbase in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to extract a Tanzanian army battalion before rebel forces could overrun the base (Operation Centavo), an SA Air Force Boeing evacuated US diplomats from Kinshasa (Operation Okhozi), and a Boeing evacuated injured US embassy staff from Nairobi after the bomb attack on the embassy.

One can also consider operations broadly similar in the capabilities they required:

● The deployment of rescue teams to Algeria in a Boeing 707 in 2003 after an earthquake (Operation Inkunzi) and the deployment of a rescue team to Iran in the same year after an earthquake there.

● The deployment of the combat support ship SAS Drakensberg to West African waters in 2011 on standby to evacuate South Africans and others from Ivory Coast if necessary (Operation Ikhala).

● The deployment of security personnel and a traffic control radar to Juba in South Sudan in 2011 for the independence ceremonies there (Operation Dawn).

● The flood rescue in Mozambique in 2000, which required the deployment of helicopters and transport aircraft and operations from ad hoc facilities as well as co-ordinating the operations of aircraft deployed by other countries.

● Various smaller-scale flood rescue operations in Mozambique, Madagascar and Malawi; election support in Mozambique in 1999 (Operation Lynx).

● Election support in the DRC in 2006 (Operation Solitaire I-IV, involving a large number of SA Air Force and chartered aircraft).

● The short notice deployment of additional troops to the Comoros in 2006 (Operation Triton IV).

Consider now the two more recent cases.

● Palma: Assuming that we were maintaining our Hercules and Oryx fleets properly, a number of Oryx could have self-deployed from Air Force Base Hoedspruit to Pemba in Mozambique using ferry tanks (ferry range 2,000km, distance to Pemba about 1,610km), while the Hercules could have flown Special Forces teams, ground support teams and fuel to Pemba.

From there the Oryx could have flown Special Forces teams to Palma to extract South Africans — and others — either flying them back to Pemba or to the airport at the Afungi gas plant, where the Hercules could collect them for the flight to SA. The Oryx would then return to Pemba, refit the ferry tanks and fly back to Hoedspruit.

If necessary, the Oryx could have been supported by Rooivalk attack helicopters. Should quick extraction not have been possible, SAS Drakensberg could have deployed to offshore Palma and used two or three Oryx and light landing craft to deploy an extraction force and evacuate the civilians.

Of course had we acquired the A400Ms the Oryx could have been loaded into them and flown to Pemba, saving time, reducing wear on the helicopters and reducing risk. Had we acquired landing ships, one of them would have been ideal for extraction over the beach should quick extraction not be possible, and it would also have extensive medical facilities.

● Khartoum: Much more challenging given the distances involved, but the right transport aircraft could have flown Oryx helicopters to Abbeit in South Sudan or Tesseney in Eritrea, the diplomatic situation permitting, accompanied by special forces teams and ground support teams. From there to Khartoum would be 420km or 435km respectively, which would mean either being sure of fuel near Khartoum, refuelling at a remote site en route, or flying with ferry tanks and discarding them in Khartoum to free space for the evacuees.

Even Port Sudan might serve as the launch base, though then the distance is extreme at about 665km, probably requiring establishment of a refuelling site along the route. Complex and risky, but not impossible, and the future may demand just such capabilities. Assuming a secure airport near Khartoum, two or three Hercules could have flown there with a protection team and medics to evacuate South Africans. Again, of course, much simpler given A400Ms — no charter of aircraft required.

The bottom line is that the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) could do a lot more if we would give it the funds to maintain its equipment. And it could do a lot more if we gave it the necessary equipment to close capability gaps, for instance longrange/heavy-lift transport aircraft.

It is not just about deterrence and fighting wars; situations such as in Mozambique and Sudan will recur and there will also be natural disasters or disasters such as the collapse of the church building in Nigeria that require a response that is best handled by the military.

We could do better than at present just by funding maintenance, and we could do a lot better by equipping the SANDF properly for the tasks we expect it to tackle.