SA’S PANDEMIC PERFORMANCE
The sheer scale of the coronavirus crisis put the cabinet squarely in the spotlight. Some ministers stepped up and shone; others failed dismally ...
As the state loosens its grip on the daily lives of its citizens and life begins returning to “normal”, President Cyril Ramaphosa has a rare chance to evaluate his executive team and determine if it is fit for purpose — because the steepest part of the country’s Covid-19 journey is only just beginning.
This week, the FM collated the views of analysts to compile a report card of how the cabinet performed during Covid-19. The results were, as expected, depressing: on average, the ministers scored a low “D”.
Only one minister — health minister Zweli Mkhize — scored a “B”. Ramaphosa, finance minister Tito Mboweni and justice minister Ronald Lamola were the only leaders to score a “C”. By contrast, three got the outright failing grade of an “F”: transport minister Fikile Mbalula, communications minister Stella Ndabeni-abrahams and defence minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-nqakula.
It’s an assessment which Ramaphosa will surely have done himself, given that his task of rebuilding the economy will be the true test of his mettle. To do so, he’ll have to navigate around the ideologues and economic illiterates in his own party and alliance, alongside a state bureaucracy with a chronic inability to adequately implement policy.
Ramaphosa’s first address to the nation ahead of the lockdown was a moment of sombre patriotism: SA had to be prepared to face a new, invisible enemy — one the world was still learning about.
At the time, and as his global counterparts dithered, he was hailed for his decisiveness in implementing one of the hardest lockdowns in the world. But that goodwill quickly evaporated as a result of the conduct of his cabinet. He was the captain of a ship, failed by his crew.
It is this crew that will now have to man the ship, as Ramaphosa turns towards the economic storm facing SA.
He’s already seeking consensus over the economic recovery plan, currently being discussed by social partners at the National Economic Development & Labour Council.
But, says University of Cape Town professor Anthony Butler, “I suspect Ramaphosa’s consensus-building and pacting approach is not going to bring sufficiently urgent and deep-rooted reform.”
In part, this is because it’s going to be up to his ministers to implement reform — and many of them showed themselves wanting during the lockdown.
It started early: less than a month into the lockdown, pictures emerged of Ndabeni-abrahams’s “lockdown lunch” at the home of a former deputy minister. But just last week Mapisa-nqakula used state resources to usher an ANC delegation into Zimbabwe to meet with Zanu-pf — despite the borders being closed.
Consider also the contradictory messages, bizarre and unnecessary regulations, inconsistency in the application of the rules, and the blatant disregard shown by the political elite (defence force officials smoking on live television during a tobacco sales ban, and the crowd of comrades who turned out for ANC stalwart Andrew Mlangeni’s funeral despite a 50-person limit on gatherings).
Then there’s the police and military brutality that stained SA’S Covid-19 response.
‘Weak leadership laid bare’
It’s been a long, hard six months. But the conduct of Ramaphosa’s cabinet has, for the most part, not been entirely out of the ordinary. If anything, it’s largely characteristic of the ANC in recent years: arrogant and selfish, with a smattering of incompetence — and with few exceptions.
Looking back, Ramaphosa doesn’t seem to regret the lockdown itself, despite its harrowing effect on the economy. The economy was already on a “weak wicket”, he told journalists last week in an engagement with the SA National Editors Forum.
“We had a hard lockdown. Those who did not experienced big infections — the UK, for example,” Ramaphosa said. “They experienced more deaths than we did. We saved lives, many lives … if we did not go on lockdown, many more would have died.”
Butler credits Ramaphosa with “act[ing] rapidly and decisively, when the key failing of many leaders around the world was to delay”.
“He adopted a whole-of-government approach, delegating authority across the executive. Critics may complain with the benefit of hindsight that the lockdown was too heavy or too extended, matters about which we will have to wait for clear evidence in the months and years ahead,” Butler says.
Ramaphosa also noted that he had received messages of support from South Africans across the board for his bold intervention. Indeed, opinion polls conducted a month and even two months into the lockdown indicated widespread support.
But the longer the lockdown lasted, the faster that support diminished.
What began as a moment of pride, a “united nation, responding to a common threat”, as Ramaphosa said at the time, rapidly turned into a frustrated citizenry pitted against political leadership who could barely explain their strange decisions.
“It was almost inevitable that SA’S institutional fragility and weak leadership would be laid bare,” says the Institute for Security Studies’ Judith February.
“Many ministers have not covered themselves in glory, and Ramaphosa himself appears less sure-footed than in March. The
What it means: Ramaphosa allowed his ministers to run their departments without interference, but this exposed those who were incompetent
risk-adjusted strategy, or what has also been referred to as the ‘enhanced risk-adjusted strategy’, seems to be somewhat confused.
“It is as if those whom the ANC relies on for votes now hold the most sway; churches, for instance, were allowed to reopen even as we were told to continue staying home and not to visit family.”
At the same time, there were ministers who shone, such as Mkhize, whom Butler describes as calm, organised, and clearly standing out. Others, in key ministries such as trade & industry, finance and transport, did less well.
DA interim leader John Steenhuisen agrees. While he welcomed Ramaphosa’s inclusive approach — the president had met opposition parties for buy-in at the outset — he says the good that Ramaphosa did was quickly undone by his cabinet.
Steenhuisen refers, for example, to regulations on the sale of cooked foods, open-toed shoes and undergarments, saying support quickly turned to anger against Ramaphosa’s administration.
The EFF, while initially supportive of the lockdown, grew frustrated as the measures were lifted.
Its leader, Julius Malema, has called for a review of all Covid-19-related data, amid concerns that the number of deaths and infections are much higher than the state has recorded. The EFF believes the government manipulated figures to give the impression that SA was winning the battle against Covid.
Ramaphosa last week expressed confidence in the data his administration relied on, even faced with the question of excess deaths reported by the Medical Research Council.
IFP chief whip Narend Singh points to Covid-linked corruption as the low point in the government’s handling of the pandemic.
Ramaphosa’s spokesperson Khusela Diko has taken a leave of absence pending the finalisation of a probe into personal protective equipment contracts allegedly obtained irregularly by her husband.
Freedom Front Plus leader Pieter Groenewald says Ramaphosa’s cabinet made “one mistake after the next” and, overall, there was no “credible communication” from the government, with different messages on the ban on tobacco and alcohol sales.
Exposing the weaknesses
The crisis, unprecedented in itself, revealed much about the workings of the government.
Butler says it exposed weaknesses in the cabinet system and in the presidency.
“The challenge was extreme and unprecedented and a kind of machinery did move into operation — but it was not clearly connected to producers of policy, relevant evidence and scientific advice,” he says.
“This is a problem in many states, especially when contested science meets public policy challenges. Ramaphosa would do well to establish an interface between science and government in the presidency [for example, a chief scientific adviser’s office].”
This poor interface culminated in the rationale for certain actions or decisions not being clearly communicated, inside and outside the government
“This was primarily a communication failure and exposed a lack of policy communication expertise that could cope with economic, behavioural and scientific knowledge,” says Butler.
He believes the handling of the crisis will probably have a negative effect on Ramaphosa’s legacy, due to SA’S economic decline. But he believes Ramaphosa’s political position — in both the ANC and the government — has been strengthened by it.
Susan Booysen, professor emeritus at Wits University and director of research at the Mapungubwe Institute for Strategic Reflection, suggests it may be time for Ramaphosa to overhaul his cabinet. However, she says he’s hamstrung by a “fear of antagonising ANC factions” and being beholden “to dead wood who helped get him into power”.
Amid the crisis, however, polls show that Ramaphosa’s popularity has remained relatively high.
Independent political and economic analyst JP Landman observes that Ramaphosa was elected by the ANC at its 2017 Nasrec conference by a margin of 52% to 48%.
“His position now is certainly much stronger than that. We can argue whether it sits at 80/20 or 70/30, but ... it is stronger than 52/48,” Landman writes on his website.
He also notes that Ramaphosa remains more popular among the public than the party itself. “An opinion poll in February 2020 found that 62% of South Africans thought he was doing a good job, while
55% supported the ANC. No political party will dump a leader who will help them at the polls.”
While his cabinet and state bureaucracy let him down, Ramaphosa, as the commander in chief, shoulders the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of his government.
As Prof Ivor Sarakinsky of the Wits School of Governance observes: “He attempted to lead his motley crew of ministers while allowing them to manage their departments without micro-interventions. This unintentionally exposed those who were unable to perform.”
Analysts and opposition leaders alike rated Ramaphosa’s performance, and scored him a decidedly generous C, on average — a fair performance in handling an unprecedented health crisis.
Minister of co-operative governance & traditional affairs Score: 2.4
Nkosazana “When you Zol” Dlamini Zuma was the face of the government’s response to Covid-19. As the minister responsible under the Disaster Management Act, she had to flesh out the regulations that determined what South Africans could do, who they could see and what they could buy.
It was the prohibition of the sale of alcohol and tobacco products that put her squarely in the firing line of smokers, drinkers and those working in the value chain of those sectors.
She’s drawn mixed reviews from the FM’S panel of analysts.
Calland says Dlamini Zuma deserves credit for the serious-minded approach she has taken to the enormous responsibility that was thrust upon her.
“I would have given her an A but for the fact that her dogmatic, pig-headed approach to the tobacco industry got in the way, arguably, of rational decision-making,” he says. “Though it should not be forgotten that she prevailed in court.”
Fikeni says some of the antipathy towards her was unfair and displayed deep suspicions attributable to the
2017 ANC leadership contest, where she stood against Cyril Ramaphosa.
In Fikeni’s view, some in the media accused Dlamini Zuma of usurping the powers of the president or pushing her agenda. “Despite all these, she seems to have done well in her role even though the legacy weaknesses of municipalities were exposed by the pandemic,” Fikeni says.
Sarakinsky says while Dlamini Zuma’s responsibilities were difficult, she made statements on policy that were only recommendations to the cabinet, while publicly questioning Ramaphosa on the sale of tobacco products as well.
Mathekga takes a very dim view of her performance, specifically citing the debacle around tobacco sales.
“She did a very bad job. The concern around the whole thing was a disaster and people lacked confidence in what her department was doing,” he says.
Booysen adds that Dlamini Zuma abused the state of disaster to further her own ambition and ego.
“She sneaked in an antismoking agenda in the name of combating Covid — and built contrived court cases to try to justify it,” she says. x
Claudi Mailovich