SA military force in Congo lacks proper backup, former general says

When SA soon deploys its full contingent of soldiers as part of a Southern African regional force (SamiDRC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) it does so with its military equipment at its lowest ebb yet in one of the most volatile warzones of Africa.

Apart from having almost no serviceable helicopters and transport aircraft available to provide air cover and evacuation support, it will have to depend on the DRC’s own limited air support when it takes on rebel groups armed to the teeth in the east of the country.

A week ago the South Africans who are still part of the UN peacekeeping and force intervention brigade had a taste of what is to come when ground forces of the M23 rebels fired at an Oryx helicopter from the SA Air Force.

The helicopter was hit at least 43 times by suspected AK-47 and PK machine gun fire, which ripped through the helicopter and its main rotors. One shot slammed into the joystick and the finger of the commander of the Oryx, Maj Jannie Augustyn. Another shot from below peppered his leg with shrapnel.

A medical orderly in the back, who was taking care of a patient whom the crew had just evacuated, was hit by a bullet that came through the floor and hit him under his body armour. In “normal ” operational circumstances the Oryx should have had the protection of one of the Rooivalk attack helicopters deployed by the air force to the DRC a few years ago. Except that the Rooivalks have not flown in many months due to technical issues and the expiry of the crew ’ s currency certification.

Military analysts described the deployment of soldiers in the DRC without air support as “idiotic ”. One former general told Business Day that a battalion of 5,000 is the minimum requirement for a force to have an impact. They should be well equipped with mortars and heavy machine guns.

“A crucial issue in the DRC is that you have to be mobile to remain on the front foot. You have to attack the rebels rather than to wait until they attack. You cannot always drive to launch an attack because the roads are terrible. Without helicopters to assist with trooping — such as the Oryx or Russian Mi17s — you will be stuck.

“You would also need attack or armed helicopters for fire support to troops on the ground, as well as for hot extraction of troops when things go haywire. Without that Sami DRC [the Southern African Development Community mission in the DRC] will not achieve anything more than the UN forces did.”

Tens of thousands of refugees started fleeing towards Goma in the past week after heavy fighting at Sake, about 23km northwest of Goma, capital of North Kivu.

While Congolese government forces (FARDC), aided by Romanian private military instructors, and UN forces had some success, the advance of M23, reportedly backed by Rwanda, towards Goma is far from over. Ironically, among the armaments confiscated by the FARDC was a PK machine gun similar to the one used to fire on the Oryx.

The Tutsi-dominated M23 distinguished itself as a militia of note when it took control of Goma despite the presence of thousands of UN peacekeepers 10 years ago.

The group emerged in April 2012 when former members of the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), another rebel group, mutinied against the DRC government. The name “M23” came from the March 23 2009 peace agreement that the government had signed with the CNDP, which the mutineers felt was not fully implemented.

The UN’s force intervention brigade (FIB) was then established with a much more aggressive mandate. SA Rooivalk helicopters played a pivotal role in defeating M23 a year later. The UN was also criticised for applying too much force and the FIB’s operations were toned down.

M23 said in a statement last week it has no intention to capture Goma despite a few rockets landing on the outskirts of the city, which has more than amillion inhabitants and hosts thousands of refugees constantly on the move from the latest violence.

According to the statement, it will defend the constant attacks on its forces and the civilian population by the Congolese army.

“The M23 remains committed to a peaceful solution and is prepared to withdraw from forward positions if a monitored ceasefire and a credible verification mechanism is in place.”

Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the UN under-secretary-general for peace operations, said on a visit to the province last week that the escalating violence in the area raises the risk of a regional explosion.

M23 strengthened its foothold after the hasty departure of an East African force in December. The force was sent packing after about six months and after Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi accused it of siding with the rebels.

The SADC agreed in 2023 to deploy its own force in the DRC to replace the East Africans. The Sami DRC was supposed to take over in December. Financial uncertainty and logistic shortages seemed to have hampered the full deployment of the brigade of 5,000 troops.

SA, Malawi and Tanzania will be the main troop-contributing countries with air troop transport promised by Angola. A total of $580m per year is needed to maintain a brigade of 5,000 and contributions will have to come from SADC countries’ own coffers. Kinshasa released $60m in November towards the force’s funding, with Botswana committing to almost $40m.

However, SA, Angola, Botswana, the DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique are still committed to the intervention force in Mozambique until July 2024.

Sami DRC said that it started its operations in the DRC on December 15 2023, though President Cyril Ramaphosa has not informed parliament about the soldiers, the cost and the duration of its commitment in that country.

A status of forces agreement was signed by SADC countries towards the end of last year. The agreement provides the legal framework for an offensive mandate for a year with the option to renew it. But the concept of operations has not yet been ratified. This will determine the composition of the force and the type of operations it will execute.

Yet, Sami DRC’s first few hundred soldiers and their equipment started arriving in Goma in December and January, as did Maj-Gen Monwabisi Dyakopu from SA, the force commander.

Due to increasing volatility in the area, SA’s presence became noticeable when a convoy patrolled the road between Sake and Goma. The convoy consisted of SA-manufactured Mamba armoured personnel carriers designed for internal security purposes, a Mfezi armoured ambulance, and the latest addition to the army’s firepower, the Goat. The gun-on-a-truck consists of an anti-aircraft gun mounted on a Toyota Land Cruiser. It was first used operationally in Mozambique with the Southern African Development Community Mission in Mozambique (Samim) deployment.

The presence of the Goat is also an indication that the first nearly 200 SANDF soldiers in the DRC include special forces.

YOU CANNOT DRIVE TO LAUNCH AN ATTACK BECAUSE THE ROADS ARE TERRIBLE ... WITHOUT HELICOPTERS YOU WILL BE STUCK

FINANCIAL UNCERTAINTY AND LOGISTIC SHORTAGES SEEMED TO HAVE HAMPERED THE FULL DEPLOYMENT OF THE BRIGADE