Seriti’s indulgence in lapse of time may have cost the truth

IN THREE years, the commission designed to unwrap one of democratic South Africa’s most pungent mysteries had already spent R83.2 million. It’s thought it could plateau out at a final tally of about R100m. Consultants alone cost at least R41.9m, while one forensic auditor pocketed R9.2m.

But none of these sums will quite reach Mount Doom: the total cost of the so-called arms deal.

It’s been guesstimated at about R70bn, but critics say that’s probably a comfortable understatement.

As chairman of the Arms Deal Commission, Judge Willie Seriti, wrapped up the business of the inquiry into the strategic defence procurement packages this week, saying he hoped to deliver his report before the deadline of December 31, the fact is we may never know the truth. This relates not only to the amounts involved, but also to everyone who got paid – and, most importantly, why.

The deal secured 26 Gripen jet fighters, four Super Lynx maritime helicopters, 24 Hawk lead-in fighter trainers, four Valour Class frigates, 30 Agusta A109 light utility helicopters and three Type 209 diesel-electric Heroine Class submarines, with the finance largely coming from England’s Barclays Bank, Société Générale in France, Italy’s Mediocredito Centrale and Commerzbank of Germany.

At least one of the repayment agreements was extended for up to eight years.

It was anticipated there would be extensive colour given to the stand when some Struggle heroes gave evidence. These included for mer president Thabo Mbeki, and ex-cabinet ministers Trevor Manuel, Ronnie Kasrils and Mosiuoa Lekota.

Kasrils was expectedly candid, saying “this was quite a small package. We are talking about equipping an army, a new defence force”.

And this indeed bore reference to the constitution, cited for its clauses around defence.

Other serious contenders on the witness list were air force and navy officials, senior representatives from Treasury and notably Armscor. But while there were moments of high interest – particularly Mbeki getting hot under the collar and the arrival of Shamin “Chippy” Shaik, the SANDF’s chief of acquisitions during the arms deal – it’s inevitable that certain key details will remain unknown.

Lingering frustration that some important potential witnesses never testified also remains. And the inquiry may have benefited from having an apparently damning report – purporting to reveal how one ar ms dealer paid millions through offshore bank accounts and used middlemen to gain political access – allowed as evidence. But Judge Seriti refused.

The resignations of the chairman’s chosen assistant judges Willem van der Merwe and Francis Legodi before the commission even started its business will surely still cast a shadow over its report.

Their decision was preceded by that of senior researcher Mokgale Norman Moabi who billowed in a storm when he accused Judge Seriti of having a “second agenda”.

This clouded the commission’s activities as covert.

Others like law researcher Kate Painting – who travelled overseas with Judge Seriti in search of documentation from foreign investigators looking into ANC officials, among other tasks – also quit.

And while those visits to Britain and Germany were said to offer scant harvest, back at home, claims of nepotism, infighting and Judge Seriti’s fiercely hands-approach to secrecy and the protection of documents created drama.

On paper, the inquiry took a mere two months longer than intended to finish its investigation into claims of bribery and corruption. But that’s only because we might have forgotten it had already been given more time than Zuma anticipated when he somewhat hurriedly announced its establishment in 2011.

Originally allocated a year for its public hearings, its report was expected some six months after that. Instead, many South Africans forgot it was happening at all as it continued in a haze of its own.

Yet there was plenty there, even if it generally failed to make the news.

In particular, the commission was a disappointing arena for primary antagonist Terry CrawfordBrowne, the former banker whose ardent campaigning went as far as the Constitutional Court in his determination to see an inquiry happen. Excitement grew as Zuma’s announcement came just before the court gave judgment, suggesting resistance from the executive was, finally, futile.

In Crawford-Browne’s testimony would seem to lie the rub, as he drew probably the most potent headlines of the three years.

He ought to have collected the emotions of a nation in presenting the allegation that SACP leader and former MK commander Chris Hani was assassinated because of what he knew about ex-defence minister Joe Modise’s role in the arms deal.

These long-running rumours, which may always trouble history, included the opinion that the late Modise had himself been poisoned, this information having been shared by controversial ANC operative Bheki Jacobs, who died of cancer three years before the inquiry began. But it now seems likely that anyone who believed – or hoped – the commission would at last expose the mechanics of the Hani-Modise power axis was wrong.

So too anyone who might have hoped this, in turn, would have led to some greater understanding of what really lay behind the Hani assassination.

The SACP, in particular, has long insisted Hani’s killers, Janusz Walus and Clive Derby-Lewis, were part of a greater agenda, and Crawford-Browne testified about allegations that Walus was linked to British arms manufacturer BAE.

Still, no absolutes were delivered. And in the end, maybe it is Chippy Shaik’s words which will resonate.

“My memory into specific events during this acquisition period may not be correct,” he said, “or I may simply not be in a position to recall… due to the lapse of time.” The indulgence of the lapse of time may hold all Judge Seriti’s power.