Free movement of people is AU ambition, but what’s standing in its way?
THE AFRICAN integration project took several major steps this year. One of them was the AU’s adoption of a protocol on the free movement of people. The move has been widely welcomed.
The free movement of Africans between African countries could unquestionably facilitate growth. It would encourage trade, tourism and investment. And it would allow students to study in other African countries and Africans with suitable skills to find rewarding jobs.
Opening borders has been shown to have positive affects in other parts of the world. For example, the growth of many Asian countries is attributable to the liberalising of inter-Asian relationships including through an agreement between Southeast Asian countries that promotes freer mobility for workers.
But there are major obstacles that need to be cleared before the ambition of free movement across Africa can be achieved.
The biggest is posed by concerns raised by the continent’s major economies like South Africa and countries in North Africa where unemployment rates are high and there are fears that increased immigration could contribute to increasing domestic tension.
There are also concerns that, if not well managed, the free movement could worsen brain drain for poorer countries.
Only about 30 countries have signed the protocol because of these and other concerns. This is lower than the 44 that signed the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.
The AU recognises the lack of readiness of many domestic and continental arrangements that would allow the immediate full implementation of the protocol. Some countries have population registration and passport systems that lack integrity, some have weak border management and some have poor security intelligence.
Implementation has therefore been divided into three phases: the right of entry and abolition of visa requirements, the right of residence and the right of establishment, which includes investment and setting up a business. Phases 2 and 3 will not be implemented until the implementation of the first phase has been reviewed.
But many countries are reluctant to enter phase 1 without some conditions being met.
The key concerns are around the absence of inter-state co-operation measures on immigration, border management, education systems and mutual recognition of qualifications, common standards for working conditions, and access to or portability of social security benefits.
South Africa, in particular, has issues with a range of the requirements.
A Department of Home Affairs memo identifies 12 preconditions for the implementation of the protocol. Some of them are unrealistically idealistic such as the condition of “peace, security and stability on the continent”.
But about half the preconditions seem reasonable. They include civil registration systems and bilateral return agreements.
Civil registration systems are critical; South Africa is one of the few countries on the continent that has a comprehensive ID system.
The position of the Department of Home Affairs is cautious. It advises against adopting phase 1 – the right of entry and abolition of visas for fellow Africans – until certain conditions are met.
It is imperative, it argues, to first improve population registration systems, establish integrated border management systems, enter into bilateral return agreements and strengthen law enforcement at national level across Africa.
South Africa, they argue, is not alone in adopting the stance. Countries with similar concerns include many North African countries.
Like South Africa, most north African countries have relatively high unemployment rates and fear a backlash from citizens.
In situations of unemployment and inequality, disadvantaged citizens can end up blaming “foreigners” for their predicament, resulting in tension that can lead to xenophobia.
It’s unlikely that the protocol will make progress unless fears are addressed.
How can the AU get the laggards on board? One suggestion is that the AU sets up a technical committee to address the issues raised.
A stronger African co-ordination around population registration, leading ultimately to an African ID or an African standard ID, would be a neat way to address the technical issues.
The technical committee could focus first on the obstacles to implementing phase 1. Once that hurdle is crossed it could move on to phase 2, and eventually to phase 3.
The technical committee must be well resourced with officials and experts to achieve its objectives and to ensure that the richer countries believe the committee will make progress with or without them. They will not want to be left out.
This article is based on a talk given by the author at the Post-Tana Forum in Gaborone.
Hirsch is a professor and director of The Nelson Mandela School of Public Governance, UCT.