Hi-tech weapons are levelling the world’s killing fields
New military capabilities are widely accessible to states and non-state actors alike, with far-reaching implications for the future of war and the global order
● The plethora of emerging technologies — artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, nanotechnology, big data, additive manufacturing, automation, machine learning and robotics, among others — is driving a global military revolution which will have a far-reaching impact on the character and the outcome of war.
This is evident not only in how these technologies have been exploited to create a new generation of extremely powerful hi-tech weapons, but in how they have significantly narrowed the military capability gap between small states and non-state actors on the one hand and big and strong states on the other.
The prohibitive costs of developing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal kept most countries outside the small exclusive club of nuclear powers that became the effective underwriters of the post-1945 global order.
The US’s near-monopoly of expensive stealth technologies and precision-guided munitions, which were applied in various weapons systems including fighter-jets, missiles, ground vehicles and ships, ensured its military capability was almost unassailable, thus entrenching its superpower status.
These weapons systems were deployed to devastating effect in the Gulf War of 1991, which was concluded in a few days, and during the so-called Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, which saw Saddam Hussein’s army fail to respond to the US’s overwhelming firepower.
However, the emergence of fourth industrial revolution (4IR) technologies, owing largely to their rapid diffusion and relatively low cost, has democratised military power.
More countries have been able to acquire cuttingedge military technology, which has significantly boosted their military capabilities. No longer can the US or any other great power walk over a smaller power without the latter pushing back — as we are currently seeing in the Russia-Ukraine and the IsraelHamas wars.
For example, the cost of operating long-range and long-endurance surveillance drones has declined drastically from more than $130m (R2.4-trillion) to just $200,000, making them widely accessible to those intending to use them for military purposes.
There have been rapid advancements in strike drone capabilities with the development of the $2m XQ-222 with 600-pound payload, which has a range over two times the traditional F-35 fighter-jet, which costs $90m.
While the US and China dominate the production of these drones, other countries such as Pakistan, Iran,
Turkey, Russia, India and those in the EU have begun producing their own armed drones. Iran targeted drone strikes on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil facility in 2019.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Isil) also used drone strikes, which killed scores of people between 2016 and 2017.
Ukraine has proved adept at deploying drone technology in its war with Russia. It has successfully used drones to attack Russian airfields and airdefence systems.
There is a wide range of AI-powered drones operating in ground, maritime and air domains for defensive and offensive purposes by countries ranging from great powers to small states.
Azerbaijan and Poland are manufacturing cheap military drones with high explosive anti-tank war heads.
Cheap space technology such as cube satellites (CubeSats) has given smaller countries access to space, which had been monopolised by the great powers. More than 70 countries and numerous corporations operate space satellites. This means they are capable of gathering intelligence that can be used in war.
Hypersonic weapons such as boost-glide rockets, cruise missiles and artillery projectiles have also become cheaper and more widespread. In 2022, North Korea claimed to have developed a hypersonic cruise missile, joining countries such as Russia, China and the US.
The 4IR has also seen cyberspace emerge as a domain of war in addition to land, air, sea and space. Small states and non-state actors are in a position to initiate cyberattacks that can harm critical infrastructure, resulting in chaos and even loss of life, which is comparable to actual warfare.
Some states have the capability to use cyber espionage to gather sensitive intelligence from another country for military purposes, while others may engage in disinformation campaigns to influence the political processes and outcomes of a rival state. It is unclear whether cyberattacks constitute acts of war and what the appropriate response should be.
Military power is no longer concentrated in one or a few countries. The 4IR has unleashed new military capabilities that are widely accessible to states and non-state actors alike, with far-reaching implications for the future of war and the global order.
The impact of the 4IR technologies on the operational and tactical dynamics of warfare in all domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber) is something that states and other actors need to think hard about.
What does this mean for the global security architecture in an environment where great powers no longer enjoy unassailable military dominance?
Is it time for the UN Security Council (UNSC), the self-appointed guarantor of global security, to be democratised in the way military power is undergoing rapid democratisation?
The UNSC, based as it is on the monopoly of nuclear power by a few states, is an anachronistic structure incapable of ensuring global peace and security in a rapidly changing environment.
More importantly, what do these developments mean for Africa? As it stands, Africa plays no significant role in the development of these revolutionary technologies reshaping modern warfare, nor in the rules governing their use.
It is therefore critical for Africans to invest in science and technology for defensive purposes. Failure to do so means the continent will remain a playing ground for countries with superior modern tools of warfare.