Overhaul the ANC
Some of us have transcended party political and ideological dogma in order to add value within a rapid changing global environment.
Political rhetoric can distort reality and lead to stagnation and infantilism.
The current political mainstream is characterised by deeply entrenched political rhetoric, wailing and myopia.
Instead of addressing real questions facing the country, innovative and creative minds are replaced with mediocrity, contriibuting to the fragility of critical service delivery points and with possible devastating effects on the country's future prospects.
The 2007 ANC elective conference in Polokwane could be viewed as a turning point in the history of the ANC in particular and South Africa in general. The ANC is the ruling party at the moment and its decisions impact on our lives.
Regime change is permissible in a constitutional democracy through constitutional means. There is no point in fuelling tensions around regime change as if is not permissible in our society.
At the moment the balance of forces is not in favour of any grouping that might contemplate to effect regime change through unconstitutional means. But regime change rhetoric could be used by the ruling elite to justify securocratic measures against those perceived to be irritants and delegitimise the genuine demands of the citizens.
In other African states the ruling elite have spearheaded an onslaught against the voice of reason, following regimechange rhetoric. We need to be vigilant.
Divergent views have emerged concerning the future of the ANC post-Polokwane.
One school of thought is that Polokwane was the final nail in the coffin of the ANC.
Another perspective views Polokwane as the start of a political rupture within the fragile structures of the movement.
Across the political spectrum, it's agreed that the conference has made the ANC vul- nerable to opposition parties, as well as self-serving domestic and international agendas. The ANC has changed in an extra-ordinary manner after Polokwane.
Intriguingly, the SACP, Cosatu and the self-proclaimed leftists perceived the Polokwane trajectory as aligned to working class aspirations meant to dislodge the so-called ‘class of 1996’. Like the ‘state capture saga’, ‘tenderpreneur salvo’, ‘the class of 1996 rhetoric’ was not informed by a political concept document. The absence of political guidance in these debates polarised the intra- and extra-political space.
The post Polokwane dispensation brought some hope to certain segments within the alliance that the second phase of the revolution underpinned by radical socio-economic transformation had arrived. That the ‘new phase’ would address deeply embedded socio-economic problems such as poverty, unemployment and inequalities.
Some of us have transcended party political and ideological dogma in order to add value within a rapid-changing global environment.
Political rhetoric can distort reality and lead to stagnation and infantilism.
The current political mainstream is characterised by deeply entrenched political rhetoric, wailing and myopia.
Instead of addressing real questions facing the country, innovative and creative minds are replaced with mediocrity, contributing to the fragility of critical service delivery points and with possible devastating effects on the country's future prospects.
The 2007 ANC elective conference in Polokwane could be viewed as a turning point in the history of the ANC in particular and South Africa in general.
The ANC is the ruling party at the moment and its decisions impact on our lives.
Regime change is permissible in a constitutional democracy through constitutional means. There is no point in fuelling tensions around regime change as if is not permissible in our society.
At the moment the balance of forces is not in favour of any grouping that might contemplate to effect regime change through unconstitutional means. But regime change rhetoric could be used by the ruling elite to justify securocratic measures against those perceived to be irritants and delegitimise the genuine demands of the citizens.
In other African states, the ruling elite have spearheaded an onslaught against the voice of reason, following regimechange rhetoric. We need to be vigilant.
Divergent views have emerged concerning the future of the ANC post-Polokwane.
One school of thought is that Polokwane was the final nail in the coffin of the ANC.
Another perspective views Polokwane as the start of a political rupture within the fragile structures of the movement.
Across the political spectrum, it’s agreed that the conference has made the ANC vulnerable to opposition parties, as well as self-serving domestic and international agendas. The ANC has changed in an extraordinary manner after Polokwane.
Intriguingly, the SACP, Cosatu and the self-proclaimed leftists perceived the Polokwane trajectory as aligned to working class aspirations meant to dislodge the so-called ‘class of 1996’.
Like the “state capture saga”, “tenderpreneur salvo”, ‘the class of 1996 rhetoric was not informed by a political concept document. The absence of political guidance in these debates polarised the intra- and extra-political space.
The post Polokwane dispensation brought some hope to certain segments within the alliance that the second phase of the revolution underpinned by radical socio-economic transformation had arrived. That the “new phase” would address deeply embedded socioeconomic problems such as poverty, unemployment and inequalities.
The post-Polokwane dispensation was also characterised by the throwing of lavish parties that drew throngs from different walks of life. Resources were made available to ensure the success of such events, which were open to the public. Material goods at such events were flaunted.
Trevor Manuel, former finance minister recently said, money is not a problem in South Africa, the problem is the manner in which the money is being used.
The Mangaung elective conference held in 2012 saw the consolidation of a dominant political oligarchy, and further ostracisation of those not 100 percent loyal to the power apex within the Presidency.
The political cleansing process was escalated to get rid of critical minds, who wanted the ANC to adhere to its original agenda.
Mangaung forced Kgalema Montlane to hang up his political gloves.
Zuma supporters, in the majority at the conference, were ordered to not vote for Fikile Mbalula according to ANC veteran Ben Turok’s book, With My Head above the Parapet, An Insider Account of the ANC in Power.
As a result of this instruction Mbalula didn’t make the cut into the ANC NEC.
After he reconciled with Zuma, he made a comeback to the NEC through co-option in terms of an ANC constitutional requirement.
This illustrates the power the President enjoys in the ANC.