Why should the EFF join the ANC?
In October 1818, the interminable antagonism between the senior chief of Xhosaland, Ngqika, and his uncle Ndlambe, erupted in a battle of epic proportions that went down in Xhosa tradition as the battle of Amalinda.
The rivalry between the EFF and the ANC some 200 years later – the strife that cut across an entire nation – was ignited by a dispute between the two parties.
The exceptional battle that has been waged by expelled president of the ANC Youth League, Julius Malema, has been commendable.
The ferocity with which he has fought over the past five years is reminiscent of the fury of Ndlambe as he defeated Ngqika and inflicted death upon 500 of his followers.
The intensity might be the same on the side of the EFF as that of the forces of Ndlambe.
In a country that has been ravaged by the scourge of poverty for centuries, a battle between the two parties may only yield destruction.
History has widely proven that the British colonisers were the true victors of the war, as the conflict between the two parties opened a window for them to meddle.
After Ngqika had lost the war, he petitioned the help of the British (in a manner that is similar to when the EFF collaborated with the DA to vote the ANC out of the metros).
To cut a long story short that collaboration ultimately led to the amaXhosa losing the rights to their most productive arable land between the Keiskamma and Fish rivers.
That annexation of land ultimately led to the once-mighty Xhosa nation being under British rule.
The South African polity over the past five years is unimaginable without the red berets of the EFF.
For a fringe group with only 6% of the electorate, they have managed to [affect] government policy direction and have got tongues wagging.
This they have done with the issue of land, which was seen as a peripheral discussion in some parties and [is] now at the centre of political discussions from parliament to beer halls in the townships.
As much as that is the case, the electoral prospects of the ANC have greatly improved since the election of Cyril Ramaphosa at Nasrec, which ultimately led to the resignation of former president Jacob Zuma a few months later.
At the peak of the Zuma scandals such as Nkandla, the ANC recorded a national vote of 51% at the 2016 local government elections, a fall from 62% in the 2014 national elections.
The latest polls (Ipsos) have placed the ANC at about 61%, with the EFF getting about 10% of the votes.
After the May 8 general elec- tions, the only time the EFF will have bargaining power and be a factor in South African politics in the immediate future is if the ANC gets less than 50% of the electorate.
This is what happened in the aftermath of the 2016 local government elections.
Only at this time will it be in a position to negotiate, but as things stand, has hit a cul de sac.
The forthcoming elections are important to the future of the EFF (if not more) as they are to the prospects of the ANC.
Malema does not strike me as someone who would be happy to be the commander-in-chief of the opposition benches for another five years.
As much as chief Ngqika wanted to defeat his paternal uncle to the throne, chief Ndlambe, Malema wants to be the president of the country – but he cannot do that with only 10% of the vote.
With the ANC getting closer to the ideological orientation of the EFF, [as] stated in its seven non-negotiable cardinal pillars, the reason for their parallel existence evaporates.
The arguments which were used in the early 1990s for the merger of the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in the ANC can be used with the EFF.
SA needs co-operation to achieve the ideals of the Freedom Charter more than contestation that is not on ideological grounds.
The EFF can be what the ANC Youth League of 1944 was to the ANC and bring them closer to the principles of Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela as they have already been doing from outside the party.
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SA needs co-operation to achieve the ideals of the Freedom Charter