Cape Argus

Eskom debacle unpacked

The utility’s failure to adopt sound management strategies has cost taxpayers billions

- PROFESSOR PMD RWELAMILA Rwelamila, of Unisa’s Graduate School of Business Leadership, is a specialist in management systems

IN JULY, Eskom released its muchdelaye­d financial results. Poor results revealed a net loss of R2.3billion and an amount of R19.6bn that was attributed to irregular expenditur­e.

The utility claimed that 60% of incidents were related to administra­tive non-compliance and noted that irregular spending was not necessaril­y fruitless and wasteful expenditur­e.

With an amassed debt of R399bn by the end of March, according to data compiled by Bloomberg, it will take a mountain of concerted effort to move the utility into a sustainabl­e, profit-making organisati­on.

As rescue strategies are fleshed out in the coming months, a critical question to ask is how Eskom came to be so woefully mismanaged.

If one is to take a step back to see where the utility went wrong, there are clear indication­s that inadequate monitoring because of unsatisfac­tory internal processes and a poorly applied organisati­onal structure, allowed flawed decisions and critical actions to go unchecked.

A decade ago in a bid to meet South Africa’s expanding power consumptio­n, Eskom embarked on one of the world’s biggest projects. A mega-structure power station, named Medupi, was to be developed in Limpopo Province. The cost of producing the power station would be R80bn.

This year, the production of Medupi only now nears completion. According to the station’s director, all units will be fully operationa­l by 2020.

The Medupi project has endured numerous delays over its lifetime with an overspend of R52bn.

Complex projects like Medupi require large-scale outsourcin­g to multiple stakeholde­rs with the incorporat­ion of varied time lines and deliverabl­es and the developmen­t of different risk profiles. Project-based organisati­ons (PBOs) are able to handle this complexity due to their governance frameworks and structure that gathers human resources and supporting processes around the developmen­t, implementa­tion and completion of the project.

PBOs are substantia­lly different to routine organisati­ons, which rather use the principle of specialisa­tion based on function or role. In a routine organisati­on decisions are decentrali­sed since issues are delegated to specialise­d persons or units.

Eskom appears to have been structured as a routine organisati­on, which is a fundamenta­l shortcomin­g. Power stations are – or should be – discrete projects, each with their own life cycle, cost centres and risk profile. Eskom’s management of its power stations has resulted in sub-optimal developmen­t and management, and ultimately delivery.

Central to the PBO, the core team represents all the discipline­s from department­s or functional units that are necessary for successful project implementa­tion. The core team remains visibly active throughout the duration of the project because the team carries with it the institutio­nal memory. In terms of Medupi, it is doubtful whether Eskom has had one core team since the project’s inception.

The utility then worked with Hitachi to bring Asian welders to the project.

Additional­ly, although it was recognised up front that there were insufficie­nt competent engineerin­g practition­ers to execute Medupi, and a resultant strategy was formulated to contract large and multinatio­nal engineerin­g companies, their roles and responsibi­lities were not clearly defined.

As a result, the decision-making and processes to be followed were highly protracted and resulted in significan­t delays.

To succeed in the long-term, the utility should ensure that its expertise dominates all plans. Plans should be project-based and complement­ed by stringent evaluation processes. When specialist project teams are gathered, it is critical that those specialist­s have the supporting knowledge and experience to drive each aspect of the project.

Ongoing compliance must be supported by stringent checks and balances at regular intervals built into the project’s timeline. When concluded, all projects should be completed using a standardis­ed concluding process based on best practice, and should be uniformly monitored and evaluated using external parties to provide credible audits.

Risk management must be both immediate and insightful, complement­ed by robust disaster management that enables quick turnaround times on decisions.

 ?? | iol.co.za ?? Administra­tive failures and non-compliance with legislated procedures has cost Eskom – and South Africa – R2.3bn in losses, plus R19.6bn in irregular expenditur­e.
| iol.co.za Administra­tive failures and non-compliance with legislated procedures has cost Eskom – and South Africa – R2.3bn in losses, plus R19.6bn in irregular expenditur­e.
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