Militants resurgent in Cabo Delgado

Mozambican army flounders as deadline for withdrawal of Sadc forces looms

Militant Islamic insurgents are on the move again in northern Mozambique, having recovered from setbacks inflicted by troops of the Southern African Development Community (Sadc), Mozambique and Rwanda.

Al Sunnah Wal Jamaah have been spreading fear and terror in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique’s northernmost province, since 2021.

The incursions threatened gas fields on the Afungi peninsula near Palma, just south of the border with Tanzania, and violently disrupted local social life.

The incursions were contained by the joint forces, which have since taken the finger off the trigger. The Sadc mission, known as Samim (Sadc Mission in Mozambique), in which South Africa has about 1,500 soldiers, has assumed a more restrained role, but the Mozambique Defence Armed Forces (FADM) has been revealed as inadequate to counter the incursions on its own.

Into this vacuum the insurgents have renewed their southerly movements, this time with more vigour and a new strategy.

Early in January Sadc still boasted that its Combat Team Bravo had achieved 70% of its objectives last year. These were to neutralise, degrade and defeat Al Sunnah Wal Jamaah by dislodging them from their strongholds. Samim also claimed to have incapacitated the militia’s ability to conduct large-scale operations and occupy villages.

Yet by the middle of February the insurgents had advanced all the way across Cabo Delgado, south to the neighbouring Nampula Province, with Samim seemingly unable to halt them. The insurgents were reported to have crossed the EN1, the main highway northwards, into the Memba district in Nampula on February 10 and 14.

In their southward march Mozambican soldiers were ambushed about 20km southwest of

Pemba, the capital of Cabo

Delgado. In this clash, and in others, dozens of

Mozambican soldiers were killed or wounded and their vehicles burnt. This time the militias did not disrupt local communities, unlike previously, when their vicious attacks included decapitations.

Few recent operations have been carried out against the group. Samim says its role is changing from an offensive to a more peacekeeping one until the end of its deployment, which is expected to take place in July.

One military expert says Samim’s deployment is winding down too fast. “The South African National Defence Force conducted its operations very well, considering the challenges of the environment,” the expert tells the FM. “But to achieve lasting success, counterinsurgency operations need to be long and drawn out, and pressure on the insurgents should be maintained.”

Tertius Jacobs, chief analyst of the Focus Group, a risk management company in South Africa and Mozambique, says in the long term Samim’s role against the insurgency may end up being negligible.

“At this stage, it is merely speculative what might happen after Samim withdraws,” he says.

Mozambican President Filipe Nyusi has been holding talks with President Paul Kagame of Rwanda about increasing the latter’s help.

Jacobs says expanding Rwanda’s role to fill the gap left by Samim would come at an “immense economic and political cost” to Mozambique. “On the other hand, the FADM does not appear ready to fill the Samim void,” he says. “It is worth noting that there is talk of Samim considering postponing parts of the withdrawal process.”

Jacobs says the limited impact of the counterinsurgency effort last year was due to intelligence leaks and low morale in the FADM. In addition, he says, the Samim intervention was rushed, poorly resourced and “with an inadequate plan”.

The way the intervention was implemented, and now the manner of the withdrawal, have been a waste of money — and of Sadc lives, says Jacobs.

Mozambique is asking the EU for more weaponry. But rearming the demoralised Mozambican troops with yet more deadly weapons, only to have these captured in rebel attacks, will not be the answer if the Mozambican government makes no effort to address the root causes of the insurgency. The delivery of basic services and health care, as well as the investment of some of the profits from gas in Cabo Delgado, have not improved since 2021. More military hardware also won’t enhance living conditions in Cabo Delgado.

The limited effect of the [intervention] last year was due to intelligence leaks and low morale

Tertius Jacobs