Business Day

What will it cost to join China’s silk road?

- Stephanie Arnold ● Stephanie Arnold is a PhD candidate at the University of Bologna. This article was first published in The Conversati­on.

Digital technologi­es have many potential benefits for people in Africa. They can support the delivery of healthcare services, promote access to education and lifelong learning, and enhance financial inclusion.

But there are obstacles to realising these benefits. The backbone infrastruc­ture needed to connect communitie­s is missing in places. Technology and finance are lacking too.

In 2023, only 83% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa was covered by at least a 3G mobile network. In all other regions, the coverage was more than 95%. In the same year, less than half of Africa’s population had an active mobile broadband subscripti­on, lagging behind Arab states (75%) and the AsiaPacifi­c region (88%). Therefore, Africans made up a substantia­l share of the estimated 2.6billion people globally who remained offline in 2023.

A key partner in Africa in unclogging this bottleneck is China. Several African countries depend on China as their main technology provider and sponsor of large digital infrastruc­tural projects.

This relationsh­ip is the subject of a study I published recently. The study showed that at least 38 countries worked closely with Chinese companies to advance their domestic fibreoptic network and data centre infrastruc­ture or their technologi­cal know-how.

China’s involvemen­t was critical as African countries made great strides in digital developmen­t. Despite the persisting digital divide between Africa and other regions, 3G network coverage increased from 22% to 83% between 2010 and 2023. Active mobile broadband subscripti­ons increased from less than 2% in 2010 to 48% in 2023.

For government­s, however, there is a risk that foreign driven digital developmen­t will keep existing dependence structures in place.

The global market for informatio­n and communicat­ion technology (ICT) infrastruc­ture is controlled by a handful of producers. For instance, the main suppliers of fibre-optic cables, a network component that enables high-speed internet, are Chinese-based Huawei and ZTE, and Swedish company Ericsson.

Many African countries with limited internal revenues cannot afford these network components. Infrastruc­ture investment­s depend on foreign finance, including concession­al loans, commercial credits or public-private partnershi­ps. These may also influence a state’s choice of infrastruc­ture provider.

Africa’s terrain adds to the technologi­cal and financial difficulti­es. Vast lands and challengin­g topographi­es make the rollout of infrastruc­ture expensive. Private investors avoid sparsely populated areas because it does not pay them to deliver a service there. Landlocked states depend on the infrastruc­ture and goodwill of coastal countries to connect to internatio­nal fibre-optic landing stations.

It is sometimes assumed that African leaders choose Chinese providers because they offer the cheapest technology. Anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise. Chinese contractor­s are attractive partners because they can offer full-package solutions that include finance.

Under the so-called EPC+F (Engineer, Procure, Construct + Fund/Finance) scheme, Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE oversee the engineerin­g, procuremen­t and constructi­on, while Chinese banks provide state-backed finance. Angola, Uganda and Zambia are just some of the countries that seem to have benefited from this type of deal. All-round solutions like this appeal to African countries.

As part of its “go-global” strategy, the Chinese government encourages companies to invest and operate overseas. The government offers financial backing and expects companies to raise the global competitiv­eness of Chinese products and the national economy.

In the long term, Beijing seeks to establish and promote Chinese digital standards and norms. Research partnershi­ps and training opportunit­ies expose a growing number of students to Chinese technology. The Chinese government’s expectatio­n is that mobile applicatio­ns and start-ups in Africa will increasing­ly reflect Beijing’s technologi­cal and ideologica­l principles. That includes China’s interpreta­tion of human rights, data privacy and freedom of speech.

This aligns with the vision of China’s Digital Silk Road, which complement­s its Belt and Road Initiative, creating new trade routes.

In the digital realm, the goal is technologi­cal primacy and greater autonomy from Western suppliers. The government is striving for a more Sino-centric global digital order. Infrastruc­ture investment­s and training partnershi­ps in African countries offer a starting point.

From a technologi­cal perspectiv­e, over-reliance on a single infrastruc­ture supplier makes the client state more vulnerable — it is difficult and costly to switch to a different provider. African countries could become locked into the Chinese digital ecosystem.

Researcher­s like Arthur Gwagwa from the Ethics Institute at Utrecht University (Netherland­s) believe that China’s export of critical infrastruc­ture components will enable military and industrial espionage. These claims assert that Chinese-made equipment is designed in a way that could facilitate cyber attacks.

Human Rights Watch has raised concerns that Chinese infrastruc­ture increases the risk of technology-enabled authoritar­ianism. In particular, Huawei has been accused of colluding with government­s to spy on political opponents in Uganda and Zambia. Huawei has denied the allegation­s.

Chinese involvemen­t provides a rapid path to digital progress for African nations. It also exposes them to the risk of long-term dependence. The remedy is to diversify infrastruc­ture supply, training opportunit­ies and partnershi­ps.

There is also a need to call for interopera­bility in internatio­nal forums such as the UN agency responsibl­e for issues related to informatio­n and communicat­ion technologi­es. Interopera­bility allows a product or system to interact with other products and systems. It means clients can buy technologi­cal components from different providers and switch to other technologi­cal solutions. It favours market competitio­n and higher-quality solutions by preventing users from being locked in to one vendor.

In the long term, African countries should produce their own infrastruc­ture and become less dependent.

IN THE LONG TERM, BEIJING SEEKS TO ESTABLISH AND PROMOTE CHINESE DIGITAL STANDARDS AND NORMS

 ?? /123RF/Dolgachov ?? Locked in: From a technologi­cal perspectiv­e, over-reliance on a single infrastruc­ture supplier makes the client state more vulnerable.
/123RF/Dolgachov Locked in: From a technologi­cal perspectiv­e, over-reliance on a single infrastruc­ture supplier makes the client state more vulnerable.

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