The ANC’s schizoid duality and the options for SA

In the middle of implementing what it calls its “renewal” process, two distinct ANC personalities emerge. The first is that of a ruling party that has pursued integrity as a strategic and moral goal upon which its reputation as a leader of society will be restored after the battering it has suffered because of revelations at several judicial commissions of inquiry and the reports of Chapter 9 institutions.

The second is that of a ruling party whose NEC decided to submit a list of parliamentary nominees that included people its own integrity management system had recommended should step aside, and whose conduct had been deemed inconsistent with clean government.

Arguably, taking a stance against corruption became flagship ANC policy. However, the party’s decision to include compromised people on its parliamentary list creates a schizoid duality that it will take generations to correct, unless voters are decisive about the kind of government they want.

The degeneration in the quality of ANC leadership from the Nelson Mandela era to the present triggers a set of questions about the ethical trajectory of the governing party. Contrary to the arguments the national executive committee

(NEC) might make to justify its decision to draw up and submit such an integrity challenged party list, it cannot airbrush out the truism that the right reasons to continue wrongdoing do not yield correctness, but rather normalise wrongdoing.

South Africa is in a social values leadership crisis. The values of our leaders are at variance with what our constitution demands.

Ramaphosa’s admission that “the ANC is accused number one in the dock” when it comes to corruption appears to be confirmed by the party’s dwindling political will to bite the proverbial bullet when it comes to graft.

With regard to ethical leadership, the ANC has reached a point of no return. It is clear that in this election it is asking for a political mandate to be different — an alternative self it might well not be committed to living. This is an ethical conundrum of epic proportions.

In his handover speech to former president Thabo Mbeki at the ANC’s Mahikeng conference, Mandela decried the mounting corruption in the country and characterised it as a risk to the moral high ground the ANC then occupied, and which was its distinct social and political capital. This capital has recently been used to liquidate the moral basis for the Israeli occupation of Palestine and call the war in Gaza genocide. Since Mandela’s warning, the ANC has increasingly become a political party merely seeking power, as well as an organisation progressively prioritising the narrow interests of a political elite.

The foregrounding of elite interests instead of delivering on the promise of liberation generated conduct only a judicial commission of inquiry could handle. The supposedly anti-corruption Ramaphosa administration now finds itself in a dilemma. The embattled president has to choose between acquiescing to society’s demands for ethical leadership and losing the support of key personalities in the ANC who have kept his fragile political career going since his marginal 2017 presidential win at Nasrec. Funds are now flowing towards parties that could weaken the ANC’s majority status, and this constitutes a vote of no confidence in the ruling party and evidence of the electorate’s thirst for an alternative to the status quo.

The CR17 funding scandal and the Phala Phala matter have compromised Ramaphosa’s ability to lead any anti-corruption drive. His purported decision not to resign in 2022 has meant his own political survival has become more important than South Africa’s. As a result, the option for most of the leadership is to continue with buying the influence of branches. With about 4,000 wardbased branches, 52 regional structures, nine provincial executive committees and an 80member NEC, purchasing the soul of the ANC can be done for less than $1bn (about R18.75bn). The CR17 files confirm the ANC is for sale, and that the only downside of the deal is reputational risk for the ruling party.

The opposition does not inspire hope. The EFFMK

Party ideological complex might not be able to become a new political animal. It will be a version of ANC-ness, and thus essentially the same species. What is more, non-ANC opposition parties are not free of malfeasance where they govern. The country’s political leadership crisis is more profound than we appreciate.

So what are the options for South Africa? First, the country needs fresh leadership — but not necessarily a new governing party. If the ANC wins an outright majority in the elections, this could be achieved through an internal ANC decision after the poll to deal with corruption decisively.

Second, a government of national unity should be formed if a coalition government is required after the polls. The coalition members should convene a judicial panel to facilitate the decisive implementation of the Zondo commission recommendations and those of other similar bodies.

Third, an economic transformation Codesa must be set up to address socioeconomic grievances, including land restitution.

Fourth, a dispensation that recognises the regional rigidities of South Africa should be considered, which might include introducing firm federal-state features to the constitution. In this regard, the ANC is leading the charge to federate South African politics.