Where it all went wrong in semi-final
THERE will be a South African at the World Cup final this Sunday at the MCG, only he will be wearing the black-and-blue jumper of New Zealand. Johannesburgborn Grant Elliott smashed Dale Steyn for six off the penultimate ball of a thrilling contest here at Eden Park.
For the boys in green, who were emotionally broken after a match that had equal quantities of magic and mistakes, they will board the next flight available for OR Tambo and over the 30 hours it takes to get home they will have sufficient time to contemplate how they let the opportunity of a lifetime slip through their fingers.
Of course the rain and Duckworth/Lewis calculations played their part, with South Africa’s momentum being halted just at the point when AB de Villiers and Faf du Plessis were ready to put their foot firmly on the accelerator. Then there was the fact that only 16 runs were added to South Africa’s total despite the loss of seven overs due to rain.
But when they revisit this game in the cold light of day, when all the emotions have been worked through, they will realise that crucial errors were made at vital junctures. Neither captain De Villiers nor coach Russell Domingo wanted to single out any individuals for the defeat, but Vernon Philander’s selection was a quandary.
Philander does have the pedigree, but the fact that he has struggled with a hamstring injury throughout this World Cup, and considering his replacement Kyle Abbott’s impressive form in his absence, the gamble to play the Cape Cobras seamer did not reap dividends.
It was not that Philander was overly expensive – he conceded 52 runs in his eight overs at 6.50 per over – but it was more that the fact that he lacked the penetration and incisiveness that Abbott had provided with the new ball.
Likewise De Villiers’s tactical acumen left a lot to be desired at times. He is a hugely inspirational leader, often taking his team by the collar and dragging them with him to the point of victory, but sometimes a bit more subtlety and forward thinking is required from South Africa’s captain.
His counterpart, Brendon McCullum, had showed the way earlier by launching a full-on attacking onslaught during the first 10 overs with the ball. McCullum knew that Trent Boult and Tim Southee were his chief attacking weapons and he backed them up with his field placings.
At times McCullum had as much as a ring of five slips waiting for an edge – and particularly on the short straight boundaries at Eden Park – the catchers are far more effective than a regulation third man.
De Villiers, instead, operated in a reactive way. Often he carried only the two regulation slips at the start of the innings. Dale Steyn required at least a gully when he came charging in with the new ball, and this was best illustrated when Martin Guptill edged the first ball of the New Zealand innings in that region. De Villiers put in a gully the next ball.
However, even with the D/L calculations and De Villiers’s leadership inefficiencies, South Africa would still have backed themselves to defend such a vast total.
The bowlers were obviously planning to deliver the short ball to McCullum, but this plan backfired as the Kiwi captain feasted on the barrage of short balls delivered to him.
The strategy of bowling short continued and particularly Philander struggled 0. On many occasions, the South African bowlers would build up the pressure with a couple of dot-balls, only to release the pressure with a long-hop that to New Zealand’s credit was despatched for a boundary to spoil the over.
South Africa’s fielding, particularly the catching, at crucial times let the Proteas down. De Villiers’s missed run-out opportunity and the collision between JP Duminy and Farhaan Berhadien in going for a catch also negated any advantage the Proteas’ might have had.
As much as you need heroes to win the big games, the attention to detail in executing the basics is also vital in a crunch match and unfortunately South Africa let themselves down badly in the most important match of their lives.