Stakes high in the Gambia
Abdul-Jalilu Ateku, a researcher on conflict prevention in West Africa, tells military intervention to remove defeated president Yahya Jammeh from power will come at a high cost to the Gambia and neighbouring states
In a further escalation of the post-election crisis in the tiny West African country, there have been reports that a Nigerian warship has been deployed off the Gambian coast and that a regional military force is being assembled in neighbouring Senegal for possible military intervention.
The events are the clearest signs yet that the regional Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) could act militarily to remove Yahya Jammeh from power. the 2010 run-off elections but refused to step down for the winner, Alassane Ouattara. West African leaders were quick to decide to intervene militarily to remove Gbagbo.
In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, UN peacekeepers had already been deployed to the country because of a conflict that had started in September 2002. Ecowas can intervene militarily through its mediation and security council on the advice of its defence and security commission. But any intervention must be carried out within the UN Charter.
This provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security, provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in chapter one of the charter.
As a member of Ecowas, the Gambia is bound by the decisions of the regional organisation and protocols relating to peace and security. Indeed, the recommendation to establish and deploy the Ecomog [Ecowas Ceasefire Monitoring Group] in Liberia in 1990 was made by a committee chaired by the then Gambian president, Dawda Jawara.
For military intervention, regional leaders can invoke the supplementary protocol on democracy and good governance, which proclaims: “Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means.” Article 45 (1) states: “In the event that democracy is abruptly brought to an end by any means or where there is massive violation of human rights in a member state, Ecowas may impose sanctions on the state concerned.”
The Ecowas mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping and security, known simply as the mechanism, authorises all forms of intervention including the deployment of political and military missions.
West African states can intervene militarily under article 25 of the mechanism in response to conflict between two or several member states and in the event of internal conflict that “threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster; or that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the subregion”. Jammeh will certainly be removed if Ecowas decides to use force. But that will come at a heavy price for the Gambia and neighbouring states.
The regional ramifications in terms of resources to maintain the mission, refugee flows and the destruction and untold hardships that the people will face should not be glossed over.
The use of military force may trigger attacks between his supporters and those of his key opponent and the president-elect, Adama Barrow.
Conflict between political groupings can trigger a civil war that will be difficult to resolve. It may take the form of ethnic cleansing, particularly in view of Jammeh’s long stay in power and the toes his administration might have stepped on. His supporters will be the targets and there would be reprisal attacks. It’s not simply a matter of forcefully removing Jammeh from power. mandate is to forcefully remove Jammeh and it fails then I’m sure there will be a high human toll. This could result in huge displacements internally and refugees would flow into neighbouring states.
But the chances of failure are small if Ecowas intervenes with the tacit support of the UN. It wouldn’t be an easy task but, in the end, Jammeh would be removed at whatever cost. My own view is that more intense mediation is required before the military option is deployed. Other options such as diplomatic sanctions, including severing ties with the Jammeh administration, remain to be pursued. If Ecowas intervenes militarily now to force Jammeh out of office, it may still not get Barrow installed.
If he is installed in another location, Jammeh is likely to get himself sworn into office. If the mission succeeds through military means then the international community would have to begin the process of rebuilding peace.
If Jammeh gets the backing of his security, which may also be supported by civilian groups, then the international community should be prepared to rebuild what’s destroyed. —