End of West as we know it may portend smarter global future
Shift towards new world order must be welcomed — while vigorously thwarting rise of extremist Russian, US populism, argues Gerrit Olivier
CONTRARY to expectations, the post-Cold War world has become a more violent, more dangerous and more unpredictable place.
This ominous trend seriously endangers the liberal international order, as we have known it since World War 2.
We are seeing growing divisions in the traditional Western alliance; hostile anti-West attitudes; extremist populist nationalism in the US (Trumpism), the UK (Brexit) and parts of Western Europe; brutal factional conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria; Putinism in Russia; China’s quest for dominance; Islamic State jihadist terrorism; and North Korea testing nuclear devices with impunity.
The West may end up as the biggest loser, facing daunting challenges as its hegemony of past decades is giving way.
The emergence of Trumpism in America, in particular, has aggravated the situation more than we could imagine.
As stated by The Economist, the American power of deterrence is “no longer alarming to its foes or reassuring to its friends”.
Since World War 2, the US has been the main guarantor of a stable international system, in terms of both economics and power politics.
Trump’s wilful, devastatingly simplistic policies may change all this. His ignorance of the basics of international politics is simply astounding, if not dangerous, reminding one of the Habsburgs, of whom it was said that they had “learned nothing and forgotten nothing”.
Under the American presidency of Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), the notion took hold that a global liberal order was of “vital American interest”. Peace was sought through the rule of law, human rights, democratic governance, multilateralism and alliances — primarily understood in ever-closer international integration.
These concepts, mostly seen in economic terms, formed the basis of the “international society” in which states pursued common interests and values for the sake of peaceful international coexistence.
The Wilsonian peace paradigm served as lodestar for American foreign policy over many decades, rendering the society of nations a relatively peaceful and rules-based configuration. This may yet come to an end. Coming onto the stage is Trump’s rousing credo to “make America great again”, based on dangerously oversimplified — if not atavistic — notions, totally alien to the exceptionalism, innate wisdom and sophistication that made America great during the previous century.
Dollar diplomacy and deal-making were manna from heaven for Trump’s gullible, reactionary followers and saw him into the White House, making way for further American (and Western) decline.
Yet — an important caveat is that America’s relative overweening military and technological supremacy is not in decline.
This may be reassuring in the context of Trumpian populism. But the real danger, given Trump’s mindset and unpredictability, is that he might be tempted to use this supremacy as his last argument as he runs out of options. Military might alone is not a sufficient guarantor for global supremacy and securing, or preventing, the hegemony of the West or East.
Neither is strong enough to monopolise the sway of future world affairs. Emerging nations, particularly Russia, demand a zero-sum approach, pitting the West against the East, overturning the former’s dominance.
Russian President Vladimir Putin dreams about creating a totally new international order in which Russia plays a dominant role reminiscent of the Soviet Union. But this is Walter Mitty daydreaming; Russia will never be a match even for a weakened West.
What is not to be doubted, however, is that the present global peace architecture is floundering.
Western dominance of world affairs is moving to an end.
The universality and legitimacy of its rules and norms can no longer rule supreme. Word politics stands at the beginning of an epoch of vast change.
Given certain conditions, this development should be welcomed. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the European international system expanded to become universal, ignoring non-Western cultures. But the “mono-civilisational” paradigm that ruled international society for decades has lost legitimacy.
German philosopher and historian Oswald Spengler denounced the myopic view of history based solely on Western experience as an “empty figment of one linear history”.
Philosopher of history Arnold Toynbee criticised the “parochialism and impertinence” of the West assuming “egocentric illusions” that the world had evolved around only “one river of civilisation, our own, and . . . all others are either tributary to it or lost in the desert”.
Despite these and other warnings, the illusions and prejudices, said American academic Samuel Huntington, “have blossomed forth in the widespread parochial conceit that the European civilisation of the West is now the universal civilisation”. This is the time for rectification, to render world politics more congruent with realities.
As Henry Kissinger observed, there are no universally accepted rules: “There is the Chinese view, the Islamic view, the Western view and, to some extent, the Russian view. The United Nations’ (supposed to be the apogee of international society) inability to bring consensus on the important issues affecting war and peace, and human rights in particular, is precisely due to EastWest ideological, power-political and cultural cleavages, strikingly evident in the Security Council.”
Learning from history, perhaps a summit of the powerful nations, such as we have seen at the end of each epoch, seems a sensible idea.
At the Congress of Vienna (1815) after the fall of Napoleon, leading nations collectively planned a new, comprehensive architecture to ensure world peace.
After World War 1, the League of Nations was established and, after World War 2, the UN.
But as the once-mighty Soviet empire collapsed, things went wrong when the West put its faith in global hegemony under the protection of the Pax Americana.
Significantly, Chinese President Xi Jinping seems to be supportive of a new, universalist approach to improve peaceful international co-operation. He stated at the 2016 World Economic Forum in Switzerland that “countries should view their own interest in broader context and refrain from pursuing their own interests at the expense of others”.
He also defended globalisation and combating global warming — signalling a greater international role for China.
Particularly significant was his call for the overhaul of the global governance system, which he said was outdated and represented the old Western-centric global order.
This is a very hopeful, wise, and indeed encouraging attitude, particularly coming from China.
Unfortunately, in spite of all the clamouring for change, there is no systematic Eastern global manifesto or code to go by.
What does a non-Western system of international behaviour entail and how does it differ from current practices? The problems we are aware of relate mainly to the global financial architecture, Western human-rights norms and values, and the limits of national sovereignty.
These, as in the cases of China and Russia, are predominantly driven by narrow self-interest.
Apart from these exceptions, most if not all states, West and East, accept and abide by the existing body of international law. This must be legitimised as global.
President Xi’s pronouncements should be seen as a timeous, welcome olive branch in the present East-West conundrum.
World order must be achieved through insight, not chaos.
Trump and Putin seem to choose the reverse.
There is the Chinese view, the Islamic view, the Western view and the Russian view